Quantification and object perception in Multimodal Large Language Models deviate from human linguistic cognition

Quantification has been proven to be a particularly difficult linguistic phenomenon for (Multimodal) Large Language Models (MLLMs). However, given that quantification interfaces with the logic, pragmatic, and numerical domains, the exact reasons for the poor performance are still unclear. This papers looks at three key features of human quantification shared cross-linguistically that have remained so far unexplored in the (M)LLM literature: the ordering of quantifiers into scales, the ranges of use and prototypicality, and the biases inherent in the human approximate number system. The aim is to determine how these features are encoded in the models' architecture, how they may differ from humans, and whether the results are affected by the type of model and language under investigation. We find that there are clear differences between humans and MLLMs with respect to these features across various tasks that tap into the representation of quantification in vivo vs. in silico. This work, thus, paves the way for addressing the nature of MLLMs as semantic and pragmatic agents, while the cross-linguistic lens can elucidate whether their abilities are robust and stable across different languages.

Large Language Model probabilities cannot distinguish between possible and impossible language

A controversial test for Large Language Models concerns the ability to discern possible from impossible language. While some evidence attests to the models' sensitivity to what crosses the limits of grammatically impossible language, this evidence has been contested on the grounds of the soundness of the testing material. We use model-internal representations to tap directly into the way Large Language Models represent the 'grammatical-ungrammatical' distinction. In a novel benchmark, we elicit probabilities from 4 models and compute minimal-pair surprisal differences, juxtaposing probabilities assigned to grammatical sentences to probabilities assigned to (i) lower frequency grammatical sentences, (ii) ungrammatical sentences, (iii) semantically odd sentences, and (iv) pragmatically odd sentences. The prediction is that if string-probabilities can function as proxies for the limits of grammar, the ungrammatical condition will stand out among the conditions that involve linguistic violations, showing a spike in the surprisal rates. Our results do not reveal a unique surprisal signature for ungrammatical prompts, as the semantically and pragmatically odd conditions consistently show higher surprisal. We thus demonstrate that probabilities do not constitute reliable proxies for model-internal representations of syntactic knowledge. Consequently, claims about models being able to distinguish possible from impossible language need verification through a different methodology.