Uniqueness and Complexity of Inverse MDP Models

What is the action sequence aa'a" that was likely responsible for reaching state s"' (from state s) in 3 steps? Addressing such questions is important in causal reasoning and in reinforcement learning. Inverse "MDP" models p(aa'a"|ss"') can be used to answer them. In the traditional "forward" view, transition "matrix" p(s'|sa) and policy {\pi}(a|s) uniquely determine "everything": the whole dynamics p(as'a's"a"...|s), and with it, the action-conditional state process p(s's"...|saa'a"), the multi-step inverse models p(aa'a"...|ss^i), etc. If the latter is our primary concern, a natural question, analogous to the forward case is to which extent 1-step inverse model p(a|ss') plus policy {\pi}(a|s) determine the multi-step inverse models or even the whole dynamics. In other words, can forward models be inferred from inverse models or even be side-stepped. This work addresses this question and variations thereof, and also whether there are efficient decision/inference algorithms for this.

On the Role of Neural Collapse in Transfer Learning

We study the ability of foundation models to learn representations for classification that are transferable to new, unseen classes. Recent results in the literature show that representations learned by a single classifier over many classes are competitive on few-shot learning problems with representations learned by special-purpose algorithms designed for such problems. In this paper we provide an explanation for this behavior based on the recently observed phenomenon that the features learned by overparameterized classification networks show an interesting clustering property, called neural collapse. We demonstrate both theoretically and empirically that neural collapse generalizes to new samples from the training classes, and -- more importantly -- to new classes as well, allowing foundation models to provide feature maps that work well in transfer learning and, specifically, in the few-shot setting.

Isotuning With Applications To Scale-Free Online Learning

We extend and combine several tools of the literature to design fast, adaptive, anytime and scale-free online learning algorithms. Scale-free regret bounds must scale linearly with the maximum loss, both toward large losses and toward very small losses. Adaptive regret bounds demonstrate that an algorithm can take advantage of easy data and potentially have constant regret. We seek to develop fast algorithms that depend on as few parameters as possible, in particular they should be anytime and thus not depend on the time horizon. Our first and main tool, isotuning, is a generalization of the idea of balancing the trade-off of the regret. We develop a set of tools to design and analyze such learning rates easily and show that they adapts automatically to the rate of the regret (whether constant, $O(\log T)$, $O(\sqrt{T})$, etc.) within a factor 2 of the optimal learning rate in hindsight for the same observed quantities. The second tool is an online correction, which allows us to obtain centered bounds for many algorithms, to prevent the regret bounds from being vacuous when the domain is overly large or only partially constrained. The last tool, null updates, prevents the algorithm from performing overly large updates, which could result in unbounded regret, or even invalid updates. We develop a general theory using these tools and apply it to several standard algorithms. In particular, we (almost entirely) restore the adaptivity to small losses of FTRL for unbounded domains, design and prove scale-free adaptive guarantees for a variant of Mirror Descent (at least when the Bregman divergence is convex in its second argument), extend Adapt-ML-Prod to scale-free guarantees, and provide several other minor contributions about Prod, AdaHedge, BOA and Soft-Bayes.

Reducing Planning Complexity of General Reinforcement Learning with Non-Markovian Abstractions

The field of General Reinforcement Learning (GRL) formulates the problem of sequential decision-making from ground up. The history of interaction constitutes a "ground" state of the system, which never repeats. On the one hand, this generality allows GRL to model almost every domain possible, e.g.\ Bandits, MDPs, POMDPs, PSRs, and history-based environments. On the other hand, in general, the near-optimal policies in GRL are functions of complete history, which hinders not only learning but also planning in GRL. The usual way around for the planning part is that the agent is given a Markovian abstraction of the underlying process. So, it can use any MDP planning algorithm to find a near-optimal policy. The Extreme State Aggregation (ESA) framework has extended this idea to non-Markovian abstractions without compromising on the possibility of planning through a (surrogate) MDP. A distinguishing feature of ESA is that it proves an upper bound of $O\left(\varepsilon^{-A} \cdot (1-\gamma)^{-2A}\right)$ on the number of states required for the surrogate MDP (where $A$ is the number of actions, $\gamma$ is the discount-factor, and $\varepsilon$ is the optimality-gap) which holds \emph{uniformly} for \emph{all} domains. While the possibility of a universal bound is quite remarkable, we show that this bound is very loose. We propose a novel non-MDP abstraction which allows for a much better upper bound of $O\left(\varepsilon^{-1} \cdot (1-\gamma)^{-2} \cdot A \cdot 2^{A}\right)$. Furthermore, we show that this bound can be improved further to $O\left(\varepsilon^{-1} \cdot (1-\gamma)^{-2} \cdot \log^3 A \right)$ by using an action-sequentialization method.

