The WMDP Benchmark: Measuring and Reducing Malicious Use With Unlearning

The White House Executive Order on Artificial Intelligence highlights the risks of large language models (LLMs) empowering malicious actors in developing biological, cyber, and chemical weapons. To measure these risks of malicious use, government institutions and major AI labs are developing evaluations for hazardous capabilities in LLMs. However, current evaluations are private, preventing further research into mitigating risk. Furthermore, they focus on only a few, highly specific pathways for malicious use. To fill these gaps, we publicly release the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proxy (WMDP) benchmark, a dataset of 4,157 multiple-choice questions that serve as a proxy measurement of hazardous knowledge in biosecurity, cybersecurity, and chemical security. WMDP was developed by a consortium of academics and technical consultants, and was stringently filtered to eliminate sensitive information prior to public release. WMDP serves two roles: first, as an evaluation for hazardous knowledge in LLMs, and second, as a benchmark for unlearning methods to remove such hazardous knowledge. To guide progress on unlearning, we develop CUT, a state-of-the-art unlearning method based on controlling model representations. CUT reduces model performance on WMDP while maintaining general capabilities in areas such as biology and computer science, suggesting that unlearning may be a concrete path towards reducing malicious use from LLMs. We release our benchmark and code publicly at https://wmdp.ai

Escalation Risks from Language Models in Military and Diplomatic Decision-Making

Governments are increasingly considering integrating autonomous AI agents in high-stakes military and foreign-policy decision-making, especially with the emergence of advanced generative AI models like GPT-4. Our work aims to scrutinize the behavior of multiple AI agents in simulated wargames, specifically focusing on their predilection to take escalatory actions that may exacerbate multilateral conflicts. Drawing on political science and international relations literature about escalation dynamics, we design a novel wargame simulation and scoring framework to assess the escalation risks of actions taken by these agents in different scenarios. Contrary to prior studies, our research provides both qualitative and quantitative insights and focuses on large language models (LLMs). We find that all five studied off-the-shelf LLMs show forms of escalation and difficult-to-predict escalation patterns. We observe that models tend to develop arms-race dynamics, leading to greater conflict, and in rare cases, even to the deployment of nuclear weapons. Qualitatively, we also collect the models' reported reasonings for chosen actions and observe worrying justifications based on deterrence and first-strike tactics. Given the high stakes of military and foreign-policy contexts, we recommend further examination and cautious consideration before deploying autonomous language model agents for strategic military or diplomatic decision-making.

SuperHF: Supervised Iterative Learning from Human Feedback

While large language models demonstrate remarkable capabilities, they often present challenges in terms of safety, alignment with human values, and stability during training. Here, we focus on two prevalent methods used to align these models, Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF). SFT is simple and robust, powering a host of open-source models, while RLHF is a more sophisticated method used in top-tier models like ChatGPT but also suffers from instability and susceptibility to reward hacking. We propose a novel approach, Supervised Iterative Learning from Human Feedback (SuperHF), which seeks to leverage the strengths of both methods. Our hypothesis is two-fold: that the reward model used in RLHF is critical for efficient data use and model generalization and that the use of Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) in RLHF may not be necessary and could contribute to instability issues. SuperHF replaces PPO with a simple supervised loss and a Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence prior. It creates its own training data by repeatedly sampling a batch of model outputs and filtering them through the reward model in an online learning regime. We then break down the reward optimization problem into three components: robustly optimizing the training rewards themselves, preventing reward hacking-exploitation of the reward model that degrades model performance-as measured by a novel METEOR similarity metric, and maintaining good performance on downstream evaluations. Our experimental results show SuperHF exceeds PPO-based RLHF on the training objective, easily and favorably trades off high reward with low reward hacking, improves downstream calibration, and performs the same on our GPT-4 based qualitative evaluation scheme all the while being significantly simpler to implement, highlighting SuperHF's potential as a competitive language model alignment technique.

Welfare Diplomacy: Benchmarking Language Model Cooperation

The growing capabilities and increasingly widespread deployment of AI systems necessitate robust benchmarks for measuring their cooperative capabilities. Unfortunately, most multi-agent benchmarks are either zero-sum or purely cooperative, providing limited opportunities for such measurements. We introduce a general-sum variant of the zero-sum board game Diplomacy -- called Welfare Diplomacy -- in which players must balance investing in military conquest and domestic welfare. We argue that Welfare Diplomacy facilitates both a clearer assessment of and stronger training incentives for cooperative capabilities. Our contributions are: (1) proposing the Welfare Diplomacy rules and implementing them via an open-source Diplomacy engine; (2) constructing baseline agents using zero-shot prompted language models; and (3) conducting experiments where we find that baselines using state-of-the-art models attain high social welfare but are exploitable. Our work aims to promote societal safety by aiding researchers in developing and assessing multi-agent AI systems. Code to evaluate Welfare Diplomacy and reproduce our experiments is available at https://github.com/mukobi/welfare-diplomacy.