TrajShield: Trajectory-Level Safety Mediation for Defending Text-to-Video Models Against Jailbreak Attacks

Text-to-Video (T2V) models have demonstrated remarkable capability in generating temporally coherent videos from natural language prompts, yet they also risk producing unsafe content such as violence or explicit material. Existing prompt-level defenses are largely inherited from text-to-image safety and operate on the lexical surface of the input, making them vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that disguise harmful intent through rephrasing or adversarial prompting. Moreover, T2V generation introduces a distinctive challenge overlooked by prior work: temporally emergent risk, where a seemingly benign prompt leads to unsafe content through the generator's temporal extrapolation toward narrative coherence. We propose \method{}, a training-free, inference-time defense framework that reformulates T2V safety as a causal intervention in a temporally structured semantic space. TrajShield handles explicit unsafe prompts, jailbreak attacks, and temporally emergent risks in a unified manner by simulating the implied trajectory of a prompt, localizing the causal origin of potential risk, and applying a minimally invasive rewrite that neutralizes the risk while preserving safety-irrelevant semantics. Experiments on T2VSafetyBench across 14 safety categories and multiple T2V backends demonstrate that TrajShield achieves state-of-the-art defenseive performance while maintaining high semantic fidelity, substantially outperforming existing defenses, with an average ASR reduction of 52.44\%.

Towards Building Non-Fine-Tunable Foundation Models

Open-sourcing foundation models (FMs) enables broad reuse but also exposes model trainers to economic and safety risks from unrestricted downstream fine-tuning. We address this problem by building non-fine-tunable foundation models: models that remain broadly usable in their released form while yielding limited adaptation gains under task-agnostic unauthorized fine-tuning. We propose Private Mask Pre-Training (PMP), a pre-training framework that concentrates representation learning into a sparse subnetwork identified early in training. The binary mask defining this subnetwork is kept private, and only the final dense weights are released. This forces unauthorized fine-tuning without access to the mask to update parameters misaligned with pretraining subspace, inducing an intrinsic mismatch between the fine-tuning objective and the pre-training geometry. We provide theoretical analysis showing that this mismatch destabilizes gradient-based adaptation and bounds fine-tuning gains. Empirical results on large language models demonstrating that PMP preserves base model performance while consistently degrading unauthorized fine-tuning across a wide range of downstream tasks, with the strength of non-fine-tunability controlled by the mask ratio.

VEIL: Jailbreaking Text-to-Video Models via Visual Exploitation from Implicit Language

Jailbreak attacks can circumvent model safety guardrails and reveal critical blind spots. Prior attacks on text-to-video (T2V) models typically add adversarial perturbations to obviously unsafe prompts, which are often easy to detect and defend. In contrast, we show that benign-looking prompts containing rich, implicit cues can induce T2V models to generate semantically unsafe videos that both violate policy and preserve the original (blocked) intent. To realize this, we propose VEIL, a jailbreak framework that leverages T2V models' cross-modal associative patterns via a modular prompt design. Specifically, our prompts combine three components: neutral scene anchors, which provide the surface-level scene description extracted from the blocked intent to maintain plausibility; latent auditory triggers, textual descriptions of innocuous-sounding audio events (e.g., creaking, muffled noises) that exploit learned audio-visual co-occurrence priors to bias the model toward particular unsafe visual concepts; and stylistic modulators, cinematic directives (e.g., camera framing, atmosphere) that amplify and stabilize the latent trigger's effect. We formalize attack generation as a constrained optimization over the above modular prompt space and solve it with a guided search procedure that balances stealth and effectiveness. Extensive experiments over 7 T2V models demonstrate the efficacy of our attack, achieving a 23 percent improvement in average attack success rate in commercial models.