Abstract:Test-time adaptation enables models to adapt to evolving domains. However, balancing the tradeoff between preserving knowledge and adapting to domain shifts remains challenging for model adaptation methods, since adapting to domain shifts can induce forgetting of task-relevant knowledge. To address this problem, we propose FOCUS, a novel frequency-based conditioning approach within a diffusion-driven input-adaptation framework. Utilising learned, spatially adaptive frequency priors, our approach conditions the reverse steps during diffusion-driven denoising to preserve task-relevant semantic information for dense prediction. FOCUS leverages a trained, lightweight, Y-shaped Frequency Prediction Network (Y-FPN) that disentangles high and low frequency information from noisy images. This minimizes the computational costs involved in implementing our approach in a diffusion-driven framework. We train Y-FPN with FrequencyMix, a novel data augmentation method that perturbs the images across diverse frequency bands, which improves the robustness of our approach to diverse corruptions. We demonstrate the effectiveness of FOCUS for semantic segmentation and monocular depth estimation across 15 corruption types and three datasets, achieving state-of-the-art averaged performance. In addition to improving standalone performance, FOCUS complements existing model adaptation methods since we can derive pseudo labels from FOCUS-denoised images for additional supervision. Even under limited, intermittent supervision with the pseudo labels derived from the FOCUS denoised images, we show that FOCUS mitigates catastrophic forgetting for recent model adaptation methods.
Abstract:Physical adversarial attacks in driving scenarios can expose critical vulnerabilities in visual perception models. However, developing such attacks remains challenging due to diverse real-world backgrounds and the requirement for maintaining visual naturality. Building upon this challenge, we reformulate physical adversarial attacks as a one-shot patch-generation problem. Our approach generates adversarial patches through a deep generative model that considers the specific scene context, enabling direct physical deployment in matching environments. The primary challenge lies in simultaneously achieving two objectives: generating adversarial patches that effectively mislead object detection systems while determining contextually appropriate placement within the scene. We propose MAGIC (Mastering Physical Adversarial Generation In Context), a novel framework powered by multi-modal LLM agents to address these challenges. MAGIC automatically understands scene context and orchestrates adversarial patch generation through the synergistic interaction of language and vision capabilities. MAGIC orchestrates three specialized LLM agents: The adv-patch generation agent (GAgent) masters the creation of deceptive patches through strategic prompt engineering for text-to-image models. The adv-patch deployment agent (DAgent) ensures contextual coherence by determining optimal placement strategies based on scene understanding. The self-examination agent (EAgent) completes this trilogy by providing critical oversight and iterative refinement of both processes. We validate our method on both digital and physical level, \ie, nuImage and manually captured real scenes, where both statistical and visual results prove that our MAGIC is powerful and effectively for attacking wide-used object detection systems.
Abstract:Vision-Large-Language-Models (Vision-LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into autonomous driving (AD) systems due to their advanced visual-language reasoning capabilities, targeting the perception, prediction, planning, and control mechanisms. However, Vision-LLMs have demonstrated susceptibilities against various types of adversarial attacks, which would compromise their reliability and safety. To further explore the risk in AD systems and the transferability of practical threats, we propose to leverage typographic attacks against AD systems relying on the decision-making capabilities of Vision-LLMs. Different from the few existing works developing general datasets of typographic attacks, this paper focuses on realistic traffic scenarios where these attacks can be deployed, on their potential effects on the decision-making autonomy, and on the practical ways in which these attacks can be physically presented. To achieve the above goals, we first propose a dataset-agnostic framework for automatically generating false answers that can mislead Vision-LLMs' reasoning. Then, we present a linguistic augmentation scheme that facilitates attacks at image-level and region-level reasoning, and we extend it with attack patterns against multiple reasoning tasks simultaneously. Based on these, we conduct a study on how these attacks can be realized in physical traffic scenarios. Through our empirical study, we evaluate the effectiveness, transferability, and realizability of typographic attacks in traffic scenes. Our findings demonstrate particular harmfulness of the typographic attacks against existing Vision-LLMs (e.g., LLaVA, Qwen-VL, VILA, and Imp), thereby raising community awareness of vulnerabilities when incorporating such models into AD systems. We will release our source code upon acceptance.