Communicating with Speakers and Listeners of Different Pragmatic Levels

This paper explores the impact of variable pragmatic competence on communicative success through simulating language learning and conversing between speakers and listeners with different levels of reasoning abilities. Through studying this interaction, we hypothesize that matching levels of reasoning between communication partners would create a more beneficial environment for communicative success and language learning. Our research findings indicate that learning from more explicit, literal language is advantageous, irrespective of the learner's level of pragmatic competence. Furthermore, we find that integrating pragmatic reasoning during language learning, not just during evaluation, significantly enhances overall communication performance. This paper provides key insights into the importance of aligning reasoning levels and incorporating pragmatic reasoning in optimizing communicative interactions.

Online Planning in POMDPs with State-Requests

In key real-world problems, full state information is sometimes available but only at a high cost, like activating precise yet energy-intensive sensors or consulting humans, thereby compelling the agent to operate under partial observability. For this scenario, we propose AEMS-SR (Anytime Error Minimization Search with State Requests), a principled online planning algorithm tailored for POMDPs with state requests. By representing the search space as a graph instead of a tree, AEMS-SR avoids the exponential growth of the search space originating from state requests. Theoretical analysis demonstrates AEMS-SR's $\varepsilon$-optimality, ensuring solution quality, while empirical evaluations illustrate its effectiveness compared with AEMS and POMCP, two SOTA online planning algorithms. AEMS-SR enables efficient planning in domains characterized by partial observability and costly state requests offering practical benefits across various applications.

Inverse Concave-Utility Reinforcement Learning is Inverse Game Theory

We consider inverse reinforcement learning problems with concave utilities. Concave Utility Reinforcement Learning (CURL) is a generalisation of the standard RL objective, which employs a concave function of the state occupancy measure, rather than a linear function. CURL has garnered recent attention for its ability to represent instances of many important applications including the standard RL such as imitation learning, pure exploration, constrained MDPs, offline RL, human-regularized RL, and others. Inverse reinforcement learning is a powerful paradigm that focuses on recovering an unknown reward function that can rationalize the observed behaviour of an agent. There has been recent theoretical advances in inverse RL where the problem is formulated as identifying the set of feasible reward functions. However, inverse RL for CURL problems has not been considered previously. In this paper we show that most of the standard IRL results do not apply to CURL in general, since CURL invalidates the classical Bellman equations. This calls for a new theoretical framework for the inverse CURL problem. Using a recent equivalence result between CURL and Mean-field Games, we propose a new definition for the feasible rewards for I-CURL by proving that this problem is equivalent to an inverse game theory problem in a subclass of mean-field games. We present initial query and sample complexity results for the I-CURL problem under assumptions such as Lipschitz-continuity. Finally, we outline future directions and applications in human--AI collaboration enabled by our results.

Policy Space Response Oracles: A Survey

In game theory, a game refers to a model of interaction among rational decision-makers or players, making choices with the goal of achieving their individual objectives. Understanding their behavior in games is often referred to as game reasoning. This survey provides a comprehensive overview of a fast-developing game-reasoning framework for large games, known as Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO). We first motivate PSRO, provide historical context, and position PSRO within game-reasoning approaches. We then focus on the strategy exploration issue for PSRO, the challenge of assembling an effective strategy portfolio for modeling the underlying game with minimum computational cost. We also survey current research directions for enhancing the efficiency of PSRO, and explore the applications of PSRO across various domains. We conclude by discussing open questions and future research.

When Do Off-Policy and On-Policy Policy Gradient Methods Align?

Policy gradient methods are widely adopted reinforcement learning algorithms for tasks with continuous action spaces. These methods succeeded in many application domains, however, because of their notorious sample inefficiency their use remains limited to problems where fast and accurate simulations are available. A common way to improve sample efficiency is to modify their objective function to be computable from off-policy samples without importance sampling. A well-established off-policy objective is the excursion objective. This work studies the difference between the excursion objective and the traditional on-policy objective, which we refer to as the on-off gap. We provide the first theoretical analysis showing conditions to reduce the on-off gap while establishing empirical evidence of shortfalls arising when these conditions are not met.

