Cyber attack detection is the process of identifying and preventing cyber attacks on computer systems and networks.
Agentic systems involved in high-stake decision-making under adversarial pressure need formal guarantees not offered by existing approaches. Motivated by the operational needs of security operations centers (SOCs) that must configure endpoint detection and response (EDR) policies under adversarial pressure, we present a tool-mediated architecture: LLM agents use deterministic tools (Stackelberg best-response, Bayesian observer updates, attack-graph primitives) and select from finite action catalogs enforced at the tool-output interface. A composite Lyapunov function machine-checked in Lean 4 with zero sorry certifies controllability, observability from asymmetric sensor data, and Input-to-State Stability (ISS) robustness under intelligent adversarial disturbance, with two corollaries extending the certificate to any controller or adversary from the catalogs. On 282 real enterprise attack graphs, the claims hold with margin. On paired offensive/defensive telemetry, a tool-mediated Claude Sonnet 4 controller reduces the attacker's expected payoff (game value) by 59% relative to a deterministic greedy baseline, with zero variance across 40 runs at four temperatures. A Claude Haiku 4.5 controller converges to suboptimal game values but stays catalog-bounded over an additional 40 runs, demonstrating that architectural stability is not dependent on the controller capability. The LLM agent's non-determinism furthers creative exploration of strategies, while the tool-mediated architecture ensures system stability.
The proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices has significantly expanded attack surfaces, making IoT ecosystems particularly susceptible to sophisticated cyber threats. To address this challenge, this work introduces A-THENA, a lightweight early intrusion detection system (EIDS) that significantly extends preliminary findings on time-aware encodings. A-THENA employs an advanced Transformer-based architecture augmented with a generalized Time-Aware Hybrid Encoding (THE), integrating packet timestamps to effectively capture temporal dynamics essential for accurate and early threat detection. The proposed system further employs a Network-Specific Augmentation (NA) pipeline, which enhances model robustness and generalization. We evaluate A-THENA on three benchmark IoT intrusion detection datasets-CICIoT23-WEB, MQTT-IoT-IDS2020, and IoTID20-where it consistently achieves strong performance. Averaged across all three datasets, it improves accuracy by 6.88 percentage points over the best-performing traditional positional encoding, 3.69 points over the strongest feature-based model, 6.17 points over the leading time-aware alternatives, and 5.11 points over related models, while achieving near-zero false alarms and false negatives. To assess real-world feasibility, we deploy A-THENA on the Raspberry Pi Zero 2 W, demonstrating its ability to perform real-time intrusion detection with minimal latency and memory usage. These results establish A-THENA as an agile, practical, and highly effective solution for securing IoT networks.
Line current differential relays (LCDRs) are measurement-driven relays that rely on time-synchronized multi-phase current waveforms to infer internal faults in AC and DC power networks. In inverter-based microgrids, however, the increasing reliance on digitally communicated measurements exposes LCDRs to false-data injection attacks (FDIAs), in which adversaries manipulate remote measurement streams to create protection-triggering yet physically inconsistent current trajectories. This paper addresses this emerging measurement integrity problem by introducing a measurement integrity validation scheme that operates as a supervisory instrumentation layer for modern LCDRs. The proposed scheme interprets short windows of synchronized instantaneous current measurements recorded during relay operation and assesses their physical consistency to distinguish genuine fault-induced trajectories from cyber-manipulated measurement streams. A recurrent neural network is trained offline using only relay-available current measurements and exploits the temporal structure of differential current waveforms, which remains informative in inverter-dominated systems where current magnitude is no longer a reliable observable. The method requires no additional sensors, auxiliary protection elements, or prior knowledge of network topology, and is applicable to both AC and DC LCDRs without structural modification. The proposed measurement validation scheme is evaluated on an islanded inverter-based microgrid under a comprehensive set of fault and FDIA scenarios, demonstrating high detection accuracy while preserving relay dependability. Hardware-in-the-loop validation using an OPAL-RT real-time simulator confirms that the scheme satisfies protection timing constraints and can operate in real time under realistic operating conditions.
