The Gate, Not the Cache: Gate Provenance Bounds the Closed-Loop Reliability of Training-Free VLA Token Skipping

Token skipping is a widely used training-free way to accelerate vision--language--action (VLA) models by bypassing computation for most visual tokens at each control step according to a gate. When the next gate is harvested from the previous accelerated forward, however, the tokens skipped at one step are also the ones least visible to the next gate, and the damage can compound across control steps until the task fails. We study the two mechanisms this class is built on, reuse and deletion, crossing each against where its gate signal comes from on identical episodes. At a skip ratio of 0.9 on LIBERO-Object, both collapse when the gate comes from the model's own accelerated forwards, to 0.68 under reuse and to 0.31 under deletion against a dense 1.00, and the collapse is invisible to the action-level detectors we evaluate. What separates collapse from dense-level operation is not the mechanism but whether the gate is clean, computed by a forward that skipped nothing. We therefore propose actuation-slack refresh, one dense pass run while the robot executes its current action chunk, off the critical path, that hands the next step a clean gate and a fresh KV base. Since the measured detectors do not reliably reveal the failure, the refresh is unconditional rather than triggered. Both mechanisms then recover to 0.98, keeping the speed of skipping and the information of a dense pass. We then integrate the refresh into state-of-the-art caching and pruning methods across two VLA policies, 4 LIBERO suites, and 4 SIMPLER tasks, where it repairs every collapse caused by using a self-harvested gate. Serve latency drops 18--22\% below dense, measured both in simulation and on a physical robot. Where the gate signal comes from, not how tokens are skipped, decides closed-loop reliability for accelerated VLAs.

FedLSG: LLM-Enhanced Semantic Calibration for Federated Graph Backdoor Defense

Federated Graph Neural Networks (FedGNNs) are highly vulnerable to backdoor poisoning, yet existing defenses typically rely on rule-based approaches that lack semantic understanding, making them vulnerable to stealthy triggers and harmful to benign structures. To solve this, we present FedLSG, the first framework that integrates large language models (LLMs) into federated graph backdoor defense. FedLSG introduces a graph and behavior to text grounding scheme that transforms local graph structures and client update behaviors into semantically rich natural language representations. The framework further adopts a lightweight student-teacher architecture. On the server side, a full scale LLM serves as a teacher, providing global contextual guidance and evaluating client updates during aggregation to identify potentially malicious participants. On the client side, a LoRA-based student is maintained to perform semantic reasoning, to suppress the influence of edges associated with backdoor triggers. By enabling semantic interpretation of both graph patterns and client behaviors, the framework adaptively incorporates rule-based signals into message passing and client aggregation for defense. Experiments demonstrate that FedLSG significantly improves resistance to backdoor attacks without compromising graph integrity.