PIG-Nav: Key Insights for Pretrained Image Goal Navigation Models

Recent studies have explored pretrained (foundation) models for vision-based robotic navigation, aiming to achieve generalizable navigation and positive transfer across diverse environments while enhancing zero-shot performance in unseen settings. In this work, we introduce PIG-Nav (Pretrained Image-Goal Navigation), a new approach that further investigates pretraining strategies for vision-based navigation models and contributes in two key areas. Model-wise, we identify two critical design choices that consistently improve the performance of pretrained navigation models: (1) integrating an early-fusion network structure to combine visual observations and goal images via appropriately pretrained Vision Transformer (ViT) image encoder, and (2) introducing suitable auxiliary tasks to enhance global navigation representation learning, thus further improving navigation performance. Dataset-wise, we propose a novel data preprocessing pipeline for efficiently labeling large-scale game video datasets for navigation model training. We demonstrate that augmenting existing open navigation datasets with diverse gameplay videos improves model performance. Our model achieves an average improvement of 22.6% in zero-shot settings and a 37.5% improvement in fine-tuning settings over existing visual navigation foundation models in two complex simulated environments and one real-world environment. These results advance the state-of-the-art in pretrained image-goal navigation models. Notably, our model maintains competitive performance while requiring significantly less fine-tuning data, highlighting its potential for real-world deployment with minimal labeled supervision.

ReLExS: Reinforcement Learning Explanations for Stackelberg No-Regret Learners

With the constraint of a no regret follower, will the players in a two-player Stackelberg game still reach Stackelberg equilibrium? We first show when the follower strategy is either reward-average or transform-reward-average, the two players can always get the Stackelberg Equilibrium. Then, we extend that the players can achieve the Stackelberg equilibrium in the two-player game under the no regret constraint. Also, we show a strict upper bound of the follower's utility difference between with and without no regret constraint. Moreover, in constant-sum two-player Stackelberg games with non-regret action sequences, we ensure the total optimal utility of the game remains also bounded.