Abstract:Nash equilibrium (NE) arises from selfish utility maximization, yet its social welfare can be arbitrarily far from optimal. Moreover, computing an NE is intractable in general. We study augmented game models in which players use budget-balanced internal transfers to improve incentives before play. We first introduce \emph{Self-Enforcing Transfer Equilibrium} (SETE), where players commit to nonnegative peer-to-peer transfers that are paid only if the recipient does not deviate from a prescribed strategy. For polymatrix games, we show that every stationary point of the social welfare function, in particular any socially optimal strategy profile, can be sustained as a SETE. This induces a Nash equilibrium in the agent normal form of the corresponding augmented game. We further propose a polynomial-time algorithm and a decentralized learning dynamic to compute such product-form equilibria. We then introduce \emph{Mediated Self-Enforcing Transfer Equilibrium} (M-SETE), where a mediator makes both the payment schedule and the prescribed strategies binding offers. This additional enforcement resolves the agent-normal-form limitation: an M-SETE is a Nash equilibrium of the augmented game itself, not merely of its agent normal form, and any socially optimal strategy profile can be supported as an M-SETE in any finite game while preserving budget balance. Thus, internal transfers improve welfare and computation while preserving independent play on the equilibrium path. When full sequential-game stability is required, binding mediation provides the corresponding implementation.
Abstract:Imitation learning has enabled highly-dexterous robotic manipulation from RGB observations. Policies trained with these methods, however, typically condition robot actions on only a short history of observations. These policies cannot solve tasks that require memory and can get stuck repeatedly executing the same failing motions. In this work, we first benchmark policy performance as context length is incrementally increased from short to long, across a spectrum of tasks with varying local stability and memory requirements, and in multiple data regimes. To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate context length in imitation learning at this level of detail. Our results challenge prior claims: naively scaling context length is not as brittle as advertised in literature. With an appropriate conditioning method and denoising backbone (UNet+Cross-Attention), single-task policies achieve high success rates on many tasks in the usual data regime even with naive scaling. Next, we propose a training algorithm to jointly train policies at multiple context lengths, further reducing the sample complexity of long-context learning. Finally, we apply our findings to re-evaluate some previously proposed solutions to long-context imitation learning.
Abstract:In this paper, we study regret minimization in repeated games with \emph{adaptive} opponents who can respond based on histories of play. The standard metric of \emph{external regret} in online learning is known to fail to capture such adaptivity. To account for players' counterfactual reasoning, we introduce {\tt Repeated Policy Regret (RP-Regret)}, a game-theoretic metric that measures the difference between the \emph{realized} and the \emph{best-in-hindsight} accumulated utility when all players can \emph{respond} to the history of play. Compared to existing regret notions in this setting, ours is native to repeated game playing, enabling stronger comparators and opponents with fewer constraints, while maintaining the possibility of finding better equilibria when all players minimize it. We first identify necessary conditions for obtaining {\tt RP-Regret} sublinear in time, on the variation of the player's comparator strategies in the regret definition and on the memories of both the comparator and opponents' strategies. We then study additional conditions and provable algorithms to minimize {\tt RP-Regret}, which is by definition \emph{non-convex} in the strategy space. To address this challenge, we propose three algorithms: (i) one based on an optimization oracle, as assumed in some prior work in online non-convex learning; (ii) one that minimizes a convex and \emph{linearized} surrogate of {\tt RP-Regret} at each iteration; (iii) one that directly minimizes {\tt RP-Regret} when opponents change strategies slowly. Furthermore, when all players can run algorithms to minimize the {\tt RP-Regret} (or its linearized variant), certain subgame perfect equilibria of the repeated game can be learned. We also provide experiments showing that minimizing our regret notions can lead to more cooperative solutions with higher utility in games such as Stag-Hunt.
Abstract:Orthonormalized update rules have rapidly become a leading choice of optimizer for training large language models, with recent open-source state-of-the-art models adopting Muon. To keep these updates tractable, Muon performs the orthonormalization with the Newton--Schulz (NS) iteration. Since NS is only approximate, directions with small singular values fail to be orthonormalized. In Muon, NS is applied to the momentum matrix at every step, yet little is known about how the singular value spectrum of these momentum matrices behaves during training, or how that behavior changes with model size. We present the first systematic study of this question. Tracking singular value quantiles of the momentum buffer across layers in models ranging from 77M to 2.8B parameters, we observe a consistent picture: after a short burn-in, the quantiles stabilize at a value determined by the layer type and model size. These stabilization values follow remarkably clean power laws in model size, with layer-dependent exponents. Layers up to mid-late depth scale very mildly with model size $M$ (around $M^{-0.25}$), so the standard 5-step NS configuration used at academic scale will continue to orthonormalize them at much larger scales. Some of the late layers, however, scale much more aggressively (up to $M^{-0.96}$) and will fall into the NS failure regime at frontier scale unless one uses more NS iterations or better-tuned coefficients. NS iterations are computationally expensive at scale; our laws give practitioners a principled, layer-aware recipe for choosing the minimum NS configuration that still orthonormalizes the directions that matter -- avoiding unnecessary computation without sacrificing update quality.
Abstract:Artificial intelligence (AI) changes social learning when aggregated outputs become training data for future predictions. To study this, we extend the DeGroot model by introducing an AI aggregator that trains on population beliefs and feeds synthesized signals back to agents. We define the learning gap as the deviation of long-run beliefs from the efficient benchmark, allowing us to capture how AI aggregation affects learning. Our main result identifies a threshold in the speed of updating: when the aggregator updates too quickly, there is no positive-measure set of training weights that robustly improves learning across a broad class of environments, whereas such weights exist when updating is sufficiently slow. We then compare global and local architectures. Local aggregators trained on proximate or topic-specific data robustly improve learning in all environments. Consequently, replacing specialized local aggregators with a single global aggregator worsens learning in at least one dimension of the state.
