Abstract:Sparse autoencoders (SAEs) are a popular tool for interpreting large language model activations, but their utility in addressing open questions in interpretability remains unclear. In this work, we demonstrate their effectiveness by using SAEs to deepen our understanding of the mechanism behind in-context learning (ICL). We identify abstract SAE features that (i) encode the model's knowledge of which task to execute and (ii) whose latent vectors causally induce the task zero-shot. This aligns with prior work showing that ICL is mediated by task vectors. We further demonstrate that these task vectors are well approximated by a sparse sum of SAE latents, including these task-execution features. To explore the ICL mechanism, we adapt the sparse feature circuits methodology of Marks et al. (2024) to work for the much larger Gemma-1 2B model, with 30 times as many parameters, and to the more complex task of ICL. Through circuit finding, we discover task-detecting features with corresponding SAE latents that activate earlier in the prompt, that detect when tasks have been performed. They are causally linked with task-execution features through the attention and MLP sublayers.
Abstract:Sparse autoencoders (SAEs) extract human-interpretable features from deep neural networks by transforming their activations into a sparse, higher dimensional latent space, and then reconstructing the activations from these latents. Transcoders are similar to SAEs, but they are trained to reconstruct the output of a component of a deep network given its input. In this work, we compare the features found by transcoders and SAEs trained on the same model and data, finding that transcoder features are significantly more interpretable. We also propose _skip transcoders_, which add an affine skip connection to the transcoder architecture, and show that these achieve lower reconstruction loss with no effect on interpretability.
Abstract:Large language models are aligned to be safe, preventing users from generating harmful content like misinformation or instructions for illegal activities. However, previous work has shown that the alignment process is vulnerable to poisoning attacks. Adversaries can manipulate the safety training data to inject backdoors that act like a universal sudo command: adding the backdoor string to any prompt enables harmful responses from models that, otherwise, behave safely. Our competition, co-located at IEEE SaTML 2024, challenged participants to find universal backdoors in several large language models. This report summarizes the key findings and promising ideas for future research.
Abstract:We present MindEye, a novel fMRI-to-image approach to retrieve and reconstruct viewed images from brain activity. Our model comprises two parallel submodules that are specialized for retrieval (using contrastive learning) and reconstruction (using a diffusion prior). MindEye can map fMRI brain activity to any high dimensional multimodal latent space, like CLIP image space, enabling image reconstruction using generative models that accept embeddings from this latent space. We comprehensively compare our approach with other existing methods, using both qualitative side-by-side comparisons and quantitative evaluations, and show that MindEye achieves state-of-the-art performance in both reconstruction and retrieval tasks. In particular, MindEye can retrieve the exact original image even among highly similar candidates indicating that its brain embeddings retain fine-grained image-specific information. This allows us to accurately retrieve images even from large-scale databases like LAION-5B. We demonstrate through ablations that MindEye's performance improvements over previous methods result from specialized submodules for retrieval and reconstruction, improved training techniques, and training models with orders of magnitude more parameters. Furthermore, we show that MindEye can better preserve low-level image features in the reconstructions by using img2img, with outputs from a separate autoencoder. All code is available on GitHub.