A Representative Study on Human Detection of Artificially Generated Media Across Countries

AI-generated media has become a threat to our digital society as we know it. These forgeries can be created automatically and on a large scale based on publicly available technology. Recognizing this challenge, academics and practitioners have proposed a multitude of automatic detection strategies to detect such artificial media. However, in contrast to these technical advances, the human perception of generated media has not been thoroughly studied yet. In this paper, we aim at closing this research gap. We perform the first comprehensive survey into people's ability to detect generated media, spanning three countries (USA, Germany, and China) with 3,002 participants across audio, image, and text media. Our results indicate that state-of-the-art forgeries are almost indistinguishable from "real" media, with the majority of participants simply guessing when asked to rate them as human- or machine-generated. In addition, AI-generated media receive is voted more human like across all media types and all countries. To further understand which factors influence people's ability to detect generated media, we include personal variables, chosen based on a literature review in the domains of deepfake and fake news research. In a regression analysis, we found that generalized trust, cognitive reflection, and self-reported familiarity with deepfakes significantly influence participant's decision across all media categories.

No more Reviewer #2: Subverting Automatic Paper-Reviewer Assignment using Adversarial Learning

The number of papers submitted to academic conferences is steadily rising in many scientific disciplines. To handle this growth, systems for automatic paper-reviewer assignments are increasingly used during the reviewing process. These systems use statistical topic models to characterize the content of submissions and automate the assignment to reviewers. In this paper, we show that this automation can be manipulated using adversarial learning. We propose an attack that adapts a given paper so that it misleads the assignment and selects its own reviewers. Our attack is based on a novel optimization strategy that alternates between the feature space and problem space to realize unobtrusive changes to the paper. To evaluate the feasibility of our attack, we simulate the paper-reviewer assignment of an actual security conference (IEEE S&P) with 165 reviewers on the program committee. Our results show that we can successfully select and remove reviewers without access to the assignment system. Moreover, we demonstrate that the manipulated papers remain plausible and are often indistinguishable from benign submissions.

More than you've asked for: A Comprehensive Analysis of Novel Prompt Injection Threats to Application-Integrated Large Language Models

We are currently witnessing dramatic advances in the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). They are already being adopted in practice and integrated into many systems, including integrated development environments (IDEs) and search engines. The functionalities of current LLMs can be modulated via natural language prompts, while their exact internal functionality remains implicit and unassessable. This property, which makes them adaptable to even unseen tasks, might also make them susceptible to targeted adversarial prompting. Recently, several ways to misalign LLMs using Prompt Injection (PI) attacks have been introduced. In such attacks, an adversary can prompt the LLM to produce malicious content or override the original instructions and the employed filtering schemes. Recent work showed that these attacks are hard to mitigate, as state-of-the-art LLMs are instruction-following. So far, these attacks assumed that the adversary is directly prompting the LLM. In this work, we show that augmenting LLMs with retrieval and API calling capabilities (so-called Application-Integrated LLMs) induces a whole new set of attack vectors. These LLMs might process poisoned content retrieved from the Web that contains malicious prompts pre-injected and selected by adversaries. We demonstrate that an attacker can indirectly perform such PI attacks. Based on this key insight, we systematically analyze the resulting threat landscape of Application-Integrated LLMs and discuss a variety of new attack vectors. To demonstrate the practical viability of our attacks, we implemented specific demonstrations of the proposed attacks within synthetic applications. In summary, our work calls for an urgent evaluation of current mitigation techniques and an investigation of whether new techniques are needed to defend LLMs against these threats.

Systematically Finding Security Vulnerabilities in Black-Box Code Generation Models

Recently, large language models for code generation have achieved breakthroughs in several programming language tasks. Their advances in competition-level programming problems have made them an emerging pillar in AI-assisted pair programming. Tools such as GitHub Copilot are already part of the daily programming workflow and are used by more than a million developers. The training data for these models is usually collected from open-source repositories (e.g., GitHub) that contain software faults and security vulnerabilities. This unsanitized training data can lead language models to learn these vulnerabilities and propagate them in the code generation procedure. Given the wide use of these models in the daily workflow of developers, it is crucial to study the security aspects of these models systematically. In this work, we propose the first approach to automatically finding security vulnerabilities in black-box code generation models. To achieve this, we propose a novel black-box inversion approach based on few-shot prompting. We evaluate the effectiveness of our approach by examining code generation models in the generation of high-risk security weaknesses. We show that our approach automatically and systematically finds 1000s of security vulnerabilities in various code generation models, including the commercial black-box model GitHub Copilot.

