Abstract:Long COVID (LC) poses a challenge for clinical decision support because relevant evidence is distributed across sources with different update cycles, evidentiary roles, and levels of clinical maturity. We present a clinician-facing chatbot that organizes four sources within a retrieval-augmented workflow: expert-curated consensus guidance, current PubMed literature, registered interventional trials, and evidence from living systematic reviews. Consensus guidance is always included to frame responses, while the remaining sources are retrieved in parallel when selected by the user. In an exploratory automated evaluation on 50 clinician-facing questions, our chatbot showed comparable mean ratings to OpenEvidence, with numerically higher scores and lower score variability in an LLM-judged comparison.
Abstract:As AI-generated reviews move from experimental tools into peer-review infrastructure, most robustness concerns have focused on explicit attacks such as hidden instructions and prompt injection. We study a harder and more policy-relevant failure mode: no hidden text, no prompt injection, and no changes to methods, experiments, figures, equations, proofs, or numerical results. The attacker modifies only presentation-level content, such as the abstract, contribution framing, related work, discussion, and narrative structure. We introduce adversarial repackaging: a closed-loop attack that uses AI-reviewer feedback to search for presentation-level revisions while keeping the scientific evidence fixed. Across three mainstream AI reviewers, adversarial repackaging achieves a 75.1% attack success rate and a mean score gain of +1.21/10. The effect is not explained by ordinary prose polishing. We also reveal that strategies that change how the reviewer interprets the paper, such as related-work repositioning and analytical discussion expansion, substantially outperform surface edits such as local polishing, table formatting, and algorithm boxes. Our analysis reveals two deeper structural failure modes. First, AI reviewers are easier to impress than to convince: highlighting strengths reliably increases perceived merit, while attempts to dissolve weaknesses frequently backfire. Second, AI reviewers can confuse the appearance of addressing a limitation with actually resolving it, allowing unchanged evidence to be reinterpreted as stronger scientific contribution. These results show that the deployment risk is not only malicious hidden instructions, but the emergence of paper presentation itself as an optimization surface. We release a contamination-free rolling benchmark and attack framework for testing whether AI reviewers remain anchored to scientific content under presentation-only edits.