A Survey on Federated Learning in Intelligent Transportation Systems

The development of Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) has brought about comprehensive urban traffic information that not only provides convenience to urban residents in their daily lives but also enhances the efficiency of urban road usage, leading to a more harmonious and sustainable urban life. Typical scenarios in ITS mainly include traffic flow prediction, traffic target recognition, and vehicular edge computing. However, most current ITS applications rely on a centralized training approach where users upload source data to a cloud server with high computing power for management and centralized training. This approach has limitations such as poor real-time performance, data silos, and difficulty in guaranteeing data privacy. To address these limitations, federated learning (FL) has been proposed as a promising solution. In this paper, we present a comprehensive review of the application of FL in ITS, with a particular focus on three key scenarios: traffic flow prediction, traffic target recognition, and vehicular edge computing. For each scenario, we provide an in-depth analysis of its key characteristics, current challenges, and specific manners in which FL is leveraged. Moreover, we discuss the benefits that FL can offer as a potential solution to the limitations of the centralized training approach currently used in ITS applications.

VoltSchemer: Use Voltage Noise to Manipulate Your Wireless Charger

Wireless charging is becoming an increasingly popular charging solution in portable electronic products for a more convenient and safer charging experience than conventional wired charging. However, our research identified new vulnerabilities in wireless charging systems, making them susceptible to intentional electromagnetic interference. These vulnerabilities facilitate a set of novel attack vectors, enabling adversaries to manipulate the charger and perform a series of attacks. In this paper, we propose VoltSchemer, a set of innovative attacks that grant attackers control over commercial-off-the-shelf wireless chargers merely by modulating the voltage from the power supply. These attacks represent the first of its kind, exploiting voltage noises from the power supply to manipulate wireless chargers without necessitating any malicious modifications to the chargers themselves. The significant threats imposed by VoltSchemer are substantiated by three practical attacks, where a charger can be manipulated to: control voice assistants via inaudible voice commands, damage devices being charged through overcharging or overheating, and bypass Qi-standard specified foreign-object-detection mechanism to damage valuable items exposed to intense magnetic fields. We demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality of the VoltSchemer attacks with successful attacks on 9 top-selling COTS wireless chargers. Furthermore, we discuss the security implications of our findings and suggest possible countermeasures to mitigate potential threats.

Programmable EM Sensor Array for Golden-Model Free Run-time Trojan Detection and Localization

Side-channel analysis has been proven effective at detecting hardware Trojans in integrated circuits (ICs). However, most detection techniques rely on large external probes and antennas for data collection and require a long measurement time to detect Trojans. Such limitations make these techniques impractical for run-time deployment and ineffective in detecting small Trojans with subtle side-channel signatures. To overcome these challenges, we propose a Programmable Sensor Array (PSA) for run-time hardware Trojan detection, localization, and identification. PSA is a tampering-resilient integrated on-chip magnetic field sensor array that can be re-programmed to change the sensors' shape, size, and location. Using PSA, EM side-channel measurement results collected from sensors at different locations on an IC can be analyzed to localize and identify the Trojan. The PSA has better performance than conventional external magnetic probes and state-of-the-art on-chip single-coil magnetic field sensors. We fabricated an AES-128 test chip with four AES Hardware Trojans. They were successfully detected, located, and identified with the proposed on-chip PSA within 10 milliseconds using our proposed cross-domain analysis.