Artificial intelligence can persuade people to take political actions

There is substantial concern about the ability of advanced artificial intelligence to influence people's behaviour. A rapidly growing body of research has found that AI can produce large persuasive effects on people's attitudes, but whether AI can persuade people to take consequential real-world actions has remained unclear. In two large preregistered experiments N=17,950 responses from 14,779 people), we used conversational AI models to persuade participants on a range of attitudinal and behavioural outcomes, including signing real petitions and donating money to charity. We found sizable AI persuasion effects on these behavioural outcomes (e.g. +19.7 percentage points on petition signing). However, we observed no evidence of a correlation between AI persuasion effects on attitudes and behaviour. Moreover, we replicated prior findings that information provision drove effects on attitudes, but found no such evidence for our behavioural outcomes. In a test of eight behavioural persuasion strategies, all outperformed the most effective attitudinal persuasion strategy, but differences among the eight were small. Taken together, these results suggest that previous findings relying on attitudinal outcomes may generalize poorly to behaviour, and therefore risk substantially mischaracterizing the real-world behavioural impact of AI persuasion.

Large Language Models Are More Persuasive Than Incentivized Human Persuaders

We directly compare the persuasion capabilities of a frontier large language model (LLM; Claude Sonnet 3.5) against incentivized human persuaders in an interactive, real-time conversational quiz setting. In this preregistered, large-scale incentivized experiment, participants (quiz takers) completed an online quiz where persuaders (either humans or LLMs) attempted to persuade quiz takers toward correct or incorrect answers. We find that LLM persuaders achieved significantly higher compliance with their directional persuasion attempts than incentivized human persuaders, demonstrating superior persuasive capabilities in both truthful (toward correct answers) and deceptive (toward incorrect answers) contexts. We also find that LLM persuaders significantly increased quiz takers' accuracy, leading to higher earnings, when steering quiz takers toward correct answers, and significantly decreased their accuracy, leading to lower earnings, when steering them toward incorrect answers. Overall, our findings suggest that AI's persuasion capabilities already exceed those of humans that have real-money bonuses tied to performance. Our findings of increasingly capable AI persuaders thus underscore the urgency of emerging alignment and governance frameworks.

Evidence of a log scaling law for political persuasion with large language models

Large language models can now generate political messages as persuasive as those written by humans, raising concerns about how far this persuasiveness may continue to increase with model size. Here, we generate 720 persuasive messages on 10 U.S. political issues from 24 language models spanning several orders of magnitude in size. We then deploy these messages in a large-scale randomized survey experiment (N = 25,982) to estimate the persuasive capability of each model. Our findings are twofold. First, we find evidence of a log scaling law: model persuasiveness is characterized by sharply diminishing returns, such that current frontier models are barely more persuasive than models smaller in size by an order of magnitude or more. Second, mere task completion (coherence, staying on topic) appears to account for larger models' persuasive advantage. These findings suggest that further scaling model size will not much increase the persuasiveness of static LLM-generated messages.