Abstract:Operational Design Domain (ODD) specifications describe where an automated driving system (ADS) is permitted to operate, but they do not prescribe what the ADS must demonstrably do once deployed within that domain. This gap between operating condition specification and behavioral validation represents a critical unresolved challenge in ADS safety assurance. This paper presents a structured, standards-grounded taxonomy of 21 behavioral competencies organized across three operational domains-Highway (HWY), Urban (URB), and Hub (HUB)-derived systematically from the PEGASUS six-layer model-based ODD. Each behavior is decomposed along longitudinal and lateral control axes and characterized against a four-property framework: Safety (gap maintenance, conflict avoidance, kinematic stability), Compliance (legal rules and behavioral norms), Comfort (rider dynamics and trust), and Efficiency (mission completion and product-level metrics). We further demonstrate that the crossing of ODD layer parameterizations with behavioral competency specifications yields concrete scenario families suitable for systematic behavioral testing and SOTIF coverage evidence. The taxonomy is grounded in AVSC00008202111, SAE J3237, and SAE J3016, and is validated as an operational specification layer through its deployment in a rule-enforced trajectory optimization system. The Hub domain is identified as a structurally distinct, underspecified domain warranting dedicated research attention.
Abstract:Methods for discovering rare failures in autonomous systems have so far been demonstrated almost exclusively in simulations with simple, academic driving stacks, leaving open whether they generalize to the more robust planners used in commercial systems. We address this gap by applying two rare-event discovery algorithms to a commercial autonomous trucking stack. Adaptive stress testing (AST) uses reinforcement learning to search for the most likely noise trajectories leading to a simulated collision, while diffusion-based failure sampling (DiFS) trains a denoising diffusion model to sample a diverse set of failures. We show that both algorithms find simulated collisions during merge and cut-in maneuvers where traditional Monte Carlo simulation does not. To make these failures actionable, we introduce a statistical analysis based on principal component analysis (PCA) that classifies failures into common modes and identifies the timesteps that most influence the outcome. We cluster the principal components and invert the PCA transform to recover generalized noise trajectories, and show that these trajectories reproduce failures in identical and similar scenarios. This provides a path from failure discovery to systematic diagnosis of perception-level flaws.
Abstract:Autonomous-vehicle motion planners must resolve conflicts among safety, regulation, comfort, and efficiency in real time while exposing those decisions for audit. We present W-SQP, a weighted tiered-slack nonlinear model predictive controller (NMPC) that compiles nine driving-rule families into a four-tier shared-slack nonlinear program solved online with CasADi and IPOPT; the name denotes the weighted quadratic slack penalty, not a sequential-quadratic-programming solver. Strongly separated tier penalties bias residual violations toward lower-priority rules while leaving actuation bounds hard. The controller replans from its executed state at $10$\,Hz and records per-rule residuals on every cycle. A $90$\,ms solver-time limit returns an anytime iterate that is projected through the vehicle dynamics before execution; median and maximum observed wall-clock solve times were $28$ and $104$\,ms. We evaluate W-SQP in closed loop on 150 Waymo Open Motion Dataset scenarios in Waymax against reactive and proposal-and-select baselines, and introduce a log-independent protocol that separates safety and regulatory compliance from resemblance to the recorded human trajectory. Under this protocol, W-SQP shows no systematic group-level deficit relative to expert replay on the log-independent safety and regulatory rules, with several localized regressions in the hardest, highest-divergence scenarios. The results characterize W-SQP as an auditable, priority-biased, anytime-capable NMPC prototype rather than a hard-real-time or formally safe controller.
Abstract:The ISO 26262 standard defines functional safety for road vehicles through risk assessments based on Severity, Exposure, and Controllability, grounded in a human-driven vehicle paradigm. In the context of autonomous vehicles (AVs), the absence of a human driver necessitates revisiting these principles. This paper decomposes the Controllability placeholder into two auditable evidence dimensions of ISO 26262 by introducing two measurable sub-concepts: Transferability and Predictability. Transferability extends Controllability to capture AV systems' ability to hand off control to dedicated fallback safety mechanisms, while Predictability captures how easily external agents can anticipate AV behavior. Predictability is formally defined from human-robot interaction-inspired principles, and a mathematical framework is provided to quantify it. A designed-versus-achievable gap is introduced to distinguish architectural fallback claims from scene-conditioned achievable fallback capability. The proposed metrics align with ISO 26262 and ISO/PAS 21448 (SOTIF), rendering fallback and interaction claims falsifiable and traceable across ODD slices. These dimensions complement rather than replace existing standards, and the enhancements preserve the structure of ISO 26262 while extending its applicability to driverless automated systems operating at SAE Levels 4 and 5.
Abstract:Autonomous driving stacks must pick one trajectory from a multi-modal candidate set; choosing by model confidence ignores safety, traffic-law, and comfort constraints. We present \textsc{RECTOR} (Rule-Enforced Constrained Trajectory Orchestrator), a post-generation reranking layer that scores candidates against a tiered rulebook (Safety~$\succ$~Legal~$\succ$~Road~$\succ$~Comfort) via differentiable proxies and a scene-conditioned applicability mechanism, then selects with a deterministic $\varepsilon$-lexicographic rule that preserves cross-tier priority by construction -- without retraining the predictor. On the Waymo Open Motion Dataset \texttt{validation\_interactive} split (43{,}219 augmented instances, $K{=}6$), under Protocol~B (28-rule proxy catalog, oracle applicability) rule-aware selection cuts Safety+Legal violations from 28.58\% to 20.42\% and Total from 40.32\% to 32.41\% versus confidence-only on the same candidates. A uniform-weight weighted-sum baseline matches binary compliance on this benchmark -- the empirical lift comes from rule-aware ranking, while the lexicographic guarantee is the structural differentiator no weight calibration can replicate. Under adversarial confidence corruption, confidence-only selection fails in 100\% of scenarios while both rule-aware selectors reject the injected mode in $\sim$96\%. All figures are proxy-evaluator results (not a safety certificate), open-loop, 5\,s horizon, U.S.\ rules, validation split.
Abstract:This paper presents a comprehensive hazard analysis, risk assessment, and loss evaluation for an Evasive Minimum Risk Maneuvering (EMRM) system designed for autonomous vehicles. The EMRM system is engineered to enhance collision avoidance and mitigate loss severity by drawing inspiration from professional drivers who perform aggressive maneuvers while maintaining stability for effective risk mitigation. Recent advancements in autonomous vehicle technology demonstrate a growing capability for high-performance maneuvers. This paper discusses a comprehensive safety verification process and establishes a clear safety goal to enhance testing validation. The study systematically identifies potential hazards and assesses their risks to overall safety and the protection of vulnerable road users. A novel loss evaluation approach is introduced, focusing on the impact of mitigation maneuvers on loss severity. Additionally, the proposed mitigation integrity level can be used to verify the minimum-risk maneuver feature. This paper applies a verification method to evasive maneuvering, contributing to the development of more reliable active safety features in autonomous driving systems.