Harnessing large-language models to generate private synthetic text

Differentially private (DP) training methods like DP-SGD can protect sensitive training data by ensuring that ML models will not reveal private information. An alternative approach, which this paper studies, is to use a sensitive dataset to generate a new synthetic dataset which is differentially private with respect to the original data. Doing so has several advantages: synthetic data can be reused for other tasks (including for hyper parameter tuning), retained indefinitely, or shared with third parties without sacrificing privacy. However, obtaining DP data is much harder than introducing DP during training. To make it feasible for text, recent work has utilized public data by starting with a pre-trained generative language model and privately finetuning it on sensitive data. This model can be used to sample a DP synthetic dataset. While this strategy seems straightforward, executing it has proven problematic. Previous approaches either show significant performance loss, or have, as we show, critical design flaws. In this paper we demonstrate that a proper training objective along with tuning fewer parameters results in excellent DP synthetic data quality. Our approach is competitive with direct DP-training of downstream classifiers in terms of performance on downstream tasks. We also demonstrate that our DP synthetic data is not only useful for downstream classifier training, but also to tune those same models.

Poisoning Web-Scale Training Datasets is Practical

Deep learning models are often trained on distributed, webscale datasets crawled from the internet. In this paper, we introduce two new dataset poisoning attacks that intentionally introduce malicious examples to a model's performance. Our attacks are immediately practical and could, today, poison 10 popular datasets. Our first attack, split-view poisoning, exploits the mutable nature of internet content to ensure a dataset annotator's initial view of the dataset differs from the view downloaded by subsequent clients. By exploiting specific invalid trust assumptions, we show how we could have poisoned 0.01% of the LAION-400M or COYO-700M datasets for just $60 USD. Our second attack, frontrunning poisoning, targets web-scale datasets that periodically snapshot crowd-sourced content -- such as Wikipedia -- where an attacker only needs a time-limited window to inject malicious examples. In light of both attacks, we notify the maintainers of each affected dataset and recommended several low-overhead defenses.

Tight Auditing of Differentially Private Machine Learning

Auditing mechanisms for differential privacy use probabilistic means to empirically estimate the privacy level of an algorithm. For private machine learning, existing auditing mechanisms are tight: the empirical privacy estimate (nearly) matches the algorithm's provable privacy guarantee. But these auditing techniques suffer from two limitations. First, they only give tight estimates under implausible worst-case assumptions (e.g., a fully adversarial dataset). Second, they require thousands or millions of training runs to produce non-trivial statistical estimates of the privacy leakage. This work addresses both issues. We design an improved auditing scheme that yields tight privacy estimates for natural (not adversarially crafted) datasets -- if the adversary can see all model updates during training. Prior auditing works rely on the same assumption, which is permitted under the standard differential privacy threat model. This threat model is also applicable, e.g., in federated learning settings. Moreover, our auditing scheme requires only two training runs (instead of thousands) to produce tight privacy estimates, by adapting recent advances in tight composition theorems for differential privacy. We demonstrate the utility of our improved auditing schemes by surfacing implementation bugs in private machine learning code that eluded prior auditing techniques.

The Privacy Onion Effect: Memorization is Relative

Machine learning models trained on private datasets have been shown to leak their private data. While recent work has found that the average data point is rarely leaked, the outlier samples are frequently subject to memorization and, consequently, privacy leakage. We demonstrate and analyse an Onion Effect of memorization: removing the "layer" of outlier points that are most vulnerable to a privacy attack exposes a new layer of previously-safe points to the same attack. We perform several experiments to study this effect, and understand why it occurs. The existence of this effect has various consequences. For example, it suggests that proposals to defend against memorization without training with rigorous privacy guarantees are unlikely to be effective. Further, it suggests that privacy-enhancing technologies such as machine unlearning could actually harm the privacy of other users.

Debugging Differential Privacy: A Case Study for Privacy Auditing

Differential Privacy can provide provable privacy guarantees for training data in machine learning. However, the presence of proofs does not preclude the presence of errors. Inspired by recent advances in auditing which have been used for estimating lower bounds on differentially private algorithms, here we show that auditing can also be used to find flaws in (purportedly) differentially private schemes. In this case study, we audit a recent open source implementation of a differentially private deep learning algorithm and find, with 99.99999999% confidence, that the implementation does not satisfy the claimed differential privacy guarantee.

Toward Training at ImageNet Scale with Differential Privacy

Differential privacy (DP) is the de facto standard for training machine learning (ML) models, including neural networks, while ensuring the privacy of individual examples in the training set. Despite a rich literature on how to train ML models with differential privacy, it remains extremely challenging to train real-life, large neural networks with both reasonable accuracy and privacy. We set out to investigate how to do this, using ImageNet image classification as a poster example of an ML task that is very challenging to resolve accurately with DP right now. This paper shares initial lessons from our effort, in the hope that it will inspire and inform other researchers to explore DP training at scale. We show approaches that help make DP training faster, as well as model types and settings of the training process that tend to work better in the DP setting. Combined, the methods we discuss let us train a Resnet-18 with DP to $47.9\%$ accuracy and privacy parameters $\epsilon = 10, \delta = 10^{-6}$. This is a significant improvement over "naive" DP training of ImageNet models, but a far cry from the $75\%$ accuracy that can be obtained by the same network without privacy. The model we use was pretrained on the Places365 data set as a starting point. We share our code at https://github.com/google-research/dp-imagenet, calling for others to build upon this new baseline to further improve DP at scale.

Membership Inference Attacks From First Principles

A membership inference attack allows an adversary to query a trained machine learning model to predict whether or not a particular example was contained in the model's training dataset. These attacks are currently evaluated using average-case "accuracy" metrics that fail to characterize whether the attack can confidently identify any members of the training set. We argue that attacks should instead be evaluated by computing their true-positive rate at low (e.g., <0.1%) false-positive rates, and find most prior attacks perform poorly when evaluated in this way. To address this we develop a Likelihood Ratio Attack (LiRA) that carefully combines multiple ideas from the literature. Our attack is 10x more powerful at low false-positive rates, and also strictly dominates prior attacks on existing metrics.

Poisoning and Backdooring Contrastive Learning

Contrastive learning methods like CLIP train on noisy and uncurated training datasets. This is cheaper than labeling datasets manually, and even improves out-of-distribution robustness. We show that this practice makes backdoor and poisoning attacks a significant threat. By poisoning just 0.005% of a dataset (e.g., just 150 images of the 3 million-example Conceptual Captions dataset), we can cause the model to misclassify test images by overlaying a small patch. Targeted poisoning attacks, whereby the model misclassifies a particular test input with an adversarially-desired label, are even easier requiring control of less than 0.0001% of the dataset (e.g., just two out of the 3 million images). Our attacks call into question whether training on noisy and uncurated Internet scrapes is desirable.

Model-Based Event Detection in Wireless Sensor Networks

In this paper we present an application of techniques from statistical signal processing to the problem of event detection in wireless sensor networks used for environmental monitoring. The proposed approach uses the well-established Principal Component Analysis (PCA) technique to build a compact model of the observed phenomena that is able to capture daily and seasonal trends in the collected measurements. We then use the divergence between actual measurements and model predictions to detect the existence of discrete events within the collected data streams. Our preliminary results show that this event detection mechanism is sensitive enough to detect the onset of rain events using the temperature modality of a wireless sensor network.