Shaking the foundations: delusions in sequence models for interaction and control

The recent phenomenal success of language models has reinvigorated machine learning research, and large sequence models such as transformers are being applied to a variety of domains. One important problem class that has remained relatively elusive however is purposeful adaptive behavior. Currently there is a common perception that sequence models "lack the understanding of the cause and effect of their actions" leading them to draw incorrect inferences due to auto-suggestive delusions. In this report we explain where this mismatch originates, and show that it can be resolved by treating actions as causal interventions. Finally, we show that in supervised learning, one can teach a system to condition or intervene on data by training with factual and counterfactual error signals respectively.

Reward-Punishment Symmetric Universal Intelligence

Can an agent's intelligence level be negative? We extend the Legg-Hutter agent-environment framework to include punishments and argue for an affirmative answer to that question. We show that if the background encodings and Universal Turing Machine (UTM) admit certain Kolmogorov complexity symmetries, then the resulting Legg-Hutter intelligence measure is symmetric about the origin. In particular, this implies reward-ignoring agents have Legg-Hutter intelligence 0 according to such UTMs.

Reinforcement Learning with Information-Theoretic Actuation

Reinforcement Learning formalises an embodied agent's interaction with the environment through observations, rewards and actions. But where do the actions come from? Actions are often considered to represent something external, such as the movement of a limb, a chess piece, or more generally, the output of an actuator. In this work we explore and formalize a contrasting view, namely that actions are best thought of as the output of a sequence of internal choices with respect to an action model. This view is particularly well-suited for leveraging the recent advances in large sequence models as prior knowledge for multi-task reinforcement learning problems. Our main contribution in this work is to show how to augment the standard MDP formalism with a sequential notion of internal action using information-theoretic techniques, and that this leads to self-consistent definitions of both internal and external action value functions.

Intelligence and Unambitiousness Using Algorithmic Information Theory

Algorithmic Information Theory has inspired intractable constructions of general intelligence (AGI), and undiscovered tractable approximations are likely feasible. Reinforcement Learning (RL), the dominant paradigm by which an agent might learn to solve arbitrary solvable problems, gives an agent a dangerous incentive: to gain arbitrary "power" in order to intervene in the provision of their own reward. We review the arguments that generally intelligent algorithmic-information-theoretic reinforcement learners such as Hutter's (2005) AIXI would seek arbitrary power, including over us. Then, using an information-theoretic exploration schedule, and a setup inspired by causal influence theory, we present a variant of AIXI which learns to not seek arbitrary power; we call it "unambitious". We show that our agent learns to accrue reward at least as well as a human mentor, while relying on that mentor with diminishing probability. And given a formal assumption that we probe empirically, we show that eventually, the agent's world-model incorporates the following true fact: intervening in the "outside world" will have no effect on reward acquisition; hence, it has no incentive to shape the outside world.

Fully General Online Imitation Learning

In imitation learning, imitators and demonstrators are policies for picking actions given past interactions with the environment. If we run an imitator, we probably want events to unfold similarly to the way they would have if the demonstrator had been acting the whole time. No existing work provides formal guidance in how this might be accomplished, instead restricting focus to environments that restart, making learning unusually easy, and conveniently limiting the significance of any mistake. We address a fully general setting, in which the (stochastic) environment and demonstrator never reset, not even for training purposes. Our new conservative Bayesian imitation learner underestimates the probabilities of each available action, and queries for more data with the remaining probability. Our main result: if an event would have been unlikely had the demonstrator acted the whole time, that event's likelihood can be bounded above when running the (initially totally ignorant) imitator instead. Meanwhile, queries to the demonstrator rapidly diminish in frequency.