Differential Privacy can provide provable privacy guarantees for training data in machine learning. However, the presence of proofs does not preclude the presence of errors. Inspired by recent advances in auditing which have been used for estimating lower bounds on differentially private algorithms, here we show that auditing can also be used to find flaws in (purportedly) differentially private schemes. In this case study, we audit a recent open source implementation of a differentially private deep learning algorithm and find, with 99.99999999% confidence, that the implementation does not satisfy the claimed differential privacy guarantee.
We revisit the problem of using public data to improve the privacy/utility trade-offs for differentially private (DP) model training. Here, public data refers to auxiliary data sets that have no privacy concerns. We consider public data that is from the same distribution as the private training data. For convex losses, we show that a variant of Mirror Descent provides population risk guarantees which are independent of the dimension of the model ($p$). Specifically, we apply Mirror Descent with the loss generated by the public data as the mirror map, and using DP gradients of the loss generated by the private (sensitive) data. To obtain dimension independence, we require $G_Q^2 \leq p$ public data samples, where $G_Q$ is a measure of the isotropy of the loss function. We further show that our algorithm has a natural ``noise stability'' property: If around the current iterate the public loss satisfies $\alpha_v$-strong convexity in a direction $v$, then using noisy gradients instead of the exact gradients shifts our next iterate in the direction $v$ by an amount proportional to $1/\alpha_v$ (in contrast with DP-SGD, where the shift is isotropic). Analogous results in prior works had to explicitly learn the geometry using the public data in the form of preconditioner matrices. Our method is also applicable to non-convex losses, as it does not rely on convexity assumptions to ensure DP guarantees. We demonstrate the empirical efficacy of our algorithm by showing privacy/utility trade-offs on linear regression, deep learning benchmark datasets (WikiText-2, CIFAR-10, and EMNIST), and in federated learning (StackOverflow). We show that our algorithm not only significantly improves over traditional DP-SGD and DP-FedAvg, which do not have access to public data, but also improves over DP-SGD and DP-FedAvg on models that have been pre-trained with the public data to begin with.
We give the first polynomial-time, polynomial-sample, differentially private estimator for the mean and covariance of an arbitrary Gaussian distribution $\mathcal{N}(\mu,\Sigma)$ in $\mathbb{R}^d$. All previous estimators are either nonconstructive, with unbounded running time, or require the user to specify a priori bounds on the parameters $\mu$ and $\Sigma$. The primary new technical tool in our algorithm is a new differentially private preconditioner that takes samples from an arbitrary Gaussian $\mathcal{N}(0,\Sigma)$ and returns a matrix $A$ such that $A \Sigma A^T$ has constant condition number.
For many differentially private algorithms, such as the prominent noisy stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD), the analysis needed to bound the privacy leakage of a single training run is well understood. However, few studies have reasoned about the privacy leakage resulting from the multiple training runs needed to fine tune the value of the training algorithm's hyperparameters. In this work, we first illustrate how simply setting hyperparameters based on non-private training runs can leak private information. Motivated by this observation, we then provide privacy guarantees for hyperparameter search procedures within the framework of Renyi Differential Privacy. Our results improve and extend the work of Liu and Talwar (STOC 2019). Our analysis supports our previous observation that tuning hyperparameters does indeed leak private information, but we prove that, under certain assumptions, this leakage is modest, as long as each candidate training run needed to select hyperparameters is itself differentially private.
We give a novel, unified derivation of conditional PAC-Bayesian and mutual information (MI) generalization bounds. We derive conditional MI bounds as an instance, with special choice of prior, of conditional MAC-Bayesian (Mean Approximately Correct) bounds, itself derived from conditional PAC-Bayesian bounds, where `conditional' means that one can use priors conditioned on a joint training and ghost sample. This allows us to get nontrivial PAC-Bayes and MI-style bounds for general VC classes, something recently shown to be impossible with standard PAC-Bayesian/MI bounds. Second, it allows us to get faster rates of order $O \left(({\text{KL}}/n)^{\gamma}\right)$ for $\gamma > 1/2$ if a Bernstein condition holds and for exp-concave losses (with $\gamma=1$), which is impossible with both standard PAC-Bayes generalization and MI bounds. Our work extends the recent work by Steinke and Zakynthinou [2020] who handle MI with VC but neither PAC-Bayes nor fast rates, the recent work of Hellstr\"om and Durisi [2020] who extend the latter to the PAC-Bayes setting via a unifying exponential inequality, and Mhammedi et al. [2019] who initiated fast rate PAC-Bayes generalization error bounds but handle neither MI nor general VC classes.
Private data analysis suffers a costly curse of dimensionality. However, the data often has an underlying low-dimensional structure. For example, when optimizing via gradient descent, the gradients often lie in or near a low-dimensional subspace. If that low-dimensional structure can be identified, then we can avoid paying (in terms of privacy or accuracy) for the high ambient dimension. We present differentially private algorithms that take input data sampled from a low-dimensional linear subspace (possibly with a small amount of error) and output that subspace (or an approximation to it). These algorithms can serve as a pre-processing step for other procedures.
In many statistical problems, incorporating priors can significantly improve performance. However, the use of prior knowledge in differentially private query release has remained underexplored, despite such priors commonly being available in the form of public datasets, such as previous US Census releases. With the goal of releasing statistics about a private dataset, we present PMW^Pub, which -- unlike existing baselines -- leverages public data drawn from a related distribution as prior information. We provide a theoretical analysis and an empirical evaluation on the American Community Survey (ACS) and ADULT datasets, which shows that our method outperforms state-of-the-art methods. Furthermore, PMW^Pub scales well to high-dimensional data domains, where running many existing methods would be computationally infeasible.
We consider training models on private data that is distributed across user devices. To ensure privacy, we add on-device noise and use secure aggregation so that only the noisy sum is revealed to the server. We present a comprehensive end-to-end system, which appropriately discretizes the data and adds discrete Gaussian noise before performing secure aggregation. We provide a novel privacy analysis for sums of discrete Gaussians. We also analyze the effect of rounding the input data and the modular summation arithmetic. Our theoretical guarantees highlight the complex tension between communication, privacy, and accuracy. Our extensive experimental results demonstrate that our solution is essentially able to achieve a comparable accuracy to central differential privacy with 16 bits of precision per value.
We present three new algorithms for constructing differentially private synthetic data---a sanitized version of a sensitive dataset that approximately preserves the answers to a large collection of statistical queries. All three algorithms are \emph{oracle-efficient} in the sense that they are computationally efficient when given access to an optimization oracle. Such an oracle can be implemented using many existing (non-private) optimization tools such as sophisticated integer program solvers. While the accuracy of the synthetic data is contingent on the oracle's optimization performance, the algorithms satisfy differential privacy even in the worst case. For all three algorithms, we provide theoretical guarantees for both accuracy and privacy. Through empirical evaluation, we demonstrate that our methods scale well with both the dimensionality of the data and the number of queries. Compared to the state-of-the-art method High-Dimensional Matrix Mechanism \cite{McKennaMHM18}, our algorithms provide better accuracy in the large workload and high privacy regime (corresponding to low privacy loss $\varepsilon$).