Safety is a fundamental requirement of many robotic systems. Control barrier function (CBF)-based approaches have been proposed to guarantee the safety of robotic systems. However, the effectiveness of these approaches highly relies on the choice of CBFs. Inspired by the universal approximation power of neural networks, there is a growing trend toward representing CBFs using neural networks, leading to the notion of neural CBFs (NCBFs). Current NCBFs, however, are trained and deployed in benign environments, making them ineffective for scenarios where robotic systems experience sensor faults and attacks. In this paper, we study safety-critical control synthesis for robotic systems under sensor faults and attacks. Our main contribution is the development and synthesis of a new class of CBFs that we term fault tolerant neural control barrier function (FT-NCBF). We derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for FT-NCBFs to guarantee safety, and develop a data-driven method to learn FT-NCBFs by minimizing a loss function constructed using the derived conditions. Using the learned FT-NCBF, we synthesize a control input and formally prove the safety guarantee provided by our approach. We demonstrate our proposed approach using two case studies: obstacle avoidance problem for an autonomous mobile robot and spacecraft rendezvous problem, with code available via https://github.com/HongchaoZhang-HZ/FTNCBF.
As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into real-world applications such as code generation and chatbot assistance, extensive efforts have been made to align LLM behavior with human values, including safety. Jailbreak attacks, aiming to provoke unintended and unsafe behaviors from LLMs, remain a significant/leading LLM safety threat. In this paper, we aim to defend LLMs against jailbreak attacks by introducing SafeDecoding, a safety-aware decoding strategy for LLMs to generate helpful and harmless responses to user queries. Our insight in developing SafeDecoding is based on the observation that, even though probabilities of tokens representing harmful contents outweigh those representing harmless responses, safety disclaimers still appear among the top tokens after sorting tokens by probability in descending order. This allows us to mitigate jailbreak attacks by identifying safety disclaimers and amplifying their token probabilities, while simultaneously attenuating the probabilities of token sequences that are aligned with the objectives of jailbreak attacks. We perform extensive experiments on five LLMs using six state-of-the-art jailbreak attacks and four benchmark datasets. Our results show that SafeDecoding significantly reduces the attack success rate and harmfulness of jailbreak attacks without compromising the helpfulness of responses to benign user queries. SafeDecoding outperforms six defense methods.
Safety is critical to the usage of large language models (LLMs). Multiple techniques such as data filtering and supervised fine-tuning have been developed to strengthen LLM safety. However, currently known techniques presume that corpora used for safety alignment of LLMs are solely interpreted by semantics. This assumption, however, does not hold in real-world applications, which leads to severe vulnerabilities in LLMs. For example, users of forums often use ASCII art, a form of text-based art, to convey image information. In this paper, we propose a novel ASCII art-based jailbreak attack and introduce a comprehensive benchmark Vision-in-Text Challenge (ViTC) to evaluate the capabilities of LLMs in recognizing prompts that cannot be solely interpreted by semantics. We show that five SOTA LLMs (GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Gemini, Claude, and Llama2) struggle to recognize prompts provided in the form of ASCII art. Based on this observation, we develop the jailbreak attack ArtPrompt, which leverages the poor performance of LLMs in recognizing ASCII art to bypass safety measures and elicit undesired behaviors from LLMs. ArtPrompt only requires black-box access to the victim LLMs, making it a practical attack. We evaluate ArtPrompt on five SOTA LLMs, and show that ArtPrompt can effectively and efficiently induce undesired behaviors from all five LLMs.
We propose and analyze an adaptive adversary that can retrain a Trojaned DNN and is also aware of SOTA output-based Trojaned model detectors. We show that such an adversary can ensure (1) high accuracy on both trigger-embedded and clean samples and (2) bypass detection. Our approach is based on an observation that the high dimensionality of the DNN parameters provides sufficient degrees of freedom to simultaneously achieve these objectives. We also enable SOTA detectors to be adaptive by allowing retraining to recalibrate their parameters, thus modeling a co-evolution of parameters of a Trojaned model and detectors. We then show that this co-evolution can be modeled as an iterative game, and prove that the resulting (optimal) solution of this interactive game leads to the adversary successfully achieving the above objectives. In addition, we provide a greedy algorithm for the adversary to select a minimum number of input samples for embedding triggers. We show that for cross-entropy or log-likelihood loss functions used by the DNNs, the greedy algorithm provides provable guarantees on the needed number of trigger-embedded input samples. Extensive experiments on four diverse datasets -- MNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and SpeechCommand -- reveal that the adversary effectively evades four SOTA output-based Trojaned model detectors: MNTD, NeuralCleanse, STRIP, and TABOR.
