Re-imagining ISO 26262 in the Age of Autonomous Vehicles: Enhancing Controllability through Transferability and Predictability

The ISO 26262 standard defines functional safety for road vehicles through risk assessments based on Severity, Exposure, and Controllability, grounded in a human-driven vehicle paradigm. In the context of autonomous vehicles (AVs), the absence of a human driver necessitates revisiting these principles. This paper decomposes the Controllability placeholder into two auditable evidence dimensions of ISO 26262 by introducing two measurable sub-concepts: Transferability and Predictability. Transferability extends Controllability to capture AV systems' ability to hand off control to dedicated fallback safety mechanisms, while Predictability captures how easily external agents can anticipate AV behavior. Predictability is formally defined from human-robot interaction-inspired principles, and a mathematical framework is provided to quantify it. A designed-versus-achievable gap is introduced to distinguish architectural fallback claims from scene-conditioned achievable fallback capability. The proposed metrics align with ISO 26262 and ISO/PAS 21448 (SOTIF), rendering fallback and interaction claims falsifiable and traceable across ODD slices. These dimensions complement rather than replace existing standards, and the enhancements preserve the structure of ISO 26262 while extending its applicability to driverless automated systems operating at SAE Levels 4 and 5.

RECTOR: Priority-Aware Rule-Based Reranking for Compliance-Aware Autonomous Driving Trajectory Selection

Autonomous driving stacks must pick one trajectory from a multi-modal candidate set; choosing by model confidence ignores safety, traffic-law, and comfort constraints. We present \textsc{RECTOR} (Rule-Enforced Constrained Trajectory Orchestrator), a post-generation reranking layer that scores candidates against a tiered rulebook (Safety~$\succ$~Legal~$\succ$~Road~$\succ$~Comfort) via differentiable proxies and a scene-conditioned applicability mechanism, then selects with a deterministic $\varepsilon$-lexicographic rule that preserves cross-tier priority by construction -- without retraining the predictor. On the Waymo Open Motion Dataset \texttt{validation\_interactive} split (43{,}219 augmented instances, $K{=}6$), under Protocol~B (28-rule proxy catalog, oracle applicability) rule-aware selection cuts Safety+Legal violations from 28.58\% to 20.42\% and Total from 40.32\% to 32.41\% versus confidence-only on the same candidates. A uniform-weight weighted-sum baseline matches binary compliance on this benchmark -- the empirical lift comes from rule-aware ranking, while the lexicographic guarantee is the structural differentiator no weight calibration can replicate. Under adversarial confidence corruption, confidence-only selection fails in 100\% of scenarios while both rule-aware selectors reject the injected mode in $\sim$96\%. All figures are proxy-evaluator results (not a safety certificate), open-loop, 5\,s horizon, U.S.\ rules, validation split.

Safety Verification for Evasive Collision Avoidance in Autonomous Vehicles with Enhanced Resolutions

This paper presents a comprehensive hazard analysis, risk assessment, and loss evaluation for an Evasive Minimum Risk Maneuvering (EMRM) system designed for autonomous vehicles. The EMRM system is engineered to enhance collision avoidance and mitigate loss severity by drawing inspiration from professional drivers who perform aggressive maneuvers while maintaining stability for effective risk mitigation. Recent advancements in autonomous vehicle technology demonstrate a growing capability for high-performance maneuvers. This paper discusses a comprehensive safety verification process and establishes a clear safety goal to enhance testing validation. The study systematically identifies potential hazards and assesses their risks to overall safety and the protection of vulnerable road users. A novel loss evaluation approach is introduced, focusing on the impact of mitigation maneuvers on loss severity. Additionally, the proposed mitigation integrity level can be used to verify the minimum-risk maneuver feature. This paper applies a verification method to evasive maneuvering, contributing to the development of more reliable active safety features in autonomous driving systems.