When Should Active RAG Retrieve? A Budget-Aware Evaluation of Utility, Calibration, and Cost

Active RAG systems decide when to retrieve external knowledge during generation, making them a budget-sensitive case of agentic RAG and self-adaptive retrieval. Yet evaluations often leave the operating point underspecified: two systems may both claim a 50% evidence-usage budget while realizing different held-out usage rates, so higher accuracy can reflect a looser budget rather than a better retrieval policy. We study budget-aware evaluation for Active RAG by recasting active retrieval as utility estimation, where retrieval is valuable only through its marginal correctness change over a no-retrieval answer. This view separates three questions that single-point evaluations conflate: whether trigger scores rank useful retrieval decisions, whether thresholds calibrated on past data meet future budgets, and how trigger-side computation changes deployment cost. We operationalize these questions with exact top-k utility frontiers, deployable threshold frontiers, conservative budget frontiers, harm audits, and cost decompositions. Across knowledge-intensive multi-hop QA datasets and open instruction models, retrieval harm is non-negligible, router rankings change across datasets and budgets, nominal thresholds can miss target usage, and simple uncertainty or retrieval-score baselines often rival learned utility routers. Budget-aware Active RAG evaluations should therefore report frontiers, realized usage, threshold-transfer error, harm rates, and cost decompositions alongside accuracy.

MIS-HCC: Hierarchical Channel Clustering for Efficient Medical Image Segmentation

Medical image segmentation models require both high accuracy and lightweight design to accommodate real-world medical applications. The deployment of these models on resource-limited medical platforms remains a significant challenge due to their high computational and parameter requirements. Existing pruning methods for model compression mostly overlook the intrinsic connections and similarity between the internal structures of complex deep neural networks. As a result, compressed models may not effectively retain the basic features of the pretrained network. To solve this problem, we propose a hierarchical clustering compression method for medical image segmentation models (MIS-HCC). This approach employs hierarchical clustering to partition channels and fuse their parameters efficiently. Specifically, it leverages the Wasserstein distance to represent similarity of channels within layers of pre-trained network, forming a similarity matrix that guides the clustering process. Channels within each cluster are then fused to produce a compressed network. Experimental results on three medical image datasets application demonstrate that MIS-HCC outperforms the state-of-the-art methods in both accuracy and compression efficiency, offering an effective solution for deploying medical image segmentation models on resource-limited medical platforms.

Operational Reframing and Approval-Framed Delegation in Multi-Agent LLM Safety

Safety evaluations of multi-agent LLM systems often compare a direct prompt with a planner-executor pipeline and report the difference as a single "pipeline effect." We argue that this aggregate is difficult to interpret because it conflates three mechanisms: harmful intent may be reframed as plausible operational work, the planner may refuse or transform the request, and the executor may act under delegation prompts implying prior approval. To separate these factors, we introduce a five-condition controlled contrast design, evaluated on 30 synthetic harmful scenarios and an exploratory external validation set from four agent-safety benchmarks using LLM-judged compliance. Our results show that aggregate pipeline safety is not a stable architectural property. Operational reframing is the most portable risk signal, increasing compliance for GPT, Gemini, and DeepSeek across both scenario sets, while Claude is comparatively resistant. Planner behavior can offset this risk mainly through refusal; however, when the planner produces executable steps, the executor may become more compliant than under the direct operational baseline. Approval-framed delegation is sensitive to prompt design, model pairing, and scenario source, and a skeptical executor prompt sharply reduces compliance. Raw-direct model rankings can also mispredict deployed planner-executor behavior. Gemini is safest under raw direct prompts in the primary set yet shows the largest amplification with a Claude planner, rising from 8.9 percent to 38.9 percent compliance. GPTs near-zero aggregate pipeline effect instead hides a reframing increase canceled by planner refusal. These findings suggest that multi-agent safety evaluations should report reframing, planner behavior, delegation framing, and model pairing separately before attributing failures to architecture itself.

