Zombie Agents: Persistent Control of Self-Evolving LLM Agents via Self-Reinforcing Injections

Self-evolving LLM agents update their internal state across sessions, often by writing and reusing long-term memory. This design improves performance on long-horizon tasks but creates a security risk: untrusted external content observed during a benign session can be stored as memory and later treated as instruction. We study this risk and formalize a persistent attack we call a Zombie Agent, where an attacker covertly implants a payload that survives across sessions, effectively turning the agent into a puppet of the attacker. We present a black-box attack framework that uses only indirect exposure through attacker-controlled web content. The attack has two phases. During infection, the agent reads a poisoned source while completing a benign task and writes the payload into long-term memory through its normal update process. During trigger, the payload is retrieved or carried forward and causes unauthorized tool behavior. We design mechanism-specific persistence strategies for common memory implementations, including sliding-window and retrieval-augmented memory, to resist truncation and relevance filtering. We evaluate the attack on representative agent setups and tasks, measuring both persistence over time and the ability to induce unauthorized actions while preserving benign task quality. Our results show that memory evolution can convert one-time indirect injection into persistent compromise, which suggests that defenses focused only on per-session prompt filtering are not sufficient for self-evolving agents.

Just-In-Time Reinforcement Learning: Continual Learning in LLM Agents Without Gradient Updates

While Large Language Model (LLM) agents excel at general tasks, they inherently struggle with continual adaptation due to the frozen weights after deployment. Conventional reinforcement learning (RL) offers a solution but incurs prohibitive computational costs and the risk of catastrophic forgetting. We introduce Just-In-Time Reinforcement Learning (JitRL), a training-free framework that enables test-time policy optimization without any gradient updates. JitRL maintains a dynamic, non-parametric memory of experiences and retrieves relevant trajectories to estimate action advantages on-the-fly. These estimates are then used to directly modulate the LLM's output logits. We theoretically prove that this additive update rule is the exact closed-form solution to the KL-constrained policy optimization objective. Extensive experiments on WebArena and Jericho demonstrate that JitRL establishes a new state-of-the-art among training-free methods. Crucially, JitRL outperforms the performance of computationally expensive fine-tuning methods (e.g., WebRL) while reducing monetary costs by over 30 times, offering a scalable path for continual learning agents. The code is available at https://github.com/liushiliushi/JitRL.