Conversational AI systems that rely on Large Language Models, like Transformers, have difficulty interweaving external data (like facts) with the language they generate. Vanilla Transformer architectures are not designed for answering factual questions with high accuracy. This paper investigates a possible route for addressing this problem. We propose to extend the standard Transformer architecture with an additional memory bank holding extra information (such as facts drawn from a knowledge base), and an extra attention layer for addressing this memory. We add this augmented memory to a Generative Adversarial Network-inspired Transformer architecture. This setup allows for implementing arbitrary felicity conditions on the generated language of the Transformer. We first demonstrate how this machinery can be deployed for handling factual questions in goal-oriented dialogues. Secondly, we demonstrate that our approach can be useful for applications like {\it style adaptation} as well: the adaptation of utterances according to certain stylistic (external) constraints, like social properties of human interlocutors in dialogues.
Due to the empirical success of reinforcement learning, an increasing number of students study the subject. However, from our practical teaching experience, we see students entering the field (bachelor, master and early PhD) often struggle. On the one hand, textbooks and (online) lectures provide the fundamentals, but students find it hard to translate between equations and code. On the other hand, public codebases do provide practical examples, but the implemented algorithms tend to be complex, and the underlying test environments contain multiple reinforcement learning challenges at once. Although this is realistic from a research perspective, it often hinders educational conceptual understanding. To solve this issue we introduce EduGym, a set of educational reinforcement learning environments and associated interactive notebooks tailored for education. Each EduGym environment is specifically designed to illustrate a certain aspect/challenge of reinforcement learning (e.g., exploration, partial observability, stochasticity, etc.), while the associated interactive notebook explains the challenge and its possible solution approaches, connecting equations and code in a single document. An evaluation among RL students and researchers shows 86% of them think EduGym is a useful tool for reinforcement learning education. All notebooks are available from https://sites.google.com/view/edu-gym/home, while the full software package can be installed from https://github.com/RLG-Leiden/edugym.
To what degree should we ascribe cognitive capacities to Large Language Models (LLMs), such as the ability to reason about intentions and beliefs known as Theory of Mind (ToM)? Here we add to this emerging debate by (i) testing 11 base- and instruction-tuned LLMs on capabilities relevant to ToM beyond the dominant false-belief paradigm, including non-literal language usage and recursive intentionality; (ii) using newly rewritten versions of standardized tests to gauge LLMs' robustness; (iii) prompting and scoring for open besides closed questions; and (iv) benchmarking LLM performance against that of children aged 7-10 on the same tasks. We find that instruction-tuned LLMs from the GPT family outperform other models, and often also children. Base-LLMs are mostly unable to solve ToM tasks, even with specialized prompting. We suggest that the interlinked evolution and development of language and ToM may help explain what instruction-tuning adds: rewarding cooperative communication that takes into account interlocutor and context. We conclude by arguing for a nuanced perspective on ToM in LLMs.
Current Large Language Models (LLMs) are unparalleled in their ability to generate grammatically correct, fluent text. LLMs are appearing rapidly, and debates on LLM capacities have taken off, but reflection is lagging behind. Thus, in this position paper, we first zoom in on the debate and critically assess three points recurring in critiques of LLM capacities: i) that LLMs only parrot statistical patterns in the training data; ii) that LLMs master formal but not functional language competence; and iii) that language learning in LLMs cannot inform human language learning. Drawing on empirical and theoretical arguments, we show that these points need more nuance. Second, we outline a pragmatic perspective on the issue of `real' understanding and intentionality in LLMs. Understanding and intentionality pertain to unobservable mental states we attribute to other humans because they have pragmatic value: they allow us to abstract away from complex underlying mechanics and predict behaviour effectively. We reflect on the circumstances under which it would make sense for humans to similarly attribute mental states to LLMs, thereby outlining a pragmatic philosophical context for LLMs as an increasingly prominent technology in society.