What Lies beyond the Pareto Front? A Survey on Decision-Support Methods for Multi-Objective Optimization

We present a review that unifies decision-support methods for exploring the solutions produced by multi-objective optimization (MOO) algorithms. As MOO is applied to solve diverse problems, approaches for analyzing the trade-offs offered by MOO algorithms are scattered across fields. We provide an overview of the advances on this topic, including methods for visualization, mining the solution set, and uncertainty exploration as well as emerging research directions, including interactivity, explainability, and ethics. We synthesize these methods drawing from different fields of research to build a unified approach, independent of the application. Our goals are to reduce the entry barrier for researchers and practitioners on using MOO algorithms and to provide novel research directions.

Bad Habits: Policy Confounding and Out-of-Trajectory Generalization in RL

Reinforcement learning agents may sometimes develop habits that are effective only when specific policies are followed. After an initial exploration phase in which agents try out different actions, they eventually converge toward a particular policy. When this occurs, the distribution of state-action trajectories becomes narrower, and agents start experiencing the same transitions again and again. At this point, spurious correlations may arise. Agents may then pick up on these correlations and learn state representations that do not generalize beyond the agent's trajectory distribution. In this paper, we provide a mathematical characterization of this phenomenon, which we refer to as policy confounding, and show, through a series of examples, when and how it occurs in practice.

What model does MuZero learn?

Model-based reinforcement learning has drawn considerable interest in recent years, given its promise to improve sample efficiency. Moreover, when using deep-learned models, it is potentially possible to learn compact models from complex sensor data. However, the effectiveness of these learned models, particularly their capacity to plan, i.e., to improve the current policy, remains unclear. In this work, we study MuZero, a well-known deep model-based reinforcement learning algorithm, and explore how far it achieves its learning objective of a value-equivalent model and how useful the learned models are for policy improvement. Amongst various other insights, we conclude that the model learned by MuZero cannot effectively generalize to evaluate unseen policies, which limits the extent to which we can additionally improve the current policy by planning with the model.

Towards a Unifying Model of Rationality in Multiagent Systems

Multiagent systems deployed in the real world need to cooperate with other agents (including humans) nearly as effectively as these agents cooperate with one another. To design such AI, and provide guarantees of its effectiveness, we need to clearly specify what types of agents our AI must be able to cooperate with. In this work we propose a generic model of socially intelligent agents, which are individually rational learners that are also able to cooperate with one another (in the sense that their joint behavior is Pareto efficient). We define rationality in terms of the regret incurred by each agent over its lifetime, and show how we can construct socially intelligent agents for different forms of regret. We then discuss the implications of this model for the development of "robust" MAS that can cooperate with a wide variety of socially intelligent agents.

Safety Guarantees in Multi-agent Learning via Trapping Regions

One of the main challenges of multi-agent learning lies in establishing convergence of the algorithms, as, in general, a collection of individual, self-serving agents is not guaranteed to converge with their joint policy, when learning concurrently. This is in stark contrast to most single-agent environments, and sets a prohibitive barrier for deployment in practical applications, as it induces uncertainty in long term behavior of the system. In this work, we propose to apply the concept of trapping regions, known from qualitative theory of dynamical systems, to create safety sets in the joint strategy space for decentralized learning. Upon verification of the direction of learning dynamics, the resulting trajectories are guaranteed not to escape such sets, during the learning process. As a result, it is ensured, that despite the uncertainty over convergence of the applied algorithms, learning will never form hazardous joint strategy combinations. We introduce a binary partitioning algorithm for verification of trapping regions in systems with known learning dynamics, and a heuristic sampling algorithm for scenarios where learning dynamics are not known. In addition, via a fixed point argument, we show the existence of a learning equilibrium within a trapping region. We demonstrate the applications to a regularized version of Dirac Generative Adversarial Network, a four-intersection traffic control scenario run in a state of the art open-source microscopic traffic simulator SUMO, and a mathematical model of economic competition.