Which Coauthor Should I Nominate in My 99 ICLR Submissions? A Mathematical Analysis of the ICLR 2026 Reciprocal Reviewer Nomination Policy

The rapid growth of AI conference submissions has created an overwhelming reviewing burden. To alleviate this, recent venues such as ICLR 2026 introduced a reviewer nomination policy: each submission must nominate one of its authors as a reviewer, and any paper nominating an irresponsible reviewer is desk-rejected. We study this new policy from the perspective of author welfare. Assuming each author carries a probability of being irresponsible, we ask: how can authors (or automated systems) nominate reviewers to minimize the risk of desk rejections? We formalize and analyze three variants of the desk-rejection risk minimization problem. The basic problem, which minimizes expected desk rejections, is solved optimally by a simple greedy algorithm. We then introduce hard and soft nomination limit variants that constrain how many papers may nominate the same author, preventing widespread failures if one author is irresponsible. These formulations connect to classical optimization frameworks, including minimum-cost flow and linear programming, allowing us to design efficient, principled nomination strategies. Our results provide the first theoretical study for reviewer nomination policies, offering both conceptual insights and practical directions for authors to wisely choose which co-author should serve as the nominated reciprocal reviewer.

Evaluating Frontier LLMs on PhD-Level Mathematical Reasoning: A Benchmark on a Textbook in Theoretical Computer Science about Randomized Algorithms

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has led to significant breakthroughs in automated mathematical reasoning and scientific discovery. Georgiev, G${ó}$mez-Serrano, Tao, and Wagner [GGSTW+25] demonstrate that AI systems can explore new constructions and improve existing bounds, illustrating the growing potential of LLMs to accelerate mathematical discovery. Similarly, Bubeck et al. [BCE+25] show that GPT-5 can meaningfully contribute to scientific workflows, from proposing hypotheses to generating proofs and analyses. Despite these advances, a rigorous evaluation of these models on canonical, graduate-level mathematical theory remains necessary to understand their baseline reasoning capabilities. In this paper, we present a comprehensive benchmark of four frontier models: GPT-5-Thinking, Gemini-3-Pro, Claude-Sonnet-4.5-Thinking, and Grok-4 against the classic curriculum of Randomized Algorithms by Motwani and Raghavan [MR95]. We tasked each model with generating formal LaTeX proofs for a series of lemmas and exercises spanning the textbook. We find that while the top-tier models (Gemini, and Claude) achieve a high accuracy rate (approx. 66%), demonstrating a robust grasp of probabilistic method and formal logic, other models lag significantly in consistency (approx. 40%). We provide a qualitative analysis of the generated proofs, highlighting differences in conciseness, hallucination rates, and logical structure. Our results suggest that while frontier models have reached a threshold of proficiency suitable for graduate-level pedagogical assistance and formalization, significant variance exists in their reliability for rigorous mathematical derivation. The code and the full set of LLM-generated responses are open-sourced and publicly available at https://github.com/magiclinux/math_benchmark_probability.

Thinking Isn't an Illusion: Overcoming the Limitations of Reasoning Models via Tool Augmentations

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have become a central focus in today's large language model (LLM) research, where models are designed to output a step-by-step thinking process before arriving at a final answer to handle complex reasoning tasks. Despite their promise, recent empirical studies (e.g., [Shojaee et al., 2025] from Apple) suggest that this thinking process may not actually enhance reasoning ability, where LLMs without explicit reasoning actually outperform LRMs on tasks with low or high complexity. In this work, we revisit these findings and investigate whether the limitations of LRMs persist when tool augmentations are introduced. We incorporate two types of tools, Python interpreters and scratchpads, and evaluate three representative LLMs and their LRM counterparts on Apple's benchmark reasoning puzzles. Our results show that, with proper tool use, LRMs consistently outperform their non-reasoning counterparts across all levels of task complexity. These findings challenge the recent narrative that reasoning is an illusion and highlight the potential of tool-augmented LRMs for solving complex problems.