CoopEval: Benchmarking Cooperation-Sustaining Mechanisms and LLM Agents in Social Dilemmas

It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings. Indeed, our experiments show that recent models -- with or without reasoning enabled -- consistently defect in single-shot social dilemmas. To tackle this safety concern, we present the first comparative study of game-theoretic mechanisms that are designed to enable cooperative outcomes between rational agents _in equilibrium_. Across four social dilemmas testing distinct components of robust cooperation, we evaluate the following mechanisms: (1) repeating the game for many rounds, (2) reputation systems, (3) third-party mediators to delegate decision making to, and (4) contract agreements for outcome-conditional payments between players. Among our findings, we establish that contracting and mediation are most effective in achieving cooperative outcomes between capable LLM models, and that repetition-induced cooperation deteriorates drastically when co-players vary. Moreover, we demonstrate that these cooperation mechanisms become _more effective_ under evolutionary pressures to maximize individual payoffs.

Evaluating Cooperation in LLM Social Groups through Elected Leadership

Governing common-pool resources requires agents to develop enduring strategies through cooperation and self-governance to avoid collective failure. While foundation models have shown potential for cooperation in these settings, existing multi-agent research provides little insight into whether structured leadership and election mechanisms can improve collective decision making. The lack of such a critical organizational feature ubiquitous in human society presents a significant shortcoming of the current methods. In this work we aim to directly address whether leadership and elections can support improved social welfare and cooperation through multi-agent simulation with LLMs. We present our open-source framework that simulates leadership through elected personas and candidate-driven agendas and carry out an empirical study of LLMs under controlled governance conditions. Our experiments demonstrate that having elected leadership improves social welfare scores by 55.4% and survival time by 128.6% across a range of high performing LLMs. Through the construction of an agent social graph we compute centrality metrics to assess the social influence of leader personas and also analyze rhetorical and cooperative tendencies revealed through a sentiment analysis on leader utterances. This work lays the foundation for further study of election mechanisms in multi-agent systems toward navigating complex social dilemmas.

Democratic or Authoritarian? Probing a New Dimension of Political Biases in Large Language Models

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into everyday life and information ecosystems, concerns about their implicit biases continue to persist. While prior work has primarily examined socio-demographic and left--right political dimensions, little attention has been paid to how LLMs align with broader geopolitical value systems, particularly the democracy--authoritarianism spectrum. In this paper, we propose a novel methodology to assess such alignment, combining (1) the F-scale, a psychometric tool for measuring authoritarian tendencies, (2) FavScore, a newly introduced metric for evaluating model favorability toward world leaders, and (3) role-model probing to assess which figures are cited as general role-models by LLMs. We find that LLMs generally favor democratic values and leaders, but exhibit increases favorability toward authoritarian figures when prompted in Mandarin. Further, models are found to often cite authoritarian figures as role models, even outside explicit political contexts. These results shed light on ways LLMs may reflect and potentially reinforce global political ideologies, highlighting the importance of evaluating bias beyond conventional socio-political axes. Our code is available at: https://github.com/irenestrauss/Democratic-Authoritarian-Bias-LLMs

Are Language Models Consequentialist or Deontological Moral Reasoners?

As AI systems increasingly navigate applications in healthcare, law, and governance, understanding how they handle ethically complex scenarios becomes critical. Previous work has mainly examined the moral judgments in large language models (LLMs), rather than their underlying moral reasoning process. In contrast, we focus on a large-scale analysis of the moral reasoning traces provided by LLMs. Furthermore, unlike prior work that attempted to draw inferences from only a handful of moral dilemmas, our study leverages over 600 distinct trolley problems as probes for revealing the reasoning patterns that emerge within different LLMs. We introduce and test a taxonomy of moral rationales to systematically classify reasoning traces according to two main normative ethical theories: consequentialism and deontology. Our analysis reveals that LLM chains-of-thought tend to favor deontological principles based on moral obligations, while post-hoc explanations shift notably toward consequentialist rationales that emphasize utility. Our framework provides a foundation for understanding how LLMs process and articulate ethical considerations, an important step toward safe and interpretable deployment of LLMs in high-stakes decision-making environments. Our code is available at https://github.com/keenansamway/moral-lens .

When Ethics and Payoffs Diverge: LLM Agents in Morally Charged Social Dilemmas

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled their use in complex agentic roles, involving decision-making with humans or other agents, making ethical alignment a key AI safety concern. While prior work has examined both LLMs' moral judgment and strategic behavior in social dilemmas, there is limited understanding of how they act when moral imperatives directly conflict with rewards or incentives. To investigate this, we introduce Moral Behavior in Social Dilemma Simulation (MoralSim) and evaluate how LLMs behave in the prisoner's dilemma and public goods game with morally charged contexts. In MoralSim, we test a range of frontier models across both game structures and three distinct moral framings, enabling a systematic examination of how LLMs navigate social dilemmas in which ethical norms conflict with payoff-maximizing strategies. Our results show substantial variation across models in both their general tendency to act morally and the consistency of their behavior across game types, the specific moral framing, and situational factors such as opponent behavior and survival risks. Crucially, no model exhibits consistently moral behavior in MoralSim, highlighting the need for caution when deploying LLMs in agentic roles where the agent's "self-interest" may conflict with ethical expectations. Our code is available at https://github.com/sbackmann/moralsim.