AstroAlertBench: Evaluating the Accuracy, Reasoning, and Honesty of Multimodal LLMs in Astronomical Classification

Modern astronomical observatories generate a massive volume of multimodal data, creating a critical bottleneck for expert human review. While multimodal large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in interpreting complex visual and textual inputs, their ability to perform specialized scientific classification while providing interpretable reasoning remains understudied. We introduce AstroAlertBench, a comprehensive multimodal benchmark designed to evaluate LLM performance in astronomical event review along a three-stage logical chain: metadata grounding, scientific reasoning, and hierarchical classification over five categories. We use a pilot sample of 1,500 real-world alerts from the Zwicky Transient Facility (ZTF), a wide-field survey that scans the northern sky to detect transient astronomical events. On this dataset, we benchmark 13 frontier closed-source and open-weight LLMs that support visual input. Our results reveal that high accuracy does not always align with model ``honesty,'' defined as the ability to self-evaluate its reasoning, which affects its reliability as a real-world assistant. We further initialize a human-in-the-loop evaluation protocol as a precursor to future community-scale participation. Together, AstroAlertBench provides a framework for developing calibrated and interpretable astronomical assistants.

Instructing LLMs to Negotiate using Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards

The recent advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has established their potential as autonomous interactive agents. However, they often struggle in strategic games of incomplete information, such as bilateral price negotiation. In this paper, we investigate if Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) can effectively teach LLMs to negotiate. Specifically, we explore the strategic behaviors that emerge during the learning process. We introduce a framework that trains a mid-sized buyer agent against a regulated LLM seller across a wide distribution of real-world products. By grounding reward signals directly in the maximization of economic surplus and strict adherence to private budget constraints, we reveal a novel four-phase strategic evolution. The agent progresses from naive bargaining to using aggressive starting prices, moves through a phase of deadlock, and ultimately develops sophisticated persuasive skills. Our results demonstrate that this verifiable training allows a 30B agent to significantly outperform frontier models over ten times its size in extracting surplus. Furthermore, the trained agent generalizes robustly to stronger counterparties unseen during training and remains effective even when facing hostile, adversarial seller personas.