For deep neural networks (DNNs) to be used in safety-critical autonomous driving tasks, it is desirable to monitor in operation time if the input for the DNN is similar to the data used in DNN training. While recent results in monitoring DNN activation patterns provide a sound guarantee due to building an abstraction out of the training data set, reducing false positives due to slight input perturbation has been an issue towards successfully adapting the techniques. We address this challenge by integrating formal symbolic reasoning inside the monitor construction process. The algorithm performs a sound worst-case estimate of neuron values with inputs (or features) subject to perturbation, before the abstraction function is applied to build the monitor. The provable robustness is further generalized to cases where monitoring a single neuron can use more than one bit, implying that one can record activation patterns with a fine-grained decision on the neuron value interval.
Deploying deep neural networks (DNNs) as core functions in autonomous driving creates unique verification and validation challenges. In particular, the continuous engineering paradigm of gradually perfecting a DNN-based perception can make the previously established result of safety verification no longer valid. This can occur either due to the newly encountered examples (i.e., input domain enlargement) inside the Operational Design Domain or due to the subsequent parameter fine-tuning activities of a DNN. This paper considers approaches to transfer results established in the previous DNN safety verification problem to the modified problem setting. By considering the reuse of state abstractions, network abstractions, and Lipschitz constants, we develop several sufficient conditions that only require formally analyzing a small part of the DNN in the new problem. The overall concept is evaluated in a $1/10$-scaled vehicle that equips a DNN controller to determine the visual waypoint from the perceived image.
We study how state-of-the-art neural networks for 3D object detection using a single-stage pipeline can be made safety aware. We start with the safety specification (reflecting the capability of other components) that partitions the 3D input space by criticality, where the critical area employs a separate criterion on robustness under perturbation, quality of bounding boxes, and the tolerance over false negatives demonstrated on the training set. In the architecture design, we consider symbolic error propagation to allow feature-level perturbation. Subsequently, we introduce a specialized loss function reflecting (1) the safety specification, (2) the use of single-stage detection architecture, and finally, (3) the characterization of robustness under perturbation. We also replace the commonly seen non-max-suppression post-processing algorithm by a safety-aware non-max-inclusion algorithm, in order to maintain the safety claim created by the neural network. The concept is detailed by extending the state-of-the-art PIXOR detector which creates object bounding boxes in bird's eye view with inputs from point clouds.
We consider the problem of engineering robust direct perception neural networks with output being regression. Such networks take high dimensional input image data, and they produce affordances such as the curvature of the upcoming road segment or the distance to the front vehicle. Our proposal starts by allowing a neural network prediction to deviate from the label with tolerance $\Delta$. The source of tolerance can be either contractual or from limiting factors where two entities may label the same data with slightly different numerical values. The tolerance motivates the use of a non-standard loss function where the loss is set to $0$ so long as the prediction-to-label distance is less than $\Delta$. We further extend the loss function and define a new provably robust criterion that is parametric to the allowed output tolerance $\Delta$, the layer index $\tilde{l}$ where perturbation is considered, and the maximum perturbation amount $\kappa$. During training, the robust loss is computed by first propagating symbolic errors from the $\tilde{l}$-th layer (with quantity bounded by $\kappa$) to the output layer, followed by computing the overflow between the error bounds and the allowed tolerance. The overall concept is experimented in engineering a direct perception neural network for understanding the central position of the ego-lane in pixel coordinates.
We study the problem of safety verification of direct perception neural networks, which take camera images as inputs and produce high-level features for autonomous vehicles to make control decisions. Formal verification of direct perception neural networks is extremely challenging, as it is difficult to formulate the specification that requires characterizing input conditions, while the number of neurons in such a network can reach millions. We approach the specification problem by learning an input property characterizer which carefully extends a direct perception neural network at close-to-output layers, and address the scalability problem by only analyzing networks starting from shared neurons without losing soundness. The presented workflow is used to understand a direct perception neural network (developed by Audi) which computes the next waypoint and orientation for autonomous vehicles to follow.
We provide a summary over architectural approaches that can be used to construct dependable learning-enabled autonomous systems, with a focus on automated driving. We consider three technology pillars for architecting dependable autonomy, namely diverse redundancy, information fusion, and runtime monitoring. For learning-enabled components, we additionally summarize recent architectural approaches to increase the dependability beyond standard convolutional neural networks. We conclude the study with a list of promising research directions addressing the challenges of existing approaches.
nn-dependability-kit is an open-source toolbox to support safety engineering of neural networks. The key functionality of nn-dependability-kit includes (a) novel dependability metrics for indicating sufficient elimination of uncertainties in the product life cycle, (b) formal reasoning engine for ensuring that the generalization does not lead to undesired behaviors, and (c) runtime monitoring for reasoning whether a decision of a neural network in operation time is supported by prior similarities in the training data.
For using neural networks in safety critical domains, it is important to know if a decision made by a neural network is supported by prior similarities in training. We propose runtime neuron activation pattern monitoring - after the standard training process, one creates a monitor by feeding the training data to the network again in order to store the neuron activation patterns in abstract form. In operation, a classification decision over an input is further supplemented by examining if a pattern similar (measured by Hamming distance) to the generated pattern is contained in the monitor. If the monitor does not contain any pattern similar to the generated pattern, it raises a warning that the decision is not based on the training data. Our experiments show that, by adjusting the similarity-threshold for activation patterns, the monitors can report a significant portion of misclassfications to be not supported by training with a small false-positive rate, when evaluated on a test set.