Guiding the Recommender: Information-Aware Auto-Bidding for Content Promotion

Modern content platforms offer paid promotion to mitigate cold start by allocating exposure via auctions. Our empirical analysis reveals a counterintuitive flaw in this paradigm: while promotion rescues low-to-medium quality content, it can harm high-quality content by forcing exposure to suboptimal audiences, polluting engagement signals and downgrading future recommendation. We recast content promotion as a dual-objective optimization that balances short-term value acquisition with long-term model improvement. To make this tractable at bid time in content promotion, we introduce a decomposable surrogate objective, gradient coverage, and establish its formal connection to Fisher Information and optimal experimental design. We design a two-stage auto-bidding algorithm based on Lagrange duality that dynamically paces budget through a shadow price and optimizes impression-level bids using per-impression marginal utilities. To address missing labels at bid time, we propose a confidence-gated gradient heuristic, paired with a zeroth-order variant for black-box models that reliably estimates learning signals in real time. We provide theoretical guarantees, proving monotone submodularity of the composite objective, sublinear regret in online auction, and budget feasibility. Extensive offline experiments on synthetic and real-world datasets validate the framework: it outperforms baselines, achieves superior final AUC/LogLoss, adheres closely to budget targets, and remains effective when gradients are approximated zeroth-order. These results show that strategic, information-aware promotion can improve long-term model performance and organic outcomes beyond naive impression-maximization strategies.

Competitive Bridge Bidding with Deep Neural Networks

The game of bridge consists of two stages: bidding and playing. While playing is proved to be relatively easy for computer programs, bidding is very challenging. During the bidding stage, each player knowing only his/her own cards needs to exchange information with his/her partner and interfere with opponents at the same time. Existing methods for solving perfect-information games cannot be directly applied to bidding. Most bridge programs are based on human-designed rules, which, however, cannot cover all situations and are usually ambiguous and even conflicting with each other. In this paper, we, for the first time, propose a competitive bidding system based on deep learning techniques, which exhibits two novelties. First, we design a compact representation to encode the private and public information available to a player for bidding. Second, based on the analysis of the impact of other players' unknown cards on one's final rewards, we design two neural networks to deal with imperfect information, the first one inferring the cards of the partner and the second one taking the outputs of the first one as part of its input to select a bid. Experimental results show that our bidding system outperforms the top rule-based program.