Towards the Detection of Diffusion Model Deepfakes

Diffusion models (DMs) have recently emerged as a promising method in image synthesis. They have surpassed generative adversarial networks (GANs) in both diversity and quality, and have achieved impressive results in text-to-image and image-to-image modeling. However, to date, only little attention has been paid to the detection of DM-generated images, which is critical to prevent adverse impacts on our society. Although prior work has shown that GAN-generated images can be reliably detected using automated methods, it is unclear whether the same methods are effective against DMs. In this work, we address this challenge and take a first look at detecting DM-generated images. We approach the problem from two different angles: First, we evaluate the performance of state-of-the-art detectors on a variety of DMs. Second, we analyze DM-generated images in the frequency domain and study different factors that influence the spectral properties of these images. Most importantly, we demonstrate that GANs and DMs produce images with different characteristics, which requires adaptation of existing classifiers to ensure reliable detection. We believe this work provides the foundation and starting point for further research to detect DM deepfakes effectively.

[RE] CNN-generated images are surprisingly easy to spot...for now

This work evaluates the reproducibility of the paper "CNN-generated images are surprisingly easy to spot... for now" by Wang et al. published at CVPR 2020. The paper addresses the challenge of detecting CNN-generated imagery, which has reached the potential to even fool humans. The authors propose two methods which help an image classifier to generalize from being trained on one specific CNN to detecting imagery produced by unseen architectures, training methods, or data sets. The paper proposes two methods to help a classifier generalize: (i) utilizing different kinds of data augmentations and (ii) using a diverse data set. This report focuses on assessing if these techniques indeed help the generalization process. Furthermore, we perform additional experiments to study the limitations of the proposed techniques.

Dompteur: Taming Audio Adversarial Examples

Adversarial examples seem to be inevitable. These specifically crafted inputs allow attackers to arbitrarily manipulate machine learning systems. Even worse, they often seem harmless to human observers. In our digital society, this poses a significant threat. For example, Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) systems, which serve as hands-free interfaces to many kinds of systems, can be attacked with inputs incomprehensible for human listeners. The research community has unsuccessfully tried several approaches to tackle this problem. In this paper we propose a different perspective: We accept the presence of adversarial examples against ASR systems, but we require them to be perceivable by human listeners. By applying the principles of psychoacoustics, we can remove semantically irrelevant information from the ASR input and train a model that resembles human perception more closely. We implement our idea in a tool named Dompteur and demonstrate that our augmented system, in contrast to an unmodified baseline, successfully focuses on perceptible ranges of the input signal. This change forces adversarial examples into the audible range, while using minimal computational overhead and preserving benign performance. To evaluate our approach, we construct an adaptive attacker, which actively tries to avoid our augmentations and demonstrate that adversarial examples from this attacker remain clearly perceivable. Finally, we substantiate our claims by performing a hearing test with crowd-sourced human listeners.

VENOMAVE: Clean-Label Poisoning Against Speech Recognition

In the past few years, we observed a wide adoption of practical systems that use Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) systems to improve human-machine interaction. Modern ASR systems are based on neural networks and prior research demonstrated that these systems are susceptible to adversarial examples, i.e., malicious audio inputs that lead to misclassification by the victim's network during the system's run time. The research question if ASR systems are also vulnerable to data poisoning attacks is still unanswered. In such an attack, a manipulation happens during the training phase of the neural network: an adversary injects malicious inputs into the training set such that the neural network's integrity and performance are compromised. In this paper, we present the first data poisoning attack in the audio domain, called VENOMAVE. Prior work in the image domain demonstrated several types of data poisoning attacks, but they cannot be applied to the audio domain. The main challenge is that we need to attack a time series of inputs. To enforce a targeted misclassification in an ASR system, we need to carefully generate a specific sequence of disturbed inputs for the target utterance, which will eventually be decoded to the desired sequence of words. More specifically, the adversarial goal is to produce a series of misclassification tasks and in each of them, we need to poison the system to misrecognize each frame of the target file. To demonstrate the practical feasibility of our attack, we evaluate VENOMAVE on an ASR system that detects sequences of digits from 0 to 9. When poisoning only 0.94% of the dataset on average, we achieve an attack success rate of 83.33%. We conclude that data poisoning attacks against ASR systems represent a real threat that needs to be considered.

Leveraging Frequency Analysis for Deep Fake Image Recognition

Deep neural networks can generate images that are astonishingly realistic, so much so that it is often hard for humans to distinguish them from actual photos. These achievements have been largely made possible by Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs). While these deep fake images have been thoroughly investigated in the image domain-a classical approach from the area of image forensics-an analysis in the frequency domain has been missing so far. In this paper, we address this shortcoming and our results reveal that in frequency space, GAN-generated images exhibit severe artifacts that can be easily identified. We perform a comprehensive analysis, showing that these artifacts are consistent across different neural network architectures, data sets, and resolutions. In a further investigation, we demonstrate that these artifacts are caused by upsampling operations found in all current GAN architectures, indicating a structural and fundamental problem in the way images are generated via GANs. Based on this analysis, we demonstrate how the frequency representation can be used to identify deep fake images in an automated way, surpassing state-of-the-art methods.