Abstract:Online learning in arbitrary, and possibly adversarial, environments has been extensively studied in sequential decision-making, and it is closely connected to equilibrium computation in game theory. Most existing online learning algorithms rely on \emph{numeric} utility feedback from the environment, which may be unavailable in human-in-the-loop applications and/or may be restricted by privacy concerns. In this paper, we study an online learning model in which the learner only observes a \emph{ranking} over a set of proposed actions at each timestep. We consider two ranking mechanisms: rankings induced by the \emph{instantaneous} utility at the current timestep, and rankings induced by the \emph{time-average} utility up to the current timestep, under both \emph{full-information} and \emph{bandit} feedback settings. Using the standard external-regret metric, we show that sublinear regret is impossible with instantaneous-utility ranking feedback in general. Moreover, when the ranking model is relatively deterministic, \emph{i.e.}, under the Plackett-Luce model with a temperature that is sufficiently small, sublinear regret is also impossible with time-average utility ranking feedback. We then develop new algorithms that achieve sublinear regret under the additional assumption that the utility sequence has sublinear total variation. Notably, for full-information time-average utility ranking feedback, this additional assumption can be removed. As a consequence, when all players in a normal-form game follow our algorithms, repeated play yields an approximate coarse correlated equilibrium. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithms in an online large-language-model routing task.
Abstract:Adaptability has been regarded as a central feature in the foundation models, enabling them to effectively acclimate to unseen downstream tasks. Parameter-efficient fine-tuning methods such as celebrated LoRA facilitate efficient adaptation of large foundation models using labeled, high-quality and generally scarce task data. To mitigate data scarcity in fine-tuning of foundation models, we propose to leverage task similarity across multiple downstream users. Intuitively, users with similar tasks must be able to assist each other in boosting the effective fine-tuning data size. We propose Collaborative Low-Rank Adaptation, or CoLoRA, which exploits task similarity to collaboratively and efficiently fine-tune personalized foundation models. The main idea in CoLoRA is to train one shared adapter capturing underlying task similarities across all tasks, and personalized adapters tailored to user-specific tasks. We theoretically study CoLoRA on heterogeneous linear regression and provide provable guarantees for ground truth recovery. We also conduct several natural language experiments with varying task similarity, which further demonstrate that when trained together with similar tasks, individual performances are significantly boosted.
Abstract:Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as "agents" for decision-making (DM) in interactive and dynamic environments. Yet, since they were not originally designed for DM, recent studies show that LLMs can struggle even in basic online DM problems, failing to achieve low regret or an effective exploration-exploitation tradeoff. To address this, we introduce Iterative Regret-Minimization Fine-Tuning (Iterative RMFT), a post-training procedure that repeatedly distills low-regret decision trajectories back into the base model. At each iteration, the model rolls out multiple decision trajectories, selects the k-lowest regret ones, and fine-tunes itself on them. Unlike prior methods that (a) distill action sequences from known DM algorithms or (b) rely on manually crafted chain-of-thought templates, our approach leverages the regret metric to elicit the model's own DM ability and reasoning rationales. This reliance on model-generated reasoning avoids rigid output engineering and provides more flexible, natural-language training signals. Empirical results show that Iterative RMFT improves LLMs' DM performance across diverse models - from Transformers with numerical input/output, to open-weight LLMs, and advanced closed-weight models like GPT-4o mini. Its flexibility in output and reasoning formats enables generalization across tasks with varying horizons, action spaces, reward processes, and natural-language contexts. Finally, we provide theoretical insight showing that a single-layer Transformer under this paradigm can act as a no-regret learner in a simplified setting. Overall, Iterative RMFT offers a principled and general post-training framework for enhancing LLMs' decision-making capabilities.




Abstract:Conventional preference learning methods often prioritize opinions held more widely when aggregating preferences from multiple evaluators. This may result in policies that are biased in favor of some types of opinions or groups. The objective of this paper is to develop a novel preference learning framework capable of aligning aggregate opinions and policies proportionally with the true population distribution of evaluator preferences. Our approach infers the feasible set of evaluator population distributions directly from pairwise comparison data. Using these estimates, the algorithm constructs a policy that satisfies foundational axioms from social choice theory, namely monotonicity and Pareto efficiency, as well as our newly-introduced axioms of population-proportional representation and population-bounded robustness. We propose a soft-max relaxation method that smoothly trade-offs population-proportional representation with the selection of the Condorcet winner (which beats all other options in pairwise comparisons). Finally, we validate the effectiveness and scalability of our approach through experiments on both tabular recommendation tasks and large-scale language model alignment.


Abstract:We study the fundamental question of how informative a dataset is for solving a given decision-making task. In our setting, the dataset provides partial information about unknown parameters that influence task outcomes. Focusing on linear programs, we characterize when a dataset is sufficient to recover an optimal decision, given an uncertainty set on the cost vector. Our main contribution is a sharp geometric characterization that identifies the directions of the cost vector that matter for optimality, relative to the task constraints and uncertainty set. We further develop a practical algorithm that, for a given task, constructs a minimal or least-costly sufficient dataset. Our results reveal that small, well-chosen datasets can often fully determine optimal decisions -- offering a principled foundation for task-aware data selection.