Data Leakage Prevention in Agentic Applications via Preemptive Hardening

Agentic systems integrate LLM driven planning with interfaces to external tools, making data leakage and tool misuse feasible via instruction/data boundary failures and prompt injection attacks. Enforcing required controls consistently is particularly challenging in workflows spanning many codebases and heterogeneous agents. To address this challenge in multi agentic systems, we present a pre-deployment pipeline for scanning, hardening, and validation of agentic applications. The pipeline analyzes prompt templates, tool interfaces, and tool-invocation code to identify leakage-enabling patterns and generate actionable patches. The hardened application is then validated through adversarial prompt injection attacks and benign input variations ensuring that mitigations do not disrupt intended behavior. In the hardening stage, high-risk tools are prioritized, and minimally invasive mitigations are applied, including schema tightening, boundary sanitization, allowlist-based tool gating, and least-privilege checks. In the validation stage, the pipeline automatically generates attack inputs that mimic jailbreaks, instruction overrides, and tool-targeted manipulation, along with benign task variants, to confirm that the functionality of the hardened application is preserved after remediation. We evaluated the pipeline on five real-world agentic applications, as well as on the AgentDojo benchmark. Across all applications, the proposed pipeline identified recurring leakage-enabling patterns and generated patches that can be integrated without disrupting the intended application behavior. The resulting modifications of application code were shown to eliminate leaks when targeted by basic jailbreak and instruction-override attacks, achieving a 100% reduction in leakage, and reduce leaks by 91% under conditions of stress-induced manipulation, without the need of continuous runtime policy enforcement.

COHORT: Collaborative Orchestration for Hardening via Offensive Replay on Emulated Topologies

Mitigating an observed adversary in an enterprise network typically takes weeks of expert work: an analyst derives a mitigation tailored to that adversary, validates it without breaking production, and verifies it disrupts the specific attack. The procedure relies on expert judgment and cannot safely be exercised against the production network. COHORT is the first end-to-end framework to automate this procedure for deployable mitigations. A role-decomposed multi-agent LLM workflow proposes candidates, implements them as real device commands, and refines them through a critique loop, all on a high-fidelity GNS3 emulator running real vendor firmware (firewall, switch, router). Each candidate is evaluated by offensive replay: re-executing the original adversary on the mitigated network for a paired comparison against the unmitigated baseline, rather than the reward-signal or expert-judgment proxies used in prior simulation, hybrid, and configuration-generation work. Two further checks complement replay: a connectivity-regression check (LAN ping and internet HTTP probe) rejects mitigations that disrupt legitimate LAN or internet connectivity, and a cumulative evaluation stacks approved mitigations onto a persistent state to surface compound effects. Across three topologies and four attack scenarios (ransomware, lateral movement, DNS exfiltration, data theft), 46.7% of generated mitigations both disrupt the attack and preserve connectivity under replay, 4.4 times the rate of a single-agent baseline using the same model and tool access. A demo video walking through the framework is available with our released artifacts.

RogueRover: Autonomous Rogue Device Localization for Incident Response

Physically localizing unauthorized wireless devices remains a critical bottleneck in cyber-physical security operations, where rogue access points can provide entry points for lateral movement and persistent compromise. While such devices can often be detected through network-side mechanisms, determining their physical location typically requires dense sensing infrastructure, site-specific RF fingerprinting, or manual inspection, limiting timely incident response. We investigate whether a single commodity robot can autonomously detect and localize rogue wireless devices under zero-configuration constraints, without RF fingerprinting, pre-installed sensors, or site calibration. We present RogueRover, an end-to-end system in which a quadruped robot autonomously patrols, collects spatially labeled RSSI measurements via a standard 802.11 interface, and estimates device locations offline. We evaluate the system across 11 patrol runs in a real indoor environment, with 6 rogue devices deployed under heterogeneous propagation conditions. Across 62 AP-patrol sessions, RogueRover achieves a median single-patrol localization error of 1.62 m without prior RF knowledge. Under multi-run aggregation, five of six devices are localized within 1 m. A blind trial validates the full pipeline, correctly identifying rogue devices among 73 observed BSSIDs and localizing them with errors of 0.34 m and 1.84 m. Across environments, simple weighted-centroid estimators perform comparably to, or better than, parametric path-loss models, indicating that measurement coverage from autonomous patrols is the primary determinant of localization accuracy under zero-prior constraints. Our results demonstrate that infrastructure-free, autonomous localization is feasible in practice, enabling rapid physical incident response in cyber-physical environments without additional sensing infrastructure.