We present a framework for bridging the gap between sensor attack detection and recovery in cyber-physical systems. The proposed framework models modern-day, complex perception pipelines as bipartite graphs, which combined with anomaly detector alerts defines a Bayesian network for inferring compromised sensors. An active probing strategy exploits system nonlinearities to maximize distinguishability between attack hypotheses, while compromised sensors are selectively disabled to maintain reliable state estimation. We propose a threshold-based probing strategy and show its effectiveness via a simplified partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) formulation. Experiments on an inverted pendulum under single and multi-sensor attacks show that our method significantly outperforms outlier-robust and prediction-based baselines, especially under prolonged attacks.
We consider the problem of learning-based man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks in cyber-physical systems (CPS), and extend our previously proposed Bellman Deviation Detection (BDD) framework for model-free reinforcement learning (RL). We refine the standard MDP attack model by allowing the reward function to depend on both the current and subsequent states, thereby capturing reward variations induced by errors in the adversary's transition estimate. We also derive an optimal system-identification strategy for the adversary that minimizes detectable value deviations. Further, we prove that the agent's asymptotic learning time required to secure the system scales linearly with the adversary's learning time, and that this matches the optimal lower bound. Hence, the proposed detection scheme is order-optimal in detection efficiency. Finally, we extend the framework to asynchronous and intermittent attack scenarios, where reliable detection is preserved.
Cyber-attacks continue to grow in scale and sophistication, yet existing network intrusion detection approaches lack the semantic depth required for path reasoning over attacker-victim interactions. We address this by first modelling network alerts as a knowledge graph, then formulating hyper-relational alert prediction as a hyper-relational knowledge graph completion (HR-KGC) problem, representing each network alert as a qualified statement (h, r, t, Q), where h and t are source and destination IPs, r denotes the attack type, and Q encodes flow-level metadata such as timestamps, ports, protocols, and attack intensity, going beyond standard KGC binary triples (h, r, t) that would discard this contextual richness. We introduce five models across three contributions: first, Hyper-relational Neural Bellman-Ford (HR-NBFNet) extends Neural Bellman-Ford Networks to the hyper-relational setting with qualifier-aware multi-hop path reasoning, while its multi-task variant MT-HR-NBFNet jointly predicts tail, relation, and qualifier-value within a single traversal pass; second, AlertStar fuses qualifier context and structural path information entirely in embedding space via cross-attention and learned path composition, and its multi-task extension MT-AlertStar eliminates the overhead of full knowledge graph propagation; third, HR-NBFNet-CQ extends qualifier-aware representations to answer complex first-order logic queries, including one-hop, two-hop chain, two-anchor intersection, and union, enabling multi-condition threat reasoning over the alert knowledge graph. Evaluated inductively on the Warden and UNSW-NB15 benchmarks across three qualifier-density regimes, AlertStar and MT-AlertStar achieve superior MR, MRR, and Hits@k, demonstrating that local qualifier fusion is both sufficient and more efficient than global path propagation for hyper-relational alert prediction.
This article presents an optimal-transport (OT)-driven, distributionally robust attack detection algorithm, OT-DETECT, for cyber-physical systems (CPS) modeled as partially observed linear stochastic systems. The underlying detection problem is formulated as a minmax optimization problem using 1-Wasserstein ambiguity sets constructed from observer residuals under both the nominal (attack-free) and attacked regimes. We show that the minmax detection problem can be reduced to a finite-dimensional linear program for computing the worst-case distribution (WCD). Off-support residuals are handled via a kernel-smoothed score function that drives a CUSUM procedure for sequential detection. We also establish a non-asymptotic tail bound on the false-positive error of the CUSUM statistic under the nominal (attack-free) condition, under mild assumptions. Numerical illustrations are provided to evaluate the robustness properties of OT-DETECT.
