Abstract:As Large Language Model (LLM) agents become more capable, their coordinated use in the form of multi-agent systems is anticipated to emerge as a practical paradigm. Prior work has examined the safety and misuse risks associated with agents. However, much of this has focused on the single-agent case and/or setups missing basic engineering safeguards such as access control, revealing a scarcity of threat modeling in multi-agent systems. We investigate the security vulnerabilities of a popular multi-agent pattern known as the orchestrator setup, in which a central agent decomposes and delegates tasks to specialized agents. Through red-teaming a concrete setup representative of a likely future use case, we demonstrate a novel attack vector, OMNI-LEAK, that compromises several agents to leak sensitive data through a single indirect prompt injection, even in the \textit{presence of data access control}. We report the susceptibility of frontier models to different categories of attacks, finding that both reasoning and non-reasoning models are vulnerable, even when the attacker lacks insider knowledge of the implementation details. Our work highlights the importance of safety research to generalize from single-agent to multi-agent settings, in order to reduce the serious risks of real-world privacy breaches and financial losses and overall public trust in AI agents.
Abstract:As Large Language Model (LLM) agents become more widespread, associated misalignment risks increase. Prior work has examined agents' ability to enact misaligned behaviour (misalignment capability) and their compliance with harmful instructions (misuse propensity). However, the likelihood of agents attempting misaligned behaviours in real-world settings (misalignment propensity) remains poorly understood. We introduce a misalignment propensity benchmark, AgentMisalignment, consisting of a suite of realistic scenarios in which LLM agents have the opportunity to display misaligned behaviour. We organise our evaluations into subcategories of misaligned behaviours, including goal-guarding, resisting shutdown, sandbagging, and power-seeking. We report the performance of frontier models on our benchmark, observing higher misalignment on average when evaluating more capable models. Finally, we systematically vary agent personalities through different system prompts. We find that persona characteristics can dramatically and unpredictably influence misalignment tendencies -- occasionally far more than the choice of model itself -- highlighting the importance of careful system prompt engineering for deployed AI agents. Our work highlights the failure of current alignment methods to generalise to LLM agents, and underscores the need for further propensity evaluations as autonomous systems become more prevalent.