A Unified Linear Programming Framework for Offline Reward Learning from Human Demonstrations and Feedback

Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) and Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) are pivotal methodologies in reward learning, which involve inferring and shaping the underlying reward function of sequential decision-making problems based on observed human demonstrations and feedback. Most prior work in reward learning has relied on prior knowledge or assumptions about decision or preference models, potentially leading to robustness issues. In response, this paper introduces a novel linear programming (LP) framework tailored for offline reward learning. Utilizing pre-collected trajectories without online exploration, this framework estimates a feasible reward set from the primal-dual optimality conditions of a suitably designed LP, and offers an optimality guarantee with provable sample efficiency. Our LP framework also enables aligning the reward functions with human feedback, such as pairwise trajectory comparison data, while maintaining computational tractability and sample efficiency. We demonstrate that our framework potentially achieves better performance compared to the conventional maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) approach through analytical examples and numerical experiments.

Uniformly Stable Algorithms for Adversarial Training and Beyond

In adversarial machine learning, neural networks suffer from a significant issue known as robust overfitting, where the robust test accuracy decreases over epochs (Rice et al., 2020). Recent research conducted by Xing et al.,2021; Xiao et al., 2022 has focused on studying the uniform stability of adversarial training. Their investigations revealed that SGD-based adversarial training fails to exhibit uniform stability, and the derived stability bounds align with the observed phenomenon of robust overfitting in experiments. This motivates us to develop uniformly stable algorithms specifically tailored for adversarial training. To this aim, we introduce Moreau envelope-$\mathcal{A}$, a variant of the Moreau Envelope-type algorithm. We employ a Moreau envelope function to reframe the original problem as a min-min problem, separating the non-strong convexity and non-smoothness of the adversarial loss. Then, this approach alternates between solving the inner and outer minimization problems to achieve uniform stability without incurring additional computational overhead. In practical scenarios, we show the efficacy of ME-$\mathcal{A}$ in mitigating the issue of robust overfitting. Beyond its application in adversarial training, this represents a fundamental result in uniform stability analysis, as ME-$\mathcal{A}$ is the first algorithm to exhibit uniform stability for weakly-convex, non-smooth problems.

Principled RLHF from Heterogeneous Feedback via Personalization and Preference Aggregation

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has been an effective technique for aligning AI systems with human values, with remarkable successes in fine-tuning large-language models recently. Most existing RLHF paradigms make the underlying assumption that human preferences are relatively homogeneous, and can be encoded by a single reward model. In this paper, we focus on addressing the issues due to the inherent heterogeneity in human preferences, as well as their potential strategic behavior in providing feedback. Specifically, we propose two frameworks to address heterogeneous human feedback in principled ways: personalization-based one and aggregation-based one. For the former, we propose two approaches based on representation learning and clustering, respectively, for learning multiple reward models that trades off the bias (due to preference heterogeneity) and variance (due to the use of fewer data for learning each model by personalization). We then establish sample complexity guarantees for both approaches. For the latter, we aim to adhere to the single-model framework, as already deployed in the current RLHF paradigm, by carefully aggregating diverse and truthful preferences from humans. We propose two approaches based on reward and preference aggregation, respectively: the former utilizes both utilitarianism and Leximin approaches to aggregate individual reward models, with sample complexity guarantees; the latter directly aggregates the human feedback in the form of probabilistic opinions. Under the probabilistic-opinion-feedback model, we also develop an approach to handle strategic human labelers who may bias and manipulate the aggregated preferences with untruthful feedback. Based on the ideas in mechanism design, our approach ensures truthful preference reporting, with the induced aggregation rule maximizing social welfare functions.