SAFEdit: Does Multi-Agent Decomposition Resolve the Reliability Challenges of Instructed Code Editing?

Instructed code editing is a significant challenge for large language models (LLMs). On the EditBench benchmark, 39 of 40 evaluated models obtain a task success rate (TSR) below 60 percent, highlighting a gap between general code generation and the ability to perform instruction-driven editing under executable test constraints. To address this, we propose SAFEdit, a multi-agent framework for instructed code editing that decomposes the editing process into specialized roles to improve reliability and reduce unintended code changes. A Planner Agent produces an explicit, visibility-aware edit plan, an Editor Agent applies minimal, literal code modifications, and a Verifier Agent executes real test runs. When tests fail, SAFEdit uses a Failure Abstraction Layer (FAL) to transform raw test logs into structured diagnostic feedback, which is fed back to the Editor to support iterative refinement. We compare SAFEdit against both prior single-model results reported for EditBench and an implemented ReAct single-agent baseline under the same evaluation conditions. We used EditBench to evaluate SAFEdit on 445 code editing instances in five languages (English, Polish, Spanish, Chinese, and Russian) under varying spatial context variants. SAFEdit achieved 68.6 percent TSR, outperforming the single-model baseline by 3.8 percentage points and the ReAct single-agent baseline by 8.6 percentage points. The iterative refinement loop was found to contribute 17.4 percentage points to SAFEdit's overall success rate. SAFEdit's automated error analysis further indicates a reduction in instruction-level hallucinations compared to single-agent approaches, providing an additional framework component for interpreting failures beyond pass or fail outcomes.

From Tool Orchestration to Code Execution: A Study of MCP Design Choices

Model Context Protocols (MCPs) provide a unified platform for agent systems to discover, select, and orchestrate tools across heterogeneous execution environments. As MCP-based systems scale to incorporate larger tool catalogs and multiple concurrently connected MCP servers, traditional tool-by-tool invocation increases coordination overhead, fragments state management, and limits support for wide-context operations. To address these scalability challenges, recent MCP designs have incorporated code execution as a first-class capability, an approach called Code Execution MCP (CE-MCP). This enables agents to consolidate complex workflows, such as SQL querying, file analysis, and multi-step data transformations, into a single program that executes within an isolated runtime environment. In this work, we formalize the architectural distinction between context-coupled (traditional) and context-decoupled (CE-MCP) models, analyzing their fundamental scalability trade-offs. Using the MCP-Bench framework across 10 representative servers, we empirically evaluate task behavior, tool utilization patterns, execution latency, and protocol efficiency as the scale of connected MCP servers and available tools increases, demonstrating that while CE-MCP significantly reduces token usage and execution latency, it introduces a vastly expanded attack surface. We address this security gap by applying the MAESTRO framework, identifying sixteen attack classes across five execution phases-including specific code execution threats such as exception-mediated code injection and unsafe capability synthesis. We validate these vulnerabilities through adversarial scenarios across multiple LLMs and propose a layered defense architecture comprising containerized sandboxing and semantic gating. Our findings provide a rigorous roadmap for balancing scalability and security in production-ready executable agent workflows.

Provably Protecting Fine-Tuned LLMs from Training Data Extraction

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) on sensitive datasets raises privacy concerns, as training data extraction (TDE) attacks can expose highly confidential information. Existing defenses against such attacks either lack formal privacy guarantees or incur substantial utility degradation. We observe that fine-tuning induces widespread probability shifts, yet preserving only a small subset of influential token-level deviations is sufficient; the remaining shifts can be aggressively smoothed with minimal impact on utility. Motivated by this insight, we propose SCP-$Δ_r$, a Near Access Freeness (NAF)-based algorithm that operates on relative probabilities and explicitly smooths low-impact tokens using a base model. SCP-$Δ_r$ achieves orders-of-magnitude better theoretical bounds than existing NAF based methods and provides strong empirical protection against TDE attacks with minimal performance loss.

