Abstract:Model merging composes specialized capabilities into a single LLM by aggregating task vectors sourced from unverified public platforms, exposing a critical supply-chain attack surface: Because any malicious behavior can be encoded into a task vector, and merging grants third-party vectors direct write access to model weights, an attacker-provided task vector can enable or amplify diverse downstream threats. Prior work studies only backdoor attacks against model merging for classifiers using static arithmetic heuristics, which fail to effectively handle diverse attacks on generative LLMs for three reasons. (i) LLMs rely on autoregressive decoding, where the minor parameter drift introduced by merging compounds across tokens and rapidly degrades the attack. (ii) Attackers have no knowledge of the victim's merging configurations, causing a static attack vector optimized in isolation to be easily diluted or destroyed. (iii) Practical threat induction must generalize to attack prompts unseen during optimization, which static vectors cannot adequately encode. We present RogueMerge, the first principled, unified framework that addresses all three challenges. To handle autoregressive generation, we replace static arithmetic with a joint optimization that explicitly enforces attack success after merging. To handle unknown merging settings, we formulate attack injection as a stochastic min-max problem and solve it via meta-learning-style simulation. To generalize across heterogeneous attack prompts, we employ distributionally robust optimization and derive a tractable first-order Taylor approximation at LLM scale, with a provable error bound. Across four threats, six merging algorithms, and over 170 merged LLMs, RogueMerge consistently outperforms existing attacks. It also remains stable across diverse merging settings and resists standard defenses.
Abstract:Video generation models are increasingly used as world simulators for tasks like driving and robotic manipulation. What matters in these settings is not whether a single video looks right, but whether the model's output changes when its input changes. We test this by giving a model two prompts describing the same scene with one physical detail varied, and checking whether the two videos diverge the way physics predicts. The wording difference between the prompts is small by design, since only one variable is changed, but the correct physical difference is not. A model that misses this can still produce two videos that each look plausible individually, and existing benchmarks score videos one at a time and cannot detect this failure. We introduce What-If World, 319 such prompt pairs built on real frames from nuScenes and DROID, organized by a taxonomy of six physical variables shared across driving and manipulation. Each pair is scored with APEO, a four-part rubric checking whether each video follows its prompt (Adherence), is physically consistent (Physics), preserves the shared scene (Environment), and ends in the correct difference (Outcome). Across nine state-of-the-art models, no system exceeds 52% on the paired score, and open-source models cluster near 28%. Every model tested fails on a large fraction of causal interventions, indicating substantial room before these models can reliably support action-conditioned simulation or model-based planning. Where models do score well, performance appears to track the visual prominence of the intervention rather than the tractability of its underlying physics. Some visually subtle interventions score as low as 14.2%, while visually pronounced ones reach 40.4%.




Abstract:Location-Based Social Network (LBSN) check-in trajectory data are important for many practical applications, like POI recommendation, advertising, and pandemic intervention. However, the high collection costs and ever-increasing privacy concerns prevent us from accessing large-scale LBSN trajectory data. The recent advances in synthetic data generation provide us with a new opportunity to achieve this, which utilizes generative AI to generate synthetic data that preserves the characteristics of real data while ensuring privacy protection. However, generating synthetic LBSN check-in trajectories remains challenging due to their spatially discrete, temporally irregular nature and the complex spatio-temporal patterns caused by sparse activities and uncertain human mobility. To address this challenge, we propose GeoGen, a two-stage coarse-to-fine framework for large-scale LBSN check-in trajectory generation. In the first stage, we reconstruct spatially continuous, temporally regular latent movement sequences from the original LBSN check-in trajectories and then design a Sparsity-aware Spatio-temporal Diffusion model (S$^2$TDiff) with an efficient denosing network to learn their underlying behavioral patterns. In the second stage, we design Coarse2FineNet, a Transformer-based Seq2Seq architecture equipped with a dynamic context fusion mechanism in the encoder and a multi-task hybrid-head decoder, which generates fine-grained LBSN trajectories based on coarse-grained latent movement sequences by modeling semantic relevance and behavioral uncertainty. Extensive experiments on four real-world datasets show that GeoGen excels state-of-the-art models for both fidelity and utility evaluation, e.g., it increases over 69% and 55% in distance and radius metrics on the FS-TKY dataset.




Abstract:Fine-tuning pre-trained models for downstream tasks has led to a proliferation of open-sourced task-specific models. Recently, Model Merging (MM) has emerged as an effective approach to facilitate knowledge transfer among these independently fine-tuned models. MM directly combines multiple fine-tuned task-specific models into a merged model without additional training, and the resulting model shows enhanced capabilities in multiple tasks. Although MM provides great utility, it may come with security risks because an adversary can exploit MM to affect multiple downstream tasks. However, the security risks of MM have barely been studied. In this paper, we first find that MM, as a new learning paradigm, introduces unique challenges for existing backdoor attacks due to the merging process. To address these challenges, we introduce BadMerging, the first backdoor attack specifically designed for MM. Notably, BadMerging allows an adversary to compromise the entire merged model by contributing as few as one backdoored task-specific model. BadMerging comprises a two-stage attack mechanism and a novel feature-interpolation-based loss to enhance the robustness of embedded backdoors against the changes of different merging parameters. Considering that a merged model may incorporate tasks from different domains, BadMerging can jointly compromise the tasks provided by the adversary (on-task attack) and other contributors (off-task attack) and solve the corresponding unique challenges with novel attack designs. Extensive experiments show that BadMerging achieves remarkable attacks against various MM algorithms. Our ablation study demonstrates that the proposed attack designs can progressively contribute to the attack performance. Finally, we show that prior defense mechanisms fail to defend against our attacks, highlighting the need for more advanced defense.




Abstract:As location-based services (LBS) have grown in popularity, the collection of human mobility data has become increasingly extensive to build machine learning (ML) models offering enhanced convenience to LBS users. However, the convenience comes with the risk of privacy leakage since this type of data might contain sensitive information related to user identities, such as home/work locations. Prior work focuses on protecting mobility data privacy during transmission or prior to release, lacking the privacy risk evaluation of mobility data-based ML models. To better understand and quantify the privacy leakage in mobility data-based ML models, we design a privacy attack suite containing data extraction and membership inference attacks tailored for point-of-interest (POI) recommendation models, one of the most widely used mobility data-based ML models. These attacks in our attack suite assume different adversary knowledge and aim to extract different types of sensitive information from mobility data, providing a holistic privacy risk assessment for POI recommendation models. Our experimental evaluation using two real-world mobility datasets demonstrates that current POI recommendation models are vulnerable to our attacks. We also present unique findings to understand what types of mobility data are more susceptible to privacy attacks. Finally, we evaluate defenses against these attacks and highlight future directions and challenges.