Fair on the Surface? Benchmarking Hidden-Output Fairness Gaps in LLM Recommenders

Fairness audits for LLM-based recommenders have largely focused on observable outputs, implicitly assuming that stable recommendations reflect stable internal processing. We challenge this assumption with FairGap, the first benchmark to jointly evaluate recommendation fairness at two levels: observable output shift (OBS) and hidden representation shift (IBS), measured through controlled counterfactual identity probes across gender, age, and race. Their relationship is summarized via Representation-Output Alignment (ROA), with quadrant diagnostics for identifying user-level hidden-output mismatch. Applied to six open-weight LLM families across three domains, FairGap reveals pervasive hidden-output decoupling: ROA rarely exceeds 0.22, and a non-negligible user population shows stable outputs despite substantial internal shifts, a mode that output-only audits cannot detect by design. Further, activation steering that reduces IBS by up to 8x simultaneously worsens OBS, demonstrating a fundamental tension between internal and output-level fairness that existing frameworks are unequipped to diagnose.

FragFuse: Bypassing Access Control of Large Language Model Agents via Memory-Based Query Fragmentation and Fusion

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on long-term memory to support complex task execution, user personalization, and domain adaptation. Meanwhile, emerging access-control mechanisms for LLM agents are being explored to block policy-violating requests and prevent misuse. We reveal a novel attack surface arising from agent memory operations: prohibited content that would trigger access control can be fragmented across interactions, stored in long-term memory in benign-appearing form, and later reconstructed through memory retrieval without appearing explicitly in the final user query. We propose FragFuse, the first attack that enables unprivileged users to bypass agent access control by exploiting this temporal channel introduced by long-term memory. FragFuse operates in three stages: (1) identifying rejection-responsive fragments via black-box adaptive querying with fragment masking; (2) injecting these fragments into memory using marker carrier queries; and (3) retrieving and fusing the stored fragments through a follow-up attack query. Although FragFuse can be instantiated manually for individual agents, we further develop a surrogate-based optimization scheme that tunes fusion instructions and marker designs, enabling automated attack generation without violating the attacker's threat-model assumptions. We evaluate FragFuse across four representative agent settings and task domains, covering three state-of-the-art agent access-control mechanisms. FragFuse achieves an average bypass success rate of 86.3% and an average end-to-end harmful task success rate of 41.1% across all settings, with only 4.4% average task-success degradation compared with configurations without access control. We also show that alternative defenses, including state-of-the-art prompt-injection detectors and perplexity detectors, do not effectively address this attack.