Strategic Bargaining in Multi-Buyer Markets: Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards for LLM Negotiations

Negotiation is a fundamental strategic interaction in management science, characterized by agents attempting to reach agreements while protecting private information, such as reservation costs and hidden valuations. A prevalent yet complex scenario involves a single seller negotiating concurrently with multiple buyers, each possessing heterogeneous, private budgets. In such settings, constrained by a limited number of communication turns, the seller must balance exploring the broader market to discover the highest valuation with concentrating sufficient turns on a single target buyer to secure the best possible outcome. Our analysis reveals a significant gap in standard Large Language Models (LLMs): while these models are linguistically proficient, they fail to act as effective economic decision-makers. Specifically, they exhibit a failure to explore the buyer pool, often fixating on the current highest bid rather than strategically investigating the market to discover latent high valuations. In this paper, we propose a specialized training recipe using Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR). By anchoring the reward function to objective economic outcomes, the strategic balance between market discovery and surplus extraction emerges natively through the learning process. Our results demonstrate that the trained seller undergoes a multi-stage strategic evolution, learning to leverage price anchoring and strategic probing to identify more profitable counterparties. The agent extracts a substantially higher surplus than frontier models by both improving its persuasive bargaining skills and consistently closing deals with high-value buyers. Finally, we show that our seller strategies generalize robustly to unseen buyer negotiation styles and budget distributions.

AstroAlertBench: Evaluating the Accuracy, Reasoning, and Honesty of Multimodal LLMs in Astronomical Classification

Modern astronomical observatories generate a massive volume of multimodal data, creating a critical bottleneck for expert human review. While multimodal large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in interpreting complex visual and textual inputs, their ability to perform specialized scientific classification while providing interpretable reasoning remains understudied. We introduce AstroAlertBench, a comprehensive multimodal benchmark designed to evaluate LLM performance in astronomical event review along a three-stage logical chain: metadata grounding, scientific reasoning, and hierarchical classification over five categories. We use a pilot sample of 1,500 real-world alerts from the Zwicky Transient Facility (ZTF), a wide-field survey that scans the northern sky to detect transient astronomical events. On this dataset, we benchmark 13 frontier closed-source and open-weight LLMs that support visual input. Our results reveal that high accuracy does not always align with model ``honesty,'' defined as the ability to self-evaluate its reasoning, which affects its reliability as a real-world assistant. We further initialize a human-in-the-loop evaluation protocol as a precursor to future community-scale participation. Together, AstroAlertBench provides a framework for developing calibrated and interpretable astronomical assistants.

Instructing LLMs to Negotiate using Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards

The recent advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has established their potential as autonomous interactive agents. However, they often struggle in strategic games of incomplete information, such as bilateral price negotiation. In this paper, we investigate if Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) can effectively teach LLMs to negotiate. Specifically, we explore the strategic behaviors that emerge during the learning process. We introduce a framework that trains a mid-sized buyer agent against a regulated LLM seller across a wide distribution of real-world products. By grounding reward signals directly in the maximization of economic surplus and strict adherence to private budget constraints, we reveal a novel four-phase strategic evolution. The agent progresses from naive bargaining to using aggressive starting prices, moves through a phase of deadlock, and ultimately develops sophisticated persuasive skills. Our results demonstrate that this verifiable training allows a 30B agent to significantly outperform frontier models over ten times its size in extracting surplus. Furthermore, the trained agent generalizes robustly to stronger counterparties unseen during training and remains effective even when facing hostile, adversarial seller personas.