Weakly Supervised Learners for Correction of AI Errors with Provable Performance Guarantees

We present a new methodology for handling AI errors by introducing weakly supervised AI error correctors with a priori performance guarantees. These AI correctors are auxiliary maps whose role is to moderate the decisions of some previously constructed underlying classifier by either approving or rejecting its decisions. The rejection of a decision can be used as a signal to suggest abstaining from making a decision. A key technical focus of the work is in providing performance guarantees for these new AI correctors through bounds on the probabilities of incorrect decisions. These bounds are distribution agnostic and do not rely on assumptions on the data dimension. Our empirical example illustrates how the framework can be applied to improve the performance of an image classifier in a challenging real-world task where training data are scarce.

How adversarial attacks can disrupt seemingly stable accurate classifiers

Adversarial attacks dramatically change the output of an otherwise accurate learning system using a seemingly inconsequential modification to a piece of input data. Paradoxically, empirical evidence indicates that even systems which are robust to large random perturbations of the input data remain susceptible to small, easily constructed, adversarial perturbations of their inputs. Here, we show that this may be seen as a fundamental feature of classifiers working with high dimensional input data. We introduce a simple generic and generalisable framework for which key behaviours observed in practical systems arise with high probability -- notably the simultaneous susceptibility of the (otherwise accurate) model to easily constructed adversarial attacks, and robustness to random perturbations of the input data. We confirm that the same phenomena are directly observed in practical neural networks trained on standard image classification problems, where even large additive random noise fails to trigger the adversarial instability of the network. A surprising takeaway is that even small margins separating a classifier's decision surface from training and testing data can hide adversarial susceptibility from being detected using randomly sampled perturbations. Counterintuitively, using additive noise during training or testing is therefore inefficient for eradicating or detecting adversarial examples, and more demanding adversarial training is required.

Towards a mathematical understanding of learning from few examples with nonlinear feature maps

We consider the problem of data classification where the training set consists of just a few data points. We explore this phenomenon mathematically and reveal key relationships between the geometry of an AI model's feature space, the structure of the underlying data distributions, and the model's generalisation capabilities. The main thrust of our analysis is to reveal the influence on the model's generalisation capabilities of nonlinear feature transformations mapping the original data into high, and possibly infinite, dimensional spaces.