Learning descriptive 3D features is crucial for understanding 3D scenes with diverse objects and complex structures. However, it is usually unknown whether important geometric attributes and scene context obtain enough emphasis in an end-to-end trained 3D scene understanding network. To guide 3D feature learning toward important geometric attributes and scene context, we explore the help of textual scene descriptions. Given some free-form descriptions paired with 3D scenes, we extract the knowledge regarding the object relationships and object attributes. We then inject the knowledge to 3D feature learning through three classification-based auxiliary tasks. This language-assisted training can be combined with modern object detection and instance segmentation methods to promote 3D semantic scene understanding, especially in a label-deficient regime. Moreover, the 3D feature learned with language assistance is better aligned with the language features, which can benefit various 3D-language multimodal tasks. Experiments on several benchmarks of 3D-only and 3D-language tasks demonstrate the effectiveness of our language-assisted 3D feature learning. Code is available at https://github.com/Asterisci/Language-Assisted-3D.
Machine learning (ML) models are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. Applications of ML to voice biometrics authentication are no exception. Yet, the implications of audio adversarial examples on these real-world systems remain poorly understood given that most research targets limited defenders who can only listen to the audio samples. Conflating detectability of an attack with human perceptibility, research has focused on methods that aim to produce imperceptible adversarial examples which humans cannot distinguish from the corresponding benign samples. We argue that this perspective is coarse for two reasons: 1. Imperceptibility is impossible to verify; it would require an experimental process that encompasses variations in listener training, equipment, volume, ear sensitivity, types of background noise etc, and 2. It disregards pipeline-based detection clues that realistic defenders leverage. This results in adversarial examples that are ineffective in the presence of knowledgeable defenders. Thus, an adversary only needs an audio sample to be plausible to a human. We thus introduce surreptitious adversarial examples, a new class of attacks that evades both human and pipeline controls. In the white-box setting, we instantiate this class with a joint, multi-stage optimization attack. Using an Amazon Mechanical Turk user study, we show that this attack produces audio samples that are more surreptitious than previous attacks that aim solely for imperceptibility. Lastly we show that surreptitious adversarial examples are challenging to develop in the black-box setting.