Do LLM Agents Have Regret? A Case Study in Online Learning and Games

Large language models (LLMs) have been increasingly employed for (interactive) decision-making, via the development of LLM-based autonomous agents. Despite their emerging successes, the performance of LLM agents in decision-making has not been fully investigated through quantitative metrics, especially in the multi-agent setting when they interact with each other, a typical scenario in real-world LLM-agent applications. To better understand the limits of LLM agents in these interactive environments, we propose to study their interactions in benchmark decision-making settings in online learning and game theory, through the performance metric of \emph{regret}. We first empirically study the {no-regret} behaviors of LLMs in canonical (non-stationary) online learning problems, as well as the emergence of equilibria when LLM agents interact through playing repeated games. We then provide some theoretical insights into the no-regret behaviors of LLM agents, under certain assumptions on the supervised pre-training and the rationality model of human decision-makers who generate the data. Notably, we also identify (simple) cases where advanced LLMs such as GPT-4 fail to be no-regret. To promote the no-regret behaviors, we propose a novel \emph{unsupervised} training loss of \emph{regret-loss}, which, in contrast to the supervised pre-training loss, does not require the labels of (optimal) actions. We then establish the statistical guarantee of generalization bound for regret-loss minimization, followed by the optimization guarantee that minimizing such a loss may automatically lead to known no-regret learning algorithms. Our further experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our regret-loss, especially in addressing the above ``regrettable'' cases.

Matching of Users and Creators in Two-Sided Markets with Departures

Many online platforms of today, including social media sites, are two-sided markets bridging content creators and users. Most of the existing literature on platform recommendation algorithms largely focuses on user preferences and decisions, and does not simultaneously address creator incentives. We propose a model of content recommendation that explicitly focuses on the dynamics of user-content matching, with the novel property that both users and creators may leave the platform permanently if they do not experience sufficient engagement. In our model, each player decides to participate at each time step based on utilities derived from the current match: users based on alignment of the recommended content with their preferences, and creators based on their audience size. We show that a user-centric greedy algorithm that does not consider creator departures can result in arbitrarily poor total engagement, relative to an algorithm that maximizes total engagement while accounting for two-sided departures. Moreover, in stark contrast to the case where only users or only creators leave the platform, we prove that with two-sided departures, approximating maximum total engagement within any constant factor is NP-hard. We present two practical algorithms, one with performance guarantees under mild assumptions on user preferences, and another that tends to outperform algorithms that ignore two-sided departures in practice.

Two-Timescale Q-Learning with Function Approximation in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games

We consider two-player zero-sum stochastic games and propose a two-timescale $Q$-learning algorithm with function approximation that is payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric between the two players. In two-timescale $Q$-learning, the fast-timescale iterates are updated in spirit to the stochastic gradient descent and the slow-timescale iterates (which we use to compute the policies) are updated by taking a convex combination between its previous iterate and the latest fast-timescale iterate. Introducing the slow timescale as well as its update equation marks as our main algorithmic novelty. In the special case of linear function approximation, we establish, to the best of our knowledge, the first last-iterate finite-sample bound for payoff-based independent learning dynamics of these types. The result implies a polynomial sample complexity to find a Nash equilibrium in such stochastic games. To establish the results, we model our proposed algorithm as a two-timescale stochastic approximation and derive the finite-sample bound through a Lyapunov-based approach. The key novelty lies in constructing a valid Lyapunov function to capture the evolution of the slow-timescale iterates. Specifically, through a change of variable, we show that the update equation of the slow-timescale iterates resembles the classical smoothed best-response dynamics, where the regularized Nash gap serves as a valid Lyapunov function. This insight enables us to construct a valid Lyapunov function via a generalized variant of the Moreau envelope of the regularized Nash gap. The construction of our Lyapunov function might be of broad independent interest in studying the behavior of stochastic approximation algorithms.