Transfer learning (TL) has been demonstrated to improve DNN model performance when faced with a scarcity of training samples. However, the suitability of TL as a solution to reduce vulnerability of overfitted DNNs to privacy attacks is unexplored. A class of privacy attacks called membership inference attacks (MIAs) aim to determine whether a given sample belongs to the training dataset (member) or not (nonmember). We introduce Double-Dip, a systematic empirical study investigating the use of TL (Stage-1) combined with randomization (Stage-2) to thwart MIAs on overfitted DNNs without degrading classification accuracy. Our study examines the roles of shared feature space and parameter values between source and target models, number of frozen layers, and complexity of pretrained models. We evaluate Double-Dip on three (Target, Source) dataset paris: (i) (CIFAR-10, ImageNet), (ii) (GTSRB, ImageNet), (iii) (CelebA, VGGFace2). We consider four publicly available pretrained DNNs: (a) VGG-19, (b) ResNet-18, (c) Swin-T, and (d) FaceNet. Our experiments demonstrate that Stage-1 reduces adversary success while also significantly increasing classification accuracy of nonmembers against an adversary with either white-box or black-box DNN model access, attempting to carry out SOTA label-only MIAs. After Stage-2, success of an adversary carrying out a label-only MIA is further reduced to near 50%, bringing it closer to a random guess and showing the effectiveness of Double-Dip. Stage-2 of Double-Dip also achieves lower ASR and higher classification accuracy than regularization and differential privacy-based methods.
Large language models (LLMs) are shown to benefit from chain-of-thought (COT) prompting, particularly when tackling tasks that require systematic reasoning processes. On the other hand, COT prompting also poses new vulnerabilities in the form of backdoor attacks, wherein the model will output unintended malicious content under specific backdoor-triggered conditions during inference. Traditional methods for launching backdoor attacks involve either contaminating the training dataset with backdoored instances or directly manipulating the model parameters during deployment. However, these approaches are not practical for commercial LLMs that typically operate via API access. In this paper, we propose BadChain, the first backdoor attack against LLMs employing COT prompting, which does not require access to the training dataset or model parameters and imposes low computational overhead. BadChain leverages the inherent reasoning capabilities of LLMs by inserting a backdoor reasoning step into the sequence of reasoning steps of the model output, thereby altering the final response when a backdoor trigger exists in the query prompt. Empirically, we show the effectiveness of BadChain for two COT strategies across four LLMs (Llama2, GPT-3.5, PaLM2, and GPT-4) and six complex benchmark tasks encompassing arithmetic, commonsense, and symbolic reasoning. Moreover, we show that LLMs endowed with stronger reasoning capabilities exhibit higher susceptibility to BadChain, exemplified by a high average attack success rate of 97.0% across the six benchmark tasks on GPT-4. Finally, we propose two defenses based on shuffling and demonstrate their overall ineffectiveness against BadChain. Therefore, BadChain remains a severe threat to LLMs, underscoring the urgency for the development of robust and effective future defenses.
Federated learning (FL) enables multiple participants to train a global machine learning model without sharing their private training data. Peer-to-peer (P2P) FL advances existing centralized FL paradigms by eliminating the server that aggregates local models from participants and then updates the global model. However, P2P FL is vulnerable to (i) honest-but-curious participants whose objective is to infer private training data of other participants, and (ii) Byzantine participants who can transmit arbitrarily manipulated local models to corrupt the learning process. P2P FL schemes that simultaneously guarantee Byzantine resilience and preserve privacy have been less studied. In this paper, we develop Brave, a protocol that ensures Byzantine Resilience And privacy-preserving property for P2P FL in the presence of both types of adversaries. We show that Brave preserves privacy by establishing that any honest-but-curious adversary cannot infer other participants' private data by observing their models. We further prove that Brave is Byzantine-resilient, which guarantees that all benign participants converge to an identical model that deviates from a global model trained without Byzantine adversaries by a bounded distance. We evaluate Brave against three state-of-the-art adversaries on a P2P FL for image classification tasks on benchmark datasets CIFAR10 and MNIST. Our results show that the global model learned with Brave in the presence of adversaries achieves comparable classification accuracy to a global model trained in the absence of any adversary.
Machine learning models that use deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. An adversary carrying out a backdoor attack embeds a predefined perturbation called a trigger into a small subset of input samples and trains the DNN such that the presence of the trigger in the input results in an adversary-desired output class. Such adversarial retraining however needs to ensure that outputs for inputs without the trigger remain unaffected and provide high classification accuracy on clean samples. In this paper, we propose MDTD, a Multi-Domain Trojan Detector for DNNs, which detects inputs containing a Trojan trigger at testing time. MDTD does not require knowledge of trigger-embedding strategy of the attacker and can be applied to a pre-trained DNN model with image, audio, or graph-based inputs. MDTD leverages an insight that input samples containing a Trojan trigger are located relatively farther away from a decision boundary than clean samples. MDTD estimates the distance to a decision boundary using adversarial learning methods and uses this distance to infer whether a test-time input sample is Trojaned or not. We evaluate MDTD against state-of-the-art Trojan detection methods across five widely used image-based datasets: CIFAR100, CIFAR10, GTSRB, SVHN, and Flowers102; four graph-based datasets: AIDS, WinMal, Toxicant, and COLLAB; and the SpeechCommand audio dataset. MDTD effectively identifies samples that contain different types of Trojan triggers. We evaluate MDTD against adaptive attacks where an adversary trains a robust DNN to increase (decrease) distance of benign (Trojan) inputs from a decision boundary.