Detecting out-of-context objects using contextual cues

This paper presents an approach to detect out-of-context (OOC) objects in an image. Given an image with a set of objects, our goal is to determine if an object is inconsistent with the scene context and detect the OOC object with a bounding box. In this work, we consider commonly explored contextual relations such as co-occurrence relations, the relative size of an object with respect to other objects, and the position of the object in the scene. We posit that contextual cues are useful to determine object labels for in-context objects and inconsistent context cues are detrimental to determining object labels for out-of-context objects. To realize this hypothesis, we propose a graph contextual reasoning network (GCRN) to detect OOC objects. GCRN consists of two separate graphs to predict object labels based on the contextual cues in the image: 1) a representation graph to learn object features based on the neighboring objects and 2) a context graph to explicitly capture contextual cues from the neighboring objects. GCRN explicitly captures the contextual cues to improve the detection of in-context objects and identify objects that violate contextual relations. In order to evaluate our approach, we create a large-scale dataset by adding OOC object instances to the COCO images. We also evaluate on recent OCD benchmark. Our results show that GCRN outperforms competitive baselines in detecting OOC objects and correctly detecting in-context objects.

iDECODe: In-distribution Equivariance for Conformal Out-of-distribution Detection

Machine learning methods such as deep neural networks (DNNs), despite their success across different domains, are known to often generate incorrect predictions with high confidence on inputs outside their training distribution. The deployment of DNNs in safety-critical domains requires detection of out-of-distribution (OOD) data so that DNNs can abstain from making predictions on those. A number of methods have been recently developed for OOD detection, but there is still room for improvement. We propose the new method iDECODe, leveraging in-distribution equivariance for conformal OOD detection. It relies on a novel base non-conformity measure and a new aggregation method, used in the inductive conformal anomaly detection framework, thereby guaranteeing a bounded false detection rate. We demonstrate the efficacy of iDECODe by experiments on image and audio datasets, obtaining state-of-the-art results. We also show that iDECODe can detect adversarial examples.

Dual-Key Multimodal Backdoors for Visual Question Answering

The success of deep learning has enabled advances in multimodal tasks that require non-trivial fusion of multiple input domains. Although multimodal models have shown potential in many problems, their increased complexity makes them more vulnerable to attacks. A Backdoor (or Trojan) attack is a class of security vulnerability wherein an attacker embeds a malicious secret behavior into a network (e.g. targeted misclassification) that is activated when an attacker-specified trigger is added to an input. In this work, we show that multimodal networks are vulnerable to a novel type of attack that we refer to as Dual-Key Multimodal Backdoors. This attack exploits the complex fusion mechanisms used by state-of-the-art networks to embed backdoors that are both effective and stealthy. Instead of using a single trigger, the proposed attack embeds a trigger in each of the input modalities and activates the malicious behavior only when both the triggers are present. We present an extensive study of multimodal backdoors on the Visual Question Answering (VQA) task with multiple architectures and visual feature backbones. A major challenge in embedding backdoors in VQA models is that most models use visual features extracted from a fixed pretrained object detector. This is challenging for the attacker as the detector can distort or ignore the visual trigger entirely, which leads to models where backdoors are over-reliant on the language trigger. We tackle this problem by proposing a visual trigger optimization strategy designed for pretrained object detectors. Through this method, we create Dual-Key Backdoors with over a 98% attack success rate while only poisoning 1% of the training data. Finally, we release TrojVQA, a large collection of clean and trojan VQA models to enable research in defending against multimodal backdoors.

Trigger Hunting with a Topological Prior for Trojan Detection

Despite their success and popularity, deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable when facing backdoor attacks. This impedes their wider adoption, especially in mission critical applications. This paper tackles the problem of Trojan detection, namely, identifying Trojaned models -- models trained with poisoned data. One popular approach is reverse engineering, i.e., recovering the triggers on a clean image by manipulating the model's prediction. One major challenge of reverse engineering approach is the enormous search space of triggers. To this end, we propose innovative priors such as diversity and topological simplicity to not only increase the chances of finding the appropriate triggers but also improve the quality of the found triggers. Moreover, by encouraging a diverse set of trigger candidates, our method can perform effectively in cases with unknown target labels. We demonstrate that these priors can significantly improve the quality of the recovered triggers, resulting in substantially improved Trojan detection accuracy as validated on both synthetic and publicly available TrojAI benchmarks.

