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John Dickerson

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Fair Polylog-Approximate Low-Cost Hierarchical Clustering

Nov 21, 2023
Marina Knittel, Max Springer, John Dickerson, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi

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Doubly Constrained Fair Clustering

May 31, 2023
John Dickerson, Seyed A. Esmaeili, Jamie Morgenstern, Claire Jie Zhang

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Artificial Intelligence/Operations Research Workshop 2 Report Out

Apr 10, 2023
John Dickerson, Bistra Dilkina, Yu Ding, Swati Gupta, Pascal Van Hentenryck, Sven Koenig, Ramayya Krishnan, Radhika Kulkarni, Catherine Gill, Haley Griffin, Maddy Hunter, Ann Schwartz

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Reckoning with the Disagreement Problem: Explanation Consensus as a Training Objective

Mar 23, 2023
Avi Schwarzschild, Max Cembalest, Karthik Rao, Keegan Hines, John Dickerson

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Neural Auctions Compromise Bidder Information

Feb 28, 2023
Alex Stein, Avi Schwarzschild, Michael Curry, Tom Goldstein, John Dickerson

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Targets in Reinforcement Learning to solve Stackelberg Security Games

Nov 30, 2022
Saptarashmi Bandyopadhyay, Chenqi Zhu, Philip Daniel, Joshua Morrison, Ethan Shay, John Dickerson

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Achieving Downstream Fairness with Geometric Repair

Mar 14, 2022
Kweku Kwegyir-Aggrey, Jessica Dai, John Dickerson, Keegan Hines

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Differentiable Economics for Randomized Affine Maximizer Auctions

Feb 06, 2022
Michael Curry, Tuomas Sandholm, John Dickerson

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Data-Driven Methods for Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in Ride-Pooling

Oct 07, 2021
Naveen Raman, Sanket Shah, John Dickerson

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Learning Revenue-Maximizing Auctions With Differentiable Matching

Jun 15, 2021
Michael J. Curry, Uro Lyi, Tom Goldstein, John Dickerson

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