Improving Methodologies for Agentic Evaluations Across Domains: Leakage of Sensitive Information, Fraud and Cybersecurity Threats

The rapid rise of autonomous AI systems and advancements in agent capabilities are introducing new risks due to reduced oversight of real-world interactions. Yet agent testing remains nascent and is still a developing science. As AI agents begin to be deployed globally, it is important that they handle different languages and cultures accurately and securely. To address this, participants from The International Network for Advanced AI Measurement, Evaluation and Science, including representatives from Singapore, Japan, Australia, Canada, the European Commission, France, Kenya, South Korea, and the United Kingdom have come together to align approaches to agentic evaluations. This is the third exercise, building on insights from two earlier joint testing exercises conducted by the Network in November 2024 and February 2025. The objective is to further refine best practices for testing advanced AI systems. The exercise was split into two strands: (1) common risks, including leakage of sensitive information and fraud, led by Singapore AISI; and (2) cybersecurity, led by UK AISI. A mix of open and closed-weight models were evaluated against tasks from various public agentic benchmarks. Given the nascency of agentic testing, our primary focus was on understanding methodological issues in conducting such tests, rather than examining test results or model capabilities. This collaboration marks an important step forward as participants work together to advance the science of agentic evaluations.

Improving Methodologies for LLM Evaluations Across Global Languages

As frontier AI models are deployed globally, it is essential that their behaviour remains safe and reliable across diverse linguistic and cultural contexts. To examine how current model safeguards hold up in such settings, participants from the International Network for Advanced AI Measurement, Evaluation and Science, including representatives from Singapore, Japan, Australia, Canada, the EU, France, Kenya, South Korea and the UK conducted a joint multilingual evaluation exercise. Led by Singapore AISI, two open-weight models were tested across ten languages spanning high and low resourced groups: Cantonese English, Farsi, French, Japanese, Korean, Kiswahili, Malay, Mandarin Chinese and Telugu. Over 6,000 newly translated prompts were evaluated across five harm categories (privacy, non-violent crime, violent crime, intellectual property and jailbreak robustness), using both LLM-as-a-judge and human annotation. The exercise shows how safety behaviours can vary across languages. These include differences in safeguard robustness across languages and harm types and variation in evaluator reliability (LLM-as-judge vs. human review). Further, it also generated methodological insights for improving multilingual safety evaluations, such as the need for culturally contextualised translations, stress-tested evaluator prompts and clearer human annotation guidelines. This work represents an initial step toward a shared framework for multilingual safety testing of advanced AI systems and calls for continued collaboration with the wider research community and industry.

A Comprehensive Survey on Physical Risk Control in the Era of Foundation Model-enabled Robotics

Recent Foundation Model-enabled robotics (FMRs) display greatly improved general-purpose skills, enabling more adaptable automation than conventional robotics. Their ability to handle diverse tasks thus creates new opportunities to replace human labor. However, unlike general foundation models, FMRs interact with the physical world, where their actions directly affect the safety of humans and surrounding objects, requiring careful deployment and control. Based on this proposition, our survey comprehensively summarizes robot control approaches to mitigate physical risks by covering all the lifespan of FMRs ranging from pre-deployment to post-accident stage. Specifically, we broadly divide the timeline into the following three phases: (1) pre-deployment phase, (2) pre-incident phase, and (3) post-incident phase. Throughout this survey, we find that there is much room to study (i) pre-incident risk mitigation strategies, (ii) research that assumes physical interaction with humans, and (iii) essential issues of foundation models themselves. We hope that this survey will be a milestone in providing a high-resolution analysis of the physical risks of FMRs and their control, contributing to the realization of a good human-robot relationship.