Genie: Generative Interactive Environments

We introduce Genie, the first generative interactive environment trained in an unsupervised manner from unlabelled Internet videos. The model can be prompted to generate an endless variety of action-controllable virtual worlds described through text, synthetic images, photographs, and even sketches. At 11B parameters, Genie can be considered a foundation world model. It is comprised of a spatiotemporal video tokenizer, an autoregressive dynamics model, and a simple and scalable latent action model. Genie enables users to act in the generated environments on a frame-by-frame basis despite training without any ground-truth action labels or other domain-specific requirements typically found in the world model literature. Further the resulting learned latent action space facilitates training agents to imitate behaviors from unseen videos, opening the path for training generalist agents of the future.

Refining Minimax Regret for Unsupervised Environment Design

In unsupervised environment design, reinforcement learning agents are trained on environment configurations (levels) generated by an adversary that maximises some objective. Regret is a commonly used objective that theoretically results in a minimax regret (MMR) policy with desirable robustness guarantees; in particular, the agent's maximum regret is bounded. However, once the agent reaches this regret bound on all levels, the adversary will only sample levels where regret cannot be further reduced. Although there are possible performance improvements to be made outside of these regret-maximising levels, learning stagnates. In this work, we introduce Bayesian level-perfect MMR (BLP), a refinement of the minimax regret objective that overcomes this limitation. We formally show that solving for this objective results in a subset of MMR policies, and that BLP policies act consistently with a Perfect Bayesian policy over all levels. We further introduce an algorithm, ReMiDi, that results in a BLP policy at convergence. We empirically demonstrate that training on levels from a minimax regret adversary causes learning to prematurely stagnate, but that ReMiDi continues learning.

minimax: Efficient Baselines for Autocurricula in JAX

Unsupervised environment design (UED) is a form of automatic curriculum learning for training robust decision-making agents to zero-shot transfer into unseen environments. Such autocurricula have received much interest from the RL community. However, UED experiments, based on CPU rollouts and GPU model updates, have often required several weeks of training. This compute requirement is a major obstacle to rapid innovation for the field. This work introduces the minimax library for UED training on accelerated hardware. Using JAX to implement fully-tensorized environments and autocurriculum algorithms, minimax allows the entire training loop to be compiled for hardware acceleration. To provide a petri dish for rapid experimentation, minimax includes a tensorized grid-world based on MiniGrid, in addition to reusable abstractions for conducting autocurricula in procedurally-generated environments. With these components, minimax provides strong UED baselines, including new parallelized variants, which achieve over 120$\times$ speedups in wall time compared to previous implementations when training with equal batch sizes. The minimax library is available under the Apache 2.0 license at https://github.com/facebookresearch/minimax.

Stabilizing Unsupervised Environment Design with a Learned Adversary

A key challenge in training generally-capable agents is the design of training tasks that facilitate broad generalization and robustness to environment variations. This challenge motivates the problem setting of Unsupervised Environment Design (UED), whereby a student agent trains on an adaptive distribution of tasks proposed by a teacher agent. A pioneering approach for UED is PAIRED, which uses reinforcement learning (RL) to train a teacher policy to design tasks from scratch, making it possible to directly generate tasks that are adapted to the agent's current capabilities. Despite its strong theoretical backing, PAIRED suffers from a variety of challenges that hinder its practical performance. Thus, state-of-the-art methods currently rely on curation and mutation rather than generation of new tasks. In this work, we investigate several key shortcomings of PAIRED and propose solutions for each shortcoming. As a result, we make it possible for PAIRED to match or exceed state-of-the-art methods, producing robust agents in several established challenging procedurally-generated environments, including a partially-observed maze navigation task and a continuous-control car racing environment. We believe this work motivates a renewed emphasis on UED methods based on learned models that directly generate challenging environments, potentially unlocking more open-ended RL training and, as a result, more general agents.

Who Needs to Know? Minimal Knowledge for Optimal Coordination

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one's collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.

