Algorithmic Collusion Without Threats

There has been substantial recent concern that pricing algorithms might learn to ``collude.'' Supra-competitive prices can emerge as a Nash equilibrium of repeated pricing games, in which sellers play strategies which threaten to punish their competitors who refuse to support high prices, and these strategies can be automatically learned. In fact, a standard economic intuition is that supra-competitive prices emerge from either the use of threats, or a failure of one party to optimize their payoff. Is this intuition correct? Would preventing threats in algorithmic decision-making prevent supra-competitive prices when sellers are optimizing for their own revenue? No. We show that supra-competitive prices can emerge even when both players are using algorithms which do not encode threats, and which optimize for their own revenue. We study sequential pricing games in which a first mover deploys an algorithm and then a second mover optimizes within the resulting environment. We show that if the first mover deploys any algorithm with a no-regret guarantee, and then the second mover even approximately optimizes within this now static environment, monopoly-like prices arise. The result holds for any no-regret learning algorithm deployed by the first mover and for any pricing policy of the second mover that obtains them profit at least as high as a random pricing would -- and hence the result applies even when the second mover is optimizing only within a space of non-responsive pricing distributions which are incapable of encoding threats. In fact, there exists a set of strategies, neither of which explicitly encode threats that form a Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous pricing game in algorithm space, and lead to near monopoly prices. This suggests that the definition of ``algorithmic collusion'' may need to be expanded, to include strategies without explicitly encoded threats.

Analysis of the ICML 2023 Ranking Data: Can Authors' Opinions of Their Own Papers Assist Peer Review in Machine Learning?

We conducted an experiment during the review process of the 2023 International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML) that requested authors with multiple submissions to rank their own papers based on perceived quality. We received 1,342 rankings, each from a distinct author, pertaining to 2,592 submissions. In this paper, we present an empirical analysis of how author-provided rankings could be leveraged to improve peer review processes at machine learning conferences. We focus on the Isotonic Mechanism, which calibrates raw review scores using author-provided rankings. Our analysis demonstrates that the ranking-calibrated scores outperform raw scores in estimating the ground truth ``expected review scores'' in both squared and absolute error metrics. Moreover, we propose several cautious, low-risk approaches to using the Isotonic Mechanism and author-provided rankings in peer review processes, including assisting senior area chairs' oversight of area chairs' recommendations, supporting the selection of paper awards, and guiding the recruitment of emergency reviewers. We conclude the paper by addressing the study's limitations and proposing future research directions.

Repeated Contracting with Multiple Non-Myopic Agents: Policy Regret and Limited Liability

We study a repeated contracting setting in which a Principal adaptively chooses amongst $k$ Agents at each of $T$ rounds. The Agents are non-myopic, and so a mechanism for the Principal induces a $T$-round extensive form game amongst the Agents. We give several results aimed at understanding an under-explored aspect of contract theory -- the game induced when choosing an Agent to contract with. First, we show that this game admits a pure-strategy \emph{non-responsive} equilibrium amongst the Agents -- informally an equilibrium in which the Agent's actions depend on the history of realized states of nature, but not on the history of each other's actions, and so avoids the complexities of collusion and threats. Next, we show that if the Principal selects Agents using a \emph{monotone} bandit algorithm, then for any concave contract, in any such equilibrium, the Principal obtains no regret to contracting with the best Agent in hindsight -- not just given their realized actions, but also to the counterfactual world in which they had offered a guaranteed $T$-round contract to the best Agent in hindsight, which would have induced a different sequence of actions. Finally, we show that if the Principal selects Agents using a monotone bandit algorithm which guarantees no swap-regret, then the Principal can additionally offer only limited liability contracts (in which the Agent never needs to pay the Principal) while getting no-regret to the counterfactual world in which she offered a linear contract to the best Agent in hindsight -- despite the fact that linear contracts are not limited liability. We instantiate this theorem by demonstrating the existence of a monotone no swap-regret bandit algorithm, which to our knowledge has not previously appeared in the literature.

An Elementary Predictor Obtaining $2\sqrt{T}$ Distance to Calibration

Blasiok et al. [2023] proposed distance to calibration as a natural measure of calibration error that unlike expected calibration error (ECE) is continuous. Recently, Qiao and Zheng [2024] gave a non-constructive argument establishing the existence of an online predictor that can obtain $O(\sqrt{T})$ distance to calibration in the adversarial setting, which is known to be impossible for ECE. They leave as an open problem finding an explicit, efficient algorithm. We resolve this problem and give an extremely simple, efficient, deterministic algorithm that obtains distance to calibration error at most $2\sqrt{T}$.