We introduce the Hiremath Early Detection (HED) Score, a principled, measure-theoretic evaluation criterion for quantifying the time-value of information in systems operating over non-stationary stochastic processes subject to abrupt regime transitions. Existing evaluation paradigms, chiefly the ROC/AUC framework and its downstream variants, are temporally agnostic: they assign identical credit to a detection at t + 1 and a detection at t + tau for arbitrarily large tau. This indifference to latency is a fundamental inadequacy in time-critical domains including cyber-physical security, algorithmic surveillance, and epidemiological monitoring. The HED Score resolves this by integrating a baseline-neutral, exponentially decaying kernel over the posterior probability stream of a target regime, beginning precisely at the onset of the regime shift. The resulting scalar simultaneously encodes detection acuity, temporal lead, and pre-transition calibration quality. We prove that the HED Score satisfies three axiomatic requirements: (A1) Temporal Monotonicity, (A2) Invariance to Pre-Attack Bias, and (A3) Sensitivity Decomposability. We further demonstrate that the HED Score admits a natural parametric family indexed by the Hiremath Decay Constant (lambda_H), whose domain-specific calibration constitutes the Hiremath Standard Table. As an empirical vehicle, we present PARD-SSM (Probabilistic Anomaly and Regime Detection via Switching State-Space Models), which couples fractional Stochastic Differential Equations (fSDEs) with a Switching Linear Dynamical System (S-LDS) inference backend. On the NSL-KDD benchmark, PARD-SSM achieves a HED Score of 0.0643, representing a 388.8 percent improvement over a Random Forest baseline (0.0132), with statistical significance confirmed via block-bootstrap resampling (p < 0.001). We propose the HED Score as the successor evaluation standard to ROC/AUC.
The increasing sophistication of cyber threats, especially zero-day attacks, poses a significant challenge to cybersecurity. Zero-day attacks exploit unknown vulnerabilities, making them difficult to detect and defend against. Existing approaches patch flaws and deploy an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). Using advanced Wasserstein GANs with Gradient Penalty (WGAN-GP), this paper makes a novel proposition to synthesize network traffic that mimics zero-day patterns, enriching data diversity and improving IDS generalization. SA-WGAN-GP is first introduced, which adds a Self-Attention (SA) mechanism to capture long-range cross-feature dependencies by reshaping the feature vector into tokens after dense projections. A JS-WGAN-GP is then proposed, which adds a Jensen-Shannon (JS) divergence-based auxiliary discriminator that is trained with Binary Cross-Entropy (BCE), frozen during updates, and used to regularize the generator for smoother gradients and higher sample quality. Third, SA-JS-WGAN-GP is created by combining the SA mechanism with JS divergence, thereby enhancing the data generation ability of WGAN-GP. As data augmentation does not equate with true zero-day attack discovery, we emulate zero-day attacks via the leave-one-attack-type-out method on the NSL-KDD dataset for training all GANs and IDS models in the assessment of the effectiveness of the proposed solution. The evaluation results show that integrating SA and JS divergence into WGAN-GP yields superior IDS performance and more effective zero-day risk detection.
Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS) face growing threats from cyber-attacks that exploit sensor and control vulnerabilities. Digital Twin (DT) technology can detect anomalies via predictive modelling, but current methods cannot distinguish attack types and often rely on costly full-system shutdowns. This paper presents i-SDT (intelligent Self-Defending DT), combining hydraulically-regularized predictive modelling, multi-class attack discrimination, and adaptive resilient control. Temporal Convolutional Networks (TCNs) with differentiable conservation constraints capture nominal dynamics and improve robustness to adversarial manipulations. A recurrent residual encoder with Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) separates normal operation from single- and multi-stage attacks in latent space. When attacks are confirmed, Model Predictive Control (MPC) uses uncertainty-aware DT predictions to keep operations safe without shutdown. Evaluation on SWaT and WADI datasets shows major gains in detection accuracy, 44.1% fewer false alarms, and 56.3% lower operational costs in simulation-in-the-loop evaluation. with sub-second inference latency confirming real-time feasibility on plant-level workstations, i-SDT advances autonomous cyber-physical defense while maintaining operational resilience.