AgentGuardian: Learning Access Control Policies to Govern AI Agent Behavior

Artificial intelligence (AI) agents are increasingly used in a variety of domains to automate tasks, interact with users, and make decisions based on data inputs. Ensuring that AI agents perform only authorized actions and handle inputs appropriately is essential for maintaining system integrity and preventing misuse. In this study, we introduce the AgentGuardian, a novel security framework that governs and protects AI agent operations by enforcing context-aware access-control policies. During a controlled staging phase, the framework monitors execution traces to learn legitimate agent behaviors and input patterns. From this phase, it derives adaptive policies that regulate tool calls made by the agent, guided by both real-time input context and the control flow dependencies of multi-step agent actions. Evaluation across two real-world AI agent applications demonstrates that AgentGuardian effectively detects malicious or misleading inputs while preserving normal agent functionality. Moreover, its control-flow-based governance mechanism mitigates hallucination-driven errors and other orchestration-level malfunctions.

Real-World Adversarial Attacks on RF-Based Drone Detectors

Radio frequency (RF) based systems are increasingly used to detect drones by analyzing their RF signal patterns, converting them into spectrogram images which are processed by object detection models. Existing RF attacks against image based models alter digital features, making over-the-air (OTA) implementation difficult due to the challenge of converting digital perturbations to transmittable waveforms that may introduce synchronization errors and interference, and encounter hardware limitations. We present the first physical attack on RF image based drone detectors, optimizing class-specific universal complex baseband (I/Q) perturbation waveforms that are transmitted alongside legitimate communications. We evaluated the attack using RF recordings and OTA experiments with four types of drones. Our results show that modest, structured I/Q perturbations are compatible with standard RF chains and reliably reduce target drone detection while preserving detection of legitimate drones.

MIA-EPT: Membership Inference Attack via Error Prediction for Tabular Data

Synthetic data generation plays an important role in enabling data sharing, particularly in sensitive domains like healthcare and finance. Recent advances in diffusion models have made it possible to generate realistic, high-quality tabular data, but they may also memorize training records and leak sensitive information. Membership inference attacks (MIAs) exploit this vulnerability by determining whether a record was used in training. While MIAs have been studied in images and text, their use against tabular diffusion models remains underexplored despite the unique risks of structured attributes and limited record diversity. In this paper, we introduce MIAEPT, Membership Inference Attack via Error Prediction for Tabular Data, a novel black-box attack specifically designed to target tabular diffusion models. MIA-EPT constructs errorbased feature vectors by masking and reconstructing attributes of target records, disclosing membership signals based on how well these attributes are predicted. MIA-EPT operates without access to the internal components of the generative model, relying only on its synthetic data output, and was shown to generalize across multiple state-of-the-art diffusion models. We validate MIA-EPT on three diffusion-based synthesizers, achieving AUC-ROC scores of up to 0.599 and TPR@10% FPR values of 22.0% in our internal tests. Under the MIDST 2025 competition conditions, MIA-EPT achieved second place in the Black-box Multi-Table track (TPR@10% FPR = 20.0%). These results demonstrate that our method can uncover substantial membership leakage in synthetic tabular data, challenging the assumption that synthetic data is inherently privacy-preserving. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/eyalgerman/MIA-EPT.

KubeGuard: LLM-Assisted Kubernetes Hardening via Configuration Files and Runtime Logs Analysis

The widespread adoption of Kubernetes (K8s) for orchestrating cloud-native applications has introduced significant security challenges, such as misconfigured resources and overly permissive configurations. Failing to address these issues can result in unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and lateral movement within clusters. Most existing K8s security solutions focus on detecting misconfigurations, typically through static analysis or anomaly detection. In contrast, this paper presents KubeGuard, a novel runtime log-driven recommender framework aimed at mitigating risks by addressing overly permissive configurations. KubeGuard is designed to harden K8s environments through two complementary tasks: Resource Creation and Resource Refinement. It leverages large language models (LLMs) to analyze manifests and runtime logs reflecting actual system behavior, using modular prompt-chaining workflows. This approach enables KubeGuard to create least-privilege configurations for new resources and refine existing manifests to reduce the attack surface. KubeGuard's output manifests are presented as recommendations that users (e.g., developers and operators) can review and adopt to enhance cluster security. Our evaluation demonstrates that KubeGuard effectively generates and refines K8s manifests for Roles, NetworkPolicies, and Deployments, leveraging both proprietary and open-source LLMs. The high precision, recall, and F1-scores affirm KubeGuard's practicality as a framework that translates runtime observability into actionable, least-privilege configuration guidance.