The Foreign Policy AI Evaluation Gap

We argue that AI systems used in conducting foreign policy tasks - broadly enacting 'statecraft' - should be a priority test case for technical AI governance research. In enacting foreign policy, we refer to the formulation and implementation of external objectives by political actors. Statecraft is a high-consequence deployment domain, with extreme downside risks and structural properties that standard evaluation practices handle poorly. These features include partial observability, unbounded action spaces, contested ground truth, and multidimensional objectives. This paper advocates for a literature-grounded research agenda. Our contribution is threefold: (i) a claim about the structural conditions of foreign policy that combine catastrophic tail risk with technical evaluation complexities, (ii) an ECOSYSTEM review that highlights the asymmetric focus on ASSESSMENT features over ACCESS, VERIFICATION, SECURITY, and OPERATIONALIZATION, and (iii) a demand-side evaluation framework that decomposes foreign-policy workflows into bounded, evaluable sub-tasks with human recombination. As AI systems are already being deployed in the conduct of war and peace, amid limited public evaluation infrastructure from the technical AI governance community, this agenda is an urgent priority.

From Democracies to Autocracies: How AI Systems Enable Authoritarianism by Design

AI-enabled authoritarianism is not confined to autocracies. In this paper, we provide greater transparency by investigating and mapping the lifecycles of six AI systems deployed in different political regimes, ranging from the US to China. By drawing on an extensive range of sources (academic publications, investigative research reports, third-party evaluations, media interviews, government procurement notices), we conduct a systematic, qualitative comparison across systems to identify the critical technical and operational features that enable authoritarianism within their respective political contexts. We find that enabling features include the centralization and co-optation of administrative data for law enforcement and political punishment, regulatory gaps that fail to deter misuse, weak user compliance that nullifies human oversight mechanisms, and the encoding of protected group traits that identify members of vulnerable populations. We find that these features are present across systems deployed in autocratic and democratic regimes, albeit in varying configurations. We also find that both centralized and fragmented AI systems can contribute to authoritarianism by exploiting governance gaps: centralized systems directed by executive authorities, particularly within security and military institutions, are often not subjected to formal oversight mechanisms, while fragmented systems diffuse accountability between stakeholders, paving the way for entrenchment. These findings reveal that AI-enabled authoritarianism is distributed, resulting from design and operational choices made by developers, administrators, and users alike. We conclude with recommendations for developers and policymakers to mitigate these risks.

Evaluation Cards: An Interpretive Layer for AI Evaluation Reporting

AI evaluation results are produced at scale but reported inconsistently across leaderboards, model cards, benchmark papers, and company blogs. The cost is interpretive: readers cannot reliably compare results across sources, identify what a report omits, or trace an aggregate claim to its underlying evidence. Recent efforts address isolated components but leave three gaps: they cover only narrow slices of the evaluation lifecycle and do not compose into a single interpretable record; they specify static representations that do not differentiate the questions different stakeholders bring to the same evidence; and they remain proposals on paper, lacking the extraction infrastructure required for adoption at scale. We present \EvalCards{}, an operational reporting layer that composes benchmark metadata, evaluation run data, and model metadata into a unified record. We (1) derive a reporting schema from a structured review of 52 papers and 10 stakeholder interviews, (2) implement four interpretive signals (reproducibility, documentation completeness, provenance and risk, and score comparability), rendered through reader modes calibrated to research and non-research audiences, and (3) deploy a monitoring tool that applies \EvalCards{} across 5,816 models, 635 benchmarks, and 101,843 results, surfacing systematic gaps in current reporting practice.

When AI Benchmarks Plateau: A Systematic Study of Benchmark Saturation

Artificial Intelligence (AI) benchmarks play a central role in measuring progress in model development and guiding deployment decisions. However, many benchmarks quickly become saturated, meaning that they can no longer differentiate between the best-performing models, diminishing their long-term value. In this study, we analyze benchmark saturation across 60 Large Language Model (LLM) benchmarks selected from technical reports by major model developers. To identify factors driving saturation, we characterize benchmarks along 14 properties spanning task design, data construction, and evaluation format. We test five hypotheses examining how each property contributes to saturation rates. Our analysis reveals that nearly half of the benchmarks exhibit saturation, with rates increasing as benchmarks age. Notably, hiding test data (i.e., public vs. private) shows no protective effect, while expert-curated benchmarks resist saturation better than crowdsourced ones. Our findings highlight which design choices extend benchmark longevity and inform strategies for more durable evaluation.

Who Evaluates AI's Social Impacts? Mapping Coverage and Gaps in First and Third Party Evaluations

Foundation models are increasingly central to high-stakes AI systems, and governance frameworks now depend on evaluations to assess their risks and capabilities. Although general capability evaluations are widespread, social impact assessments covering bias, fairness, privacy, environmental costs, and labor practices remain uneven across the AI ecosystem. To characterize this landscape, we conduct the first comprehensive analysis of both first-party and third-party social impact evaluation reporting across a wide range of model developers. Our study examines 186 first-party release reports and 183 post-release evaluation sources, and complements this quantitative analysis with interviews of model developers. We find a clear division of evaluation labor: first-party reporting is sparse, often superficial, and has declined over time in key areas such as environmental impact and bias, while third-party evaluators including academic researchers, nonprofits, and independent organizations provide broader and more rigorous coverage of bias, harmful content, and performance disparities. However, this complementarity has limits. Only model developers can authoritatively report on data provenance, content moderation labor, financial costs, and training infrastructure, yet interviews reveal that these disclosures are often deprioritized unless tied to product adoption or regulatory compliance. Our findings indicate that current evaluation practices leave major gaps in assessing AI's societal impacts, highlighting the urgent need for policies that promote developer transparency, strengthen independent evaluation ecosystems, and create shared infrastructure to aggregate and compare third-party evaluations in a consistent and accessible way.

Expert Survey: AI Reliability & Security Research Priorities

Our survey of 53 specialists across 105 AI reliability and security research areas identifies the most promising research prospects to guide strategic AI R&D investment. As companies are seeking to develop AI systems with broadly human-level capabilities, research on reliability and security is urgently needed to ensure AI's benefits can be safely and broadly realized and prevent severe harms. This study is the first to quantify expert priorities across a comprehensive taxonomy of AI safety and security research directions and to produce a data-driven ranking of their potential impact. These rankings may support evidence-based decisions about how to effectively deploy resources toward AI reliability and security research.