MAESTRO: Open-Ended Environment Design for Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Open-ended learning methods that automatically generate a curriculum of increasingly challenging tasks serve as a promising avenue toward generally capable reinforcement learning agents. Existing methods adapt curricula independently over either environment parameters (in single-agent settings) or co-player policies (in multi-agent settings). However, the strengths and weaknesses of co-players can manifest themselves differently depending on environmental features. It is thus crucial to consider the dependency between the environment and co-player when shaping a curriculum in multi-agent domains. In this work, we use this insight and extend Unsupervised Environment Design (UED) to multi-agent environments. We then introduce Multi-Agent Environment Design Strategist for Open-Ended Learning (MAESTRO), the first multi-agent UED approach for two-player zero-sum settings. MAESTRO efficiently produces adversarial, joint curricula over both environments and co-players and attains minimax-regret guarantees at Nash equilibrium. Our experiments show that MAESTRO outperforms a number of strong baselines on competitive two-player games, spanning discrete and continuous control settings.

Grounding Aleatoric Uncertainty in Unsupervised Environment Design

Adaptive curricula in reinforcement learning (RL) have proven effective for producing policies robust to discrepancies between the train and test environment. Recently, the Unsupervised Environment Design (UED) framework generalized RL curricula to generating sequences of entire environments, leading to new methods with robust minimax regret properties. Problematically, in partially-observable or stochastic settings, optimal policies may depend on the ground-truth distribution over aleatoric parameters of the environment in the intended deployment setting, while curriculum learning necessarily shifts the training distribution. We formalize this phenomenon as curriculum-induced covariate shift (CICS), and describe how its occurrence in aleatoric parameters can lead to suboptimal policies. Directly sampling these parameters from the ground-truth distribution avoids the issue, but thwarts curriculum learning. We propose SAMPLR, a minimax regret UED method that optimizes the ground-truth utility function, even when the underlying training data is biased due to CICS. We prove, and validate on challenging domains, that our approach preserves optimality under the ground-truth distribution, while promoting robustness across the full range of environment settings.

Evolving Curricula with Regret-Based Environment Design

It remains a significant challenge to train generally capable agents with reinforcement learning (RL). A promising avenue for improving the robustness of RL agents is through the use of curricula. One such class of methods frames environment design as a game between a student and a teacher, using regret-based objectives to produce environment instantiations (or levels) at the frontier of the student agent's capabilities. These methods benefit from their generality, with theoretical guarantees at equilibrium, yet they often struggle to find effective levels in challenging design spaces. By contrast, evolutionary approaches seek to incrementally alter environment complexity, resulting in potentially open-ended learning, but often rely on domain-specific heuristics and vast amounts of computational resources. In this paper we propose to harness the power of evolution in a principled, regret-based curriculum. Our approach, which we call Adversarially Compounding Complexity by Editing Levels (ACCEL), seeks to constantly produce levels at the frontier of an agent's capabilities, resulting in curricula that start simple but become increasingly complex. ACCEL maintains the theoretical benefits of prior regret-based methods, while providing significant empirical gains in a diverse set of environments. An interactive version of the paper is available at accelagent.github.io.

Replay-Guided Adversarial Environment Design

Deep reinforcement learning (RL) agents may successfully generalize to new settings if trained on an appropriately diverse set of environment and task configurations. Unsupervised Environment Design (UED) is a promising self-supervised RL paradigm, wherein the free parameters of an underspecified environment are automatically adapted during training to the agent's capabilities, leading to the emergence of diverse training environments. Here, we cast Prioritized Level Replay (PLR), an empirically successful but theoretically unmotivated method that selectively samples randomly-generated training levels, as UED. We argue that by curating completely random levels, PLR, too, can generate novel and complex levels for effective training. This insight reveals a natural class of UED methods we call Dual Curriculum Design (DCD). Crucially, DCD includes both PLR and a popular UED algorithm, PAIRED, as special cases and inherits similar theoretical guarantees. This connection allows us to develop novel theory for PLR, providing a version with a robustness guarantee at Nash equilibria. Furthermore, our theory suggests a highly counterintuitive improvement to PLR: by stopping the agent from updating its policy on uncurated levels (training on less data), we can improve the convergence to Nash equilibria. Indeed, our experiments confirm that our new method, PLR$^{\perp}$, obtains better results on a suite of out-of-distribution, zero-shot transfer tasks, in addition to demonstrating that PLR$^{\perp}$ improves the performance of PAIRED, from which it inherited its theoretical framework.