Abstract:Synthesizing realistic time series with generative models has wide-ranging applications in real-world scenarios. Despite recent progress, most existing methods are trained under the assumption of abundant training data, which substantially limits their effectiveness in data-scarce settings. In this paper, we propose TimeMoDE, a novel framework that integrates Diffusion Transformers with Mixture-of-Experts to exploit both domain adaptability and diffusion-stage awareness for time series generation under data scarcity. It is pre-trained on a large-scale collection of multi-domain datasets to extract domain-agnostic temporal representations and domain-specific information benefiting generalization during fine-tuning. We propose Domain Prompts to condition expert assignment for indistinguishable noised tokens, mitigating the limitations of capturing inter-dataset relationships. Moreover, we incorporate diffusion timestep signals to equip the experts with awareness of time series degradation variations, facilitating adaptive calibrate to stage-dependent denoising requirements. Extensive experiments demonstrate that TimeMoDE outperforms existing methods under diverse low-data settings. It establishes an innovative paradigm for advanced time series few-shot generation.
Abstract:Adversarial training (AT) remains one of the most reliable empirical defenses against adversarial attacks. Its robustness critically depends on how the underlying min-max objective is optimized. In practice, Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) optimizer remains the default optimization choice for AT, whereas adaptive optimizers often improve standard training but may yield inferior robustness. Recently, the Muon optimizer, which orthogonalizes matrix-valued updates via an approximate polar decomposition, has achieved notable success in large-scale training at a memory cost comparable to SGD. This raises a security-relevant question: \textit{can orthogonalized optimization improve AT under strong and heterogeneous threat models?} Focusing on this problem, we conduct a comprehensive theoretical and empirical study. Theoretically, we show that Muon imposes a spectral-norm stability ceiling on matrix updates, limiting uncontrolled spectral growth in the training dynamics without explicitly shrinking the learned weights. Empirically, across five architectures and three $\ell_p$ threat models ($\ell_\infty$, $\ell_1$, $\ell_2$) and their union, Muon is competitive with SGD on CNNs and substantially outperforms AdamW on both CNNs and ViTs. These results identify optimizer geometry as a security-relevant factor in adversarial training, while clarifying the empirical regimes in which orthogonalized updates are beneficial. Overall, our findings highlight optimizer design as a security-critical component of AT.