Cyber attack detection is the process of identifying and preventing cyber attacks on computer systems and networks.
We consider the problem of learning-based man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks in cyber-physical systems (CPS), and extend our previously proposed Bellman Deviation Detection (BDD) framework for model-free reinforcement learning (RL). We refine the standard MDP attack model by allowing the reward function to depend on both the current and subsequent states, thereby capturing reward variations induced by errors in the adversary's transition estimate. We also derive an optimal system-identification strategy for the adversary that minimizes detectable value deviations. Further, we prove that the agent's asymptotic learning time required to secure the system scales linearly with the adversary's learning time, and that this matches the optimal lower bound. Hence, the proposed detection scheme is order-optimal in detection efficiency. Finally, we extend the framework to asynchronous and intermittent attack scenarios, where reliable detection is preserved.
As the Internet of Things (IoT) continues to expand across critical infrastructure, smart environments, and consumer devices, securing them against cyber threats has become increasingly vital. Traditional intrusion detection models often treat IoT threats as binary classification problems or rely on opaque models, thereby limiting trust. This work studies multiclass threat attribution in IoT environments using the CICIoT2023 dataset, grouping over 30 attack variants into 8 semantically meaningful classes. We utilize a combination of a gradient boosting model and SHAP (SHapley Additive exPlanations) to deliver both global and class-specific explanations, enabling detailed insight into the features driving each attack classification. The results show that the model distinguishes distinct behavioral signatures of the attacks using flow timing, packet size uniformity, TCP flag dynamics, and statistical variance. Additional analysis that exposes both feature attribution and the decision trajectory per class further validates these observed patterns. Our findings contribute to the development of more accurate and explainable intrusion detection systems, bridging the gap between high-performance machine learning and the need for trust and accountability in AI-driven cybersecurity for IoT environments.
This article presents an optimal-transport (OT)-driven, distributionally robust attack detection algorithm, OT-DETECT, for cyber-physical systems (CPS) modeled as partially observed linear stochastic systems. The underlying detection problem is formulated as a minmax optimization problem using 1-Wasserstein ambiguity sets constructed from observer residuals under both the nominal (attack-free) and attacked regimes. We show that the minmax detection problem can be reduced to a finite-dimensional linear program for computing the worst-case distribution (WCD). Off-support residuals are handled via a kernel-smoothed score function that drives a CUSUM procedure for sequential detection. We also establish a non-asymptotic tail bound on the false-positive error of the CUSUM statistic under the nominal (attack-free) condition, under mild assumptions. Numerical illustrations are provided to evaluate the robustness properties of OT-DETECT.
The increasing sophistication of cyber threats, especially zero-day attacks, poses a significant challenge to cybersecurity. Zero-day attacks exploit unknown vulnerabilities, making them difficult to detect and defend against. Existing approaches patch flaws and deploy an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). Using advanced Wasserstein GANs with Gradient Penalty (WGAN-GP), this paper makes a novel proposition to synthesize network traffic that mimics zero-day patterns, enriching data diversity and improving IDS generalization. SA-WGAN-GP is first introduced, which adds a Self-Attention (SA) mechanism to capture long-range cross-feature dependencies by reshaping the feature vector into tokens after dense projections. A JS-WGAN-GP is then proposed, which adds a Jensen-Shannon (JS) divergence-based auxiliary discriminator that is trained with Binary Cross-Entropy (BCE), frozen during updates, and used to regularize the generator for smoother gradients and higher sample quality. Third, SA-JS-WGAN-GP is created by combining the SA mechanism with JS divergence, thereby enhancing the data generation ability of WGAN-GP. As data augmentation does not equate with true zero-day attack discovery, we emulate zero-day attacks via the leave-one-attack-type-out method on the NSL-KDD dataset for training all GANs and IDS models in the assessment of the effectiveness of the proposed solution. The evaluation results show that integrating SA and JS divergence into WGAN-GP yields superior IDS performance and more effective zero-day risk detection.
Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS) face growing threats from cyber-attacks that exploit sensor and control vulnerabilities. Digital Twin (DT) technology can detect anomalies via predictive modelling, but current methods cannot distinguish attack types and often rely on costly full-system shutdowns. This paper presents i-SDT (intelligent Self-Defending DT), combining hydraulically-regularized predictive modelling, multi-class attack discrimination, and adaptive resilient control. Temporal Convolutional Networks (TCNs) with differentiable conservation constraints capture nominal dynamics and improve robustness to adversarial manipulations. A recurrent residual encoder with Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) separates normal operation from single- and multi-stage attacks in latent space. When attacks are confirmed, Model Predictive Control (MPC) uses uncertainty-aware DT predictions to keep operations safe without shutdown. Evaluation on SWaT and WADI datasets shows major gains in detection accuracy, 44.1% fewer false alarms, and 56.3% lower operational costs in simulation-in-the-loop evaluation. with sub-second inference latency confirming real-time feasibility on plant-level workstations, i-SDT advances autonomous cyber-physical defense while maintaining operational resilience.