Beyond Simpson's Paradox: A Cascade of Confounders in AI Agent Pull-Request Co-Authorship

Pooled across five AI coding agents, pull requests (PRs) with a human Co-Authored-By trailer merge less often than purely-autonomous ones (53.8% vs. 79.8%) -- yet this aggregate finding is a textbook Simpson's Paradox. Stratifying 33,596 PRs from the AIDev dataset by agent identity reverses the conclusion: Copilot and Devin show large positive within-agent gaps (+41.2 and +33.5 pp, both p<0.001), while Cursor, Claude Code, and Codex show small effects whose cross-sectional 95% CIs span zero. The paradox is driven entirely by agent composition: Codex, which dominates 64.9% of the dataset, achieves high merge rates while rarely using co-authorship. But Simpson's Paradox is only the first layer of a cascade of confounders: within-repo controls eliminate Devin's gap (+33.5 to +1.6 pp, p=0.73); a commit-count control further halves Copilot's within-repo gap (+36.2 to +24.4 pp); restricted to multi-commit PRs, the Copilot within-repo effect dissolves to +4.8 pp (p=0.59). No agent retains a clear co-authorship effect once both repository selection and PR structure are controlled. Our findings caution against reporting agent-pooled statistics without stratification and demonstrate that cross-sectional co-authorship associations are largely selection and PR-structure artefacts rather than evidence of a causal benefit.

When Safe Skills Collide: Measuring Compositional Risk in Agent Skill Ecosystems

LLM agents increasingly rely on community-contributed skills that expand an agent's operational capability set. We study a core safety problem in agentic AI systems: whether individually safe skills can compose into unsafe installed skill sets. We present SkillReact, a compositional security measurement framework with three components: a deterministic static-composition benchmark, a two-rater LLM-assisted human-adjudication pipeline, and an action-based exploitability harness. On 1,520 ClawHub skills, 651 pass individual inspection and form 211,575 pairs; the benchmark flags 22.25% of these as structural candidates. We treat this raw rate as a recall-oriented scanner ceiling and calibrate it against human judgment: in a pattern-stratified audit, roughly one in five flagged pair-pattern hits survives as a real compositional risk (population-weighted validity 18.2%, our headline result), implying about 14K genuine risk memberships in a single registry that per-skill scanning misses by construction, since every pair is individually safe. An action-based harness then probes when these candidates become model-issued tool calls, and finds realization gated by host-model disposition: on an anchor-conditioned dropper subset, Haiku-4-5 issues the dropper-stage tool call on all 39 direct-prompt trials (36 of them the full download-then-execute chain, 3 download-only), Opus-4-7 stops at the download, and Sonnet-4-6 refuses outright. A control that holds the request fixed and varies only the installed skills finds compliance highest with no skills installed: a composition fixes which capabilities are reachable, while the host model decides whether to use them. Together these motivate install-time compositional checks and capability isolation as complements to per-skill scanning.

ChainCaps: Composition-Safe Tool-Using Agents via Monotonic Capability Attenuation

Tool-using agents increasingly operate in open-ended deployment environments, where they compose file systems, web APIs, code interpreters, and enterprise services at runtime. This creates a safety gap in tool composition: an agent can satisfy every per-tool permission check and still produce an unsafe end-to-end effect, such as reading a confidential document, summarizing it, and sending the summary to an external endpoint. We call this failure mode permission laundering. ChainCaps addresses it with a runtime rule: every value carries a sink-specific capability budget, and tool composition propagates budgets by intersection. A value can preserve or lose authority as it moves through a tool chain, but it cannot gain new authority through composition. We implement ChainCaps as a transparent MCP proxy that requires no changes to the agent or tool servers. On 82 tasks across five frontier models from three providers, ChainCaps reduces attack success rate from 25-68% to 0-4.8% while preserving 96-100% benign completion. In replay experiments, it also outperforms scalar-IFC and per-function-isolation baselines. Manifest quality is the dominant deployment bottleneck: expert manifests reach 100% attack blocking, while naive manifests fall to 27.3%. Our claims are limited to explicit-flow composition safety under trusted manifests and proxy-visible data movement, a practical gap in deployed tool-using agents today.