Towards a Framework for Evaluating Explanations in Automated Fact Verification

As deep neural models in NLP become more complex, and as a consequence opaque, the necessity to interpret them becomes greater. A burgeoning interest has emerged in rationalizing explanations to provide short and coherent justifications for predictions. In this position paper, we advocate for a formal framework for key concepts and properties about rationalizing explanations to support their evaluation systematically. We also outline one such formal framework, tailored to rationalizing explanations of increasingly complex structures, from free-form explanations to deductive explanations, to argumentative explanations (with the richest structure). Focusing on the automated fact verification task, we provide illustrations of the use and usefulness of our formalization for evaluating explanations, tailored to their varying structures.

Can Large Language Models perform Relation-based Argument Mining?

Argument mining (AM) is the process of automatically extracting arguments, their components and/or relations amongst arguments and components from text. As the number of platforms supporting online debate increases, the need for AM becomes ever more urgent, especially in support of downstream tasks. Relation-based AM (RbAM) is a form of AM focusing on identifying agreement (support) and disagreement (attack) relations amongst arguments. RbAM is a challenging classification task, with existing methods failing to perform satisfactorily. In this paper, we show that general-purpose Large Language Models (LLMs), appropriately primed and prompted, can significantly outperform the best performing (RoBERTa-based) baseline. Specifically, we experiment with two open-source LLMs (Llama-2 and Mistral) with ten datasets.

The Reasons that Agents Act: Intention and Instrumental Goals

Intention is an important and challenging concept in AI. It is important because it underlies many other concepts we care about, such as agency, manipulation, legal responsibility, and blame. However, ascribing intent to AI systems is contentious, and there is no universally accepted theory of intention applicable to AI agents. We operationalise the intention with which an agent acts, relating to the reasons it chooses its decision. We introduce a formal definition of intention in structural causal influence models, grounded in the philosophy literature on intent and applicable to real-world machine learning systems. Through a number of examples and results, we show that our definition captures the intuitive notion of intent and satisfies desiderata set-out by past work. In addition, we show how our definition relates to past concepts, including actual causality, and the notion of instrumental goals, which is a core idea in the literature on safe AI agents. Finally, we demonstrate how our definition can be used to infer the intentions of reinforcement learning agents and language models from their behaviour.

Robust Counterfactual Explanations in Machine Learning: A Survey

Counterfactual explanations (CEs) are advocated as being ideally suited to providing algorithmic recourse for subjects affected by the predictions of machine learning models. While CEs can be beneficial to affected individuals, recent work has exposed severe issues related to the robustness of state-of-the-art methods for obtaining CEs. Since a lack of robustness may compromise the validity of CEs, techniques to mitigate this risk are in order. In this survey, we review works in the rapidly growing area of robust CEs and perform an in-depth analysis of the forms of robustness they consider. We also discuss existing solutions and their limitations, providing a solid foundation for future developments.

Contribution Functions for Quantitative Bipolar Argumentation Graphs: A Principle-based Analysis

We present a principle-based analysis of contribution functions for quantitative bipolar argumentation graphs that quantify the contribution of one argument to another. The introduced principles formalise the intuitions underlying different contribution functions as well as expectations one would have regarding the behaviour of contribution functions in general. As none of the covered contribution functions satisfies all principles, our analysis can serve as a tool that enables the selection of the most suitable function based on the requirements of a given use case.

Recourse under Model Multiplicity via Argumentative Ensembling (Technical Report)

Model Multiplicity (MM) arises when multiple, equally performing machine learning models can be trained to solve the same prediction task. Recent studies show that models obtained under MM may produce inconsistent predictions for the same input. When this occurs, it becomes challenging to provide counterfactual explanations (CEs), a common means for offering recourse recommendations to individuals negatively affected by models' predictions. In this paper, we formalise this problem, which we name recourse-aware ensembling, and identify several desirable properties which methods for solving it should satisfy. We show that existing ensembling methods, naturally extended in different ways to provide CEs, fail to satisfy these properties. We then introduce argumentative ensembling, deploying computational argumentation to guarantee robustness of CEs to MM, while also accommodating customisable user preferences. We show theoretically and experimentally that argumentative ensembling satisfies properties which the existing methods lack, and that the trade-offs are minimal wrt accuracy.

Recourse under Model Multiplicity via Argumentative Ensembling

Model Multiplicity (MM) arises when multiple, equally performing machine learning models can be trained to solve the same prediction task. Recent studies show that models obtained under MM may produce inconsistent predictions for the same input. When this occurs, it becomes challenging to provide counterfactual explanations (CEs), a common means for offering recourse recommendations to individuals negatively affected by models' predictions. In this paper, we formalise this problem, which we name recourse-aware ensembling, and identify several desirable properties which methods for solving it should satisfy. We show that existing ensembling methods, naturally extended in different ways to provide CEs, fail to satisfy these properties. We then introduce argumentative ensembling, deploying computational argumentation to guarantee robustness of CEs to MM, while also accommodating customisable user preferences. We show theoretically and experimentally that argumentative ensembling satisfies properties which the existing methods lack, and that the trade-offs are minimal wrt accuracy.

Shapley-PC: Constraint-based Causal Structure Learning with Shapley Values

Causal Structure Learning (CSL), amounting to extracting causal relations among the variables in a dataset, is widely perceived as an important step towards robust and transparent models. Constraint-based CSL leverages conditional independence tests to perform causal discovery. We propose Shapley-PC, a novel method to improve constraint-based CSL algorithms by using Shapley values over the possible conditioning sets to decide which variables are responsible for the observed conditional (in)dependences. We prove soundness and asymptotic consistency and demonstrate that it can outperform state-of-the-art constraint-based, search-based and functional causal model-based methods, according to standard metrics in CSL.

Honesty Is the Best Policy: Defining and Mitigating AI Deception

Deceptive agents are a challenge for the safety, trustworthiness, and cooperation of AI systems. We focus on the problem that agents might deceive in order to achieve their goals (for instance, in our experiments with language models, the goal of being evaluated as truthful). There are a number of existing definitions of deception in the literature on game theory and symbolic AI, but there is no overarching theory of deception for learning agents in games. We introduce a formal definition of deception in structural causal games, grounded in the philosophy literature, and applicable to real-world machine learning systems. Several examples and results illustrate that our formal definition aligns with the philosophical and commonsense meaning of deception. Our main technical result is to provide graphical criteria for deception. We show, experimentally, that these results can be used to mitigate deception in reinforcement learning agents and language models.