Protein Folding Neural Networks Are Not Robust

Deep neural networks such as AlphaFold and RoseTTAFold predict remarkably accurate structures of proteins compared to other algorithmic approaches. It is known that biologically small perturbations in the protein sequence do not lead to drastic changes in the protein structure. In this paper, we demonstrate that RoseTTAFold does not exhibit such a robustness despite its high accuracy, and biologically small perturbations for some input sequences result in radically different predicted protein structures. This raises the challenge of detecting when these predicted protein structures cannot be trusted. We define the robustness measure for the predicted structure of a protein sequence to be the inverse of the root-mean-square distance (RMSD) in the predicted structure and the structure of its adversarially perturbed sequence. We use adversarial attack methods to create adversarial protein sequences, and show that the RMSD in the predicted protein structure ranges from 0.119\r{A} to 34.162\r{A} when the adversarial perturbations are bounded by 20 units in the BLOSUM62 distance. This demonstrates very high variance in the robustness measure of the predicted structures. We show that the magnitude of the correlation (0.917) between our robustness measure and the RMSD between the predicted structure and the ground truth is high, that is, the predictions with low robustness measure cannot be trusted. This is the first paper demonstrating the susceptibility of RoseTTAFold to adversarial attacks.

Detecting OODs as datapoints with High Uncertainty

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are known to produce incorrect predictions with very high confidence on out-of-distribution inputs (OODs). This limitation is one of the key challenges in the adoption of DNNs in high-assurance systems such as autonomous driving, air traffic management, and medical diagnosis. This challenge has received significant attention recently, and several techniques have been developed to detect inputs where the model's prediction cannot be trusted. These techniques detect OODs as datapoints with either high epistemic uncertainty or high aleatoric uncertainty. We demonstrate the difference in the detection ability of these techniques and propose an ensemble approach for detection of OODs as datapoints with high uncertainty (epistemic or aleatoric). We perform experiments on vision datasets with multiple DNN architectures, achieving state-of-the-art results in most cases.

Online Defense of Trojaned Models using Misattributions

This paper proposes a new approach to detecting neural Trojans on Deep Neural Networks during inference. This approach is based on monitoring the inference of a machine learning model, computing the attribution of the model's decision on different features of the input, and then statistically analyzing these attributions to detect whether an input sample contains the Trojan trigger. The anomalous attributions, aka misattributions, are then accompanied by reverse-engineering of the trigger to evaluate whether the input sample is truly poisoned with a Trojan trigger. We evaluate our approach on several benchmarks, including models trained on MNIST, Fashion MNIST, and German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark, and demonstrate the state of the art detection accuracy.

Are all outliers alike? On Understanding the Diversity of Outliers for Detecting OODs

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are known to produce incorrect predictions with very high confidence on out-of-distribution (OOD) inputs. This limitation is one of the key challenges in the adoption of deep learning models in high-assurance systems such as autonomous driving, air traffic management, and medical diagnosis. This challenge has received significant attention recently, and several techniques have been developed to detect inputs where the model's prediction cannot be trusted. These techniques use different statistical, geometric, or topological signatures. This paper presents a taxonomy of OOD outlier inputs based on their source and nature of uncertainty. We demonstrate how different existing detection approaches fail to detect certain types of outliers. We utilize these insights to develop a novel integrated detection approach that uses multiple attributes corresponding to different types of outliers. Our results include experiments on CIFAR10, SVHN and MNIST as in-distribution data and Imagenet, LSUN, SVHN (for CIFAR10), CIFAR10 (for SVHN), KMNIST, and F-MNIST as OOD data across different DNN architectures such as ResNet34, WideResNet, DenseNet, and LeNet5.

Detecting Trojaned DNNs Using Counterfactual Attributions

We target the problem of detecting Trojans or backdoors in DNNs. Such models behave normally with typical inputs but produce specific incorrect predictions for inputs poisoned with a Trojan trigger. Our approach is based on a novel observation that the trigger behavior depends on a few ghost neurons that activate on trigger pattern and exhibit abnormally higher relative attribution for wrong decisions when activated. Further, these trigger neurons are also active on normal inputs of the target class. Thus, we use counterfactual attributions to localize these ghost neurons from clean inputs and then incrementally excite them to observe changes in the model's accuracy. We use this information for Trojan detection by using a deep set encoder that enables invariance to the number of model classes, architecture, etc. Our approach is implemented in the TrinityAI tool that exploits the synergies between trustworthiness, resilience, and interpretability challenges in deep learning. We evaluate our approach on benchmarks with high diversity in model architectures, triggers, etc. We show consistent gains (+10%) over state-of-the-art methods that rely on the susceptibility of the DNN to specific adversarial attacks, which in turn requires strong assumptions on the nature of the Trojan attack.