LLMs Don't Know Their Own Decision Boundaries: The Unreliability of Self-Generated Counterfactual Explanations

To collaborate effectively with humans, language models must be able to explain their decisions in natural language. We study a specific type of self-explanation: self-generated counterfactual explanations (SCEs), where a model explains its prediction by modifying the input such that it would have predicted a different outcome. We evaluate whether LLMs can produce SCEs that are valid, achieving the intended outcome, and minimal, modifying the input no more than necessary. When asked to generate counterfactuals, we find that LLMs typically produce SCEs that are valid, but far from minimal, offering little insight into their decision-making behaviour. Worryingly, when asked to generate minimal counterfactuals, LLMs typically make excessively small edits that fail to change predictions. The observed validity-minimality trade-off is consistent across several LLMs, datasets, and evaluation settings. Our findings suggest that SCEs are, at best, an ineffective explainability tool and, at worst, can provide misleading insights into model behaviour. Proposals to deploy LLMs in high-stakes settings must consider the impact of unreliable self-explanations on downstream decision-making. Our code is available at https://github.com/HarryMayne/SCEs.

Contextual Trust

Trust is an important aspect of human life. It provides instrumental value in allowing us to collaborate on and defer actions to others, and intrinsic value in our intimate relationships with romantic partners, family, and friends. In this paper I examine the nature of trust from a philosophical perspective. Specifically I propose to view trust as a context-sensitive state in a manner that will be made precise. The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, I make the simple observation that an individual's trust is typically both action- and context-sensitive. Action-sensitivity means that trust may obtain between a given truster and trustee for only certain actions. Context-sensitivity means that trust may obtain between a given truster and trustee, regarding the same action, in some conditions and not others. I also opine about what kinds of things may play the role of the truster, trustee, and action. Second, I advance a theory for the nature of contextual trust. I propose that the answer to "What does it mean for $A$ to trust $B$ to do $X$ in context $C$?" has two conditions. First, $A$ must take $B$'s doing $X$ as a means towards one of $A$'s ends. Second, $A$ must adopt an unquestioning attitude concerning $B$'s doing $X$ in context $C$. This unquestioning attitude is similar to the attitude introduced in Nguyen 2021. Finally, we explore how contextual trust can help us make sense of trust in general non-interpersonal settings, notably that of artificial intelligence (AI) systems. The field of Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) assigns paramount importance to the problem of user trust in opaque computational models, yet does little to give trust diagnostic or even conceptual criteria. I propose that contextual trust is a natural fit for the task by illustrating that model transparency and explainability map nicely into our construction of the contexts $C$.