Principles of Solomonoff Induction and AIXI

We identify principles characterizing Solomonoff Induction by demands on an agent's external behaviour. Key concepts are rationality, computability, indifference and time consistency. Furthermore, we discuss extensions to the full AI case to derive AIXI.

No Free Lunch versus Occam's Razor in Supervised Learning

The No Free Lunch theorems are often used to argue that domain specific knowledge is required to design successful algorithms. We use algorithmic information theory to argue the case for a universal bias allowing an algorithm to succeed in all interesting problem domains. Additionally, we give a new algorithm for off-line classification, inspired by Solomonoff induction, with good performance on all structured problems under reasonable assumptions. This includes a proof of the efficacy of the well-known heuristic of randomly selecting training data in the hope of reducing misclassification rates.

Feature Reinforcement Learning In Practice

Following a recent surge in using history-based methods for resolving perceptual aliasing in reinforcement learning, we introduce an algorithm based on the feature reinforcement learning framework called PhiMDP. To create a practical algorithm we devise a stochastic search procedure for a class of context trees based on parallel tempering and a specialized proposal distribution. We provide the first empirical evaluation for PhiMDP. Our proposed algorithm achieves superior performance to the classical U-tree algorithm and the recent active-LZ algorithm, and is competitive with MC-AIXI-CTW that maintains a bayesian mixture over all context trees up to a chosen depth.We are encouraged by our ability to compete with this sophisticated method using an algorithm that simply picks one single model, and uses Q-learning on the corresponding MDP. Our PhiMDP algorithm is much simpler, yet consumes less time and memory. These results show promise for our future work on attacking more complex and larger problems.

Asymptotically Optimal Agents

Artificial general intelligence aims to create agents capable of learning to solve arbitrary interesting problems. We define two versions of asymptotic optimality and prove that no agent can satisfy the strong version while in some cases, depending on discounting, there does exist a non-computable weak asymptotically optimal agent.

Universal Prediction of Selected Bits

Many learning tasks can be viewed as sequence prediction problems. For example, online classification can be converted to sequence prediction with the sequence being pairs of input/target data and where the goal is to correctly predict the target data given input data and previous input/target pairs. Solomonoff induction is known to solve the general sequence prediction problem, but only if the entire sequence is sampled from a computable distribution. In the case of classification and discriminative learning though, only the targets need be structured (given the inputs). We show that the normalised version of Solomonoff induction can still be used in this case, and more generally that it can detect any recursive sub-pattern (regularity) within an otherwise completely unstructured sequence. It is also shown that the unnormalised version can fail to predict very simple recursive sub-patterns.

Time Consistent Discounting

A possibly immortal agent tries to maximise its summed discounted rewards over time, where discounting is used to avoid infinite utilities and encourage the agent to value current rewards more than future ones. Some commonly used discount functions lead to time-inconsistent behavior where the agent changes its plan over time. These inconsistencies can lead to very poor behavior. We generalise the usual discounted utility model to one where the discount function changes with the age of the agent. We then give a simple characterisation of time-(in)consistent discount functions and show the existence of a rational policy for an agent that knows its discount function is time-inconsistent.

Axioms for Rational Reinforcement Learning

We provide a formal, simple and intuitive theory of rational decision making including sequential decisions that affect the environment. The theory has a geometric flavor, which makes the arguments easy to visualize and understand. Our theory is for complete decision makers, which means that they have a complete set of preferences. Our main result shows that a complete rational decision maker implicitly has a probabilistic model of the environment. We have a countable version of this result that brings light on the issue of countable vs finite additivity by showing how it depends on the geometry of the space which we have preferences over. This is achieved through fruitfully connecting rationality with the Hahn-Banach Theorem. The theory presented here can be viewed as a formalization and extension of the betting odds approach to probability of Ramsey and De Finetti.

A Philosophical Treatise of Universal Induction

Understanding inductive reasoning is a problem that has engaged mankind for thousands of years. This problem is relevant to a wide range of fields and is integral to the philosophy of science. It has been tackled by many great minds ranging from philosophers to scientists to mathematicians, and more recently computer scientists. In this article we argue the case for Solomonoff Induction, a formal inductive framework which combines algorithmic information theory with the Bayesian framework. Although it achieves excellent theoretical results and is based on solid philosophical foundations, the requisite technical knowledge necessary for understanding this framework has caused it to remain largely unknown and unappreciated in the wider scientific community. The main contribution of this article is to convey Solomonoff induction and its related concepts in a generally accessible form with the aim of bridging this current technical gap. In the process we examine the major historical contributions that have led to the formulation of Solomonoff Induction as well as criticisms of Solomonoff and induction in general. In particular we examine how Solomonoff induction addresses many issues that have plagued other inductive systems, such as the black ravens paradox and the confirmation problem, and compare this approach with other recent approaches.

Algorithmic Randomness as Foundation of Inductive Reasoning and Artificial Intelligence

This article is a brief personal account of the past, present, and future of algorithmic randomness, emphasizing its role in inductive inference and artificial intelligence. It is written for a general audience interested in science and philosophy. Intuitively, randomness is a lack of order or predictability. If randomness is the opposite of determinism, then algorithmic randomness is the opposite of computability. Besides many other things, these concepts have been used to quantify Ockham's razor, solve the induction problem, and define intelligence.

Universal Learning Theory

This encyclopedic article gives a mini-introduction into the theory of universal learning, founded by Ray Solomonoff in the 1960s and significantly developed and extended in the last decade. It explains the spirit of universal learning, but necessarily glosses over technical subtleties.