The proliferation of large-scale IoT networks has been both a blessing and a curse. Not only has it revolutionized the way organizations operate by increasing the efficiency of automated procedures, but it has also simplified our daily lives. However, while IoT networks have improved convenience and connectivity, they have also increased security risk due to unauthorized devices gaining access to these networks and exploiting existing weaknesses with specific attack types. The research proposes two lightweight deep learning (DL)-based intelligent intrusion detection systems (IDS). to enhance the security of IoT networks: the proposed convolutional neural network (CNN)-based IDS and the proposed long short-term memory (LSTM)-based IDS. The research evaluated the performance of both intelligent IDSs based on DL using the CICIoT2023 dataset. DL-based intelligent IDSs successfully identify and classify various cyber threats using binary, grouped, and multi-class classification. The proposed CNN-based IDS achieves an accuracy of 99.34%, 99.02% and 98.6%, while the proposed LSTM-based IDS achieves an accuracy of 99.42%, 99.13%, and 98.68% for binary, grouped, and multi-class classification, respectively.
Log data are essential for intrusion detection and forensic investigations. However, manual log analysis is tedious due to high data volumes, heterogeneous event formats, and unstructured messages. Even though many automated methods for log analysis exist, they usually still rely on domain-specific configurations such as expert-defined detection rules, handcrafted log parsers, or manual feature-engineering. Crucially, the level of automation of conventional methods is limited due to their inability to semantically understand logs and explain their underlying causes. In contrast, Large Language Models enable domain- and format-agnostic interpretation of system logs and security alerts. Unfortunately, research on this topic remains challenging, because publicly available and labeled data sets covering a broad range of attack techniques are scarce. To address this gap, we introduce the Cyber Attack Manifestation Log Data Set (CAM-LDS), comprising seven attack scenarios that cover 81 distinct techniques across 13 tactics and collected from 18 distinct sources within a fully open-source and reproducible test environment. We extract log events that directly result from attack executions to facilitate analysis of manifestations concerning command observability, event frequencies, performance metrics, and intrusion detection alerts. We further present an illustrative case study utilizing an LLM to process the CAM-LDS. The results indicate that correct attack techniques are predicted perfectly for approximately one third of attack steps and adequately for another third, highlighting the potential of LLM-based log interpretation and utility of our data set.
Cyber-security systems often operate in resource-constrained environments, such as edge environments and real-time monitoring systems, where model size and inference time are crucial. A light-weight intrusion detection framework is proposed that utilizes the Kolmogorov-Arnold Network (KAN) to capture complex features in the data, with the efficiency of decoupled knowledge distillation (DKD) training approach. A high-capacity KAN network is first trained to detect attacks performed on the test bed. This model then serves as a teacher to guide a much smaller multilayer perceptron (MLP) student model via DKD. The resulting DKD-MLP model contains only 2,522 and 1,622 parameters for WADI and SWaT datasets, which are significantly smaller than the number of parameters of the KAN teacher model. This is highly appropriate for deployment in resource-constrained devices with limited computational resources. Despite its low size, the student model maintains a high performance. Our approach demonstrate the practicality of using KAN as a knowledge-rich teacher to train much smaller student models, without considerable drop in accuracy in intrusion detection frameworks. We have validated our approach on two publicly available datasets. We report F1-score improvements of 4.18% on WADI and 3.07% on SWaT when using the DKD-MLP model, compared to the bare student model. The implementation of this paper is available on our GitHub repository.
Automated detection of cyber attacks is a critical capability to counteract the growing volume and sophistication of cyber attacks. However, the high numbers of security alerts issued by intrusion detection systems lead to alert fatigue among analysts working in security operations centres (SOC), which in turn causes slow reaction time and incorrect decision making. Alert grouping, which refers to clustering of security alerts according to their underlying causes, can significantly reduce the number of distinct items analysts have to consider. Unfortunately, conventional time-based alert grouping solutions are unsuitable for large scale computer networks characterised by high levels of false positive alerts and simultaneously occurring attacks. To address these limitations, we propose AlertBERT, a self-supervised framework designed to group alerts from isolated or concurrent attacks in noisy environments. Thereby, our open-source implementation of AlertBERT leverages masked-language-models and density-based clustering to support both real-time or forensic operation. To evaluate our framework, we further introduce a novel data augmentation method that enables flexible control over noise levels and simulates concurrent attack occurrences. Based on the data sets generated through this method, we demonstrate that AlertBERT consistently outperforms conventional time-based grouping techniques, achieving superior accuracy in identifying correct alert groups.
The Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) relies on heterogeneous, bandwidth-constrained, and intermittently connected tactical networks that face rapidly evolving cyber threats. In this setting, intrusion detection cannot depend on continuous central collection of raw traffic due to disrupted links, latency, operational security limits, and non-IID traffic across zones. We present Zone-Adaptive Intrusion Detection (ZAID), a collaborative detection and model-improvement framework for unseen attack types, where "zero-day" refers to previously unobserved attack families and behaviours (not vulnerability disclosure timing). ZAID combines a universal convolutional model for generalisable traffic representations, an autoencoder-based reconstruction signal as an auxiliary anomaly score, and lightweight adapter modules for parameter-efficient zone adaptation. To support cross-zone generalisation under constrained connectivity, ZAID uses federated aggregation and pseudo-labelling to leverage locally observed, weakly labelled behaviours. We evaluate ZAID on ToN_IoT using a zero-day protocol that excludes MITM, DDoS, and DoS from supervised training and introduces them during zone-level deployment and adaptation. ZAID achieves up to 83.16% accuracy on unseen attack traffic and transfers to UNSW-NB15 under the same procedure, with a best accuracy of 71.64%. These results indicate that parameter-efficient, zone-personalised collaboration can improve the detection of previously unseen attacks in contested IoBT environments.