EM for Mixture of Linear Regression with Clustered Data

Modern data-driven and distributed learning frameworks deal with diverse massive data generated by clients spread across heterogeneous environments. Indeed, data heterogeneity is a major bottleneck in scaling up many distributed learning paradigms. In many settings however, heterogeneous data may be generated in clusters with shared structures, as is the case in several applications such as federated learning where a common latent variable governs the distribution of all the samples generated by a client. It is therefore natural to ask how the underlying clustered structures in distributed data can be exploited to improve learning schemes. In this paper, we tackle this question in the special case of estimating $d$-dimensional parameters of a two-component mixture of linear regressions problem where each of $m$ nodes generates $n$ samples with a shared latent variable. We employ the well-known Expectation-Maximization (EM) method to estimate the maximum likelihood parameters from $m$ batches of dependent samples each containing $n$ measurements. Discarding the clustered structure in the mixture model, EM is known to require $O(\log(mn/d))$ iterations to reach the statistical accuracy of $O(\sqrt{d/(mn)})$. In contrast, we show that if initialized properly, EM on the structured data requires only $O(1)$ iterations to reach the same statistical accuracy, as long as $m$ grows up as $e^{o(n)}$. Our analysis establishes and combines novel asymptotic optimization and generalization guarantees for population and empirical EM with dependent samples, which may be of independent interest.

Multi-Player Zero-Sum Markov Games with Networked Separable Interactions

We study a new class of Markov games (MGs), \textit{Multi-player Zero-sum Markov Games} with {\it Networked separable interactions} (MZNMGs), to model the local interaction structure in non-cooperative multi-agent sequential decision-making. We define an MZNMG as a model where {the payoffs of the auxiliary games associated with each state are zero-sum and} have some separable (i.e., polymatrix) structure across the neighbors over some interaction network. We first identify the necessary and sufficient conditions under which an MG can be presented as an MZNMG, and show that the set of Markov coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) collapses to the set of Markov Nash equilibrium (NE) in these games, in that the {product of} per-state marginalization of the former for all players yields the latter. Furthermore, we show that finding approximate Markov \emph{stationary} CCE in infinite-horizon discounted MZNMGs is \texttt{PPAD}-hard, unless the underlying network has a ``star topology''. Then, we propose fictitious-play-type dynamics, the classical learning dynamics in normal-form games, for MZNMGs, and establish convergence guarantees to Markov stationary NE under a star-shaped network structure. Finally, in light of the hardness result, we focus on computing a Markov \emph{non-stationary} NE and provide finite-iteration guarantees for a series of value-iteration-based algorithms. We also provide numerical experiments to corroborate our theoretical results.

A Finite-Sample Analysis of Payoff-Based Independent Learning in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games

We study two-player zero-sum stochastic games, and propose a form of independent learning dynamics called Doubly Smoothed Best-Response dynamics, which integrates a discrete and doubly smoothed variant of the best-response dynamics into temporal-difference (TD)-learning and minimax value iteration. The resulting dynamics are payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric among players. Our main results provide finite-sample guarantees. In particular, we prove the first-known $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/\epsilon^2)$ sample complexity bound for payoff-based independent learning dynamics, up to a smoothing bias. In the special case where the stochastic game has only one state (i.e., matrix games), we provide a sharper $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/\epsilon)$ sample complexity. Our analysis uses a novel coupled Lyapunov drift approach to capture the evolution of multiple sets of coupled and stochastic iterates, which might be of independent interest.

Revisiting the Linear-Programming Framework for Offline RL with General Function Approximation

Offline reinforcement learning (RL) concerns pursuing an optimal policy for sequential decision-making from a pre-collected dataset, without further interaction with the environment. Recent theoretical progress has focused on developing sample-efficient offline RL algorithms with various relaxed assumptions on data coverage and function approximators, especially to handle the case with excessively large state-action spaces. Among them, the framework based on the linear-programming (LP) reformulation of Markov decision processes has shown promise: it enables sample-efficient offline RL with function approximation, under only partial data coverage and realizability assumptions on the function classes, with favorable computational tractability. In this work, we revisit the LP framework for offline RL, and advance the existing results in several aspects, relaxing certain assumptions and achieving optimal statistical rates in terms of sample size. Our key enabler is to introduce proper constraints in the reformulation, instead of using any regularization as in the literature, sometimes also with careful choices of the function classes and initial state distributions. We hope our insights further advocate the study of the LP framework, as well as the induced primal-dual minimax optimization, in offline RL.