Maximum Entropy Model Correction in Reinforcement Learning

We propose and theoretically analyze an approach for planning with an approximate model in reinforcement learning that can reduce the adverse impact of model error. If the model is accurate enough, it accelerates the convergence to the true value function too. One of its key components is the MaxEnt Model Correction (MoCo) procedure that corrects the model's next-state distributions based on a Maximum Entropy density estimation formulation. Based on MoCo, we introduce the Model Correcting Value Iteration (MoCoVI) algorithm, and its sampled-based variant MoCoDyna. We show that MoCoVI and MoCoDyna's convergence can be much faster than the conventional model-free algorithms. Unlike traditional model-based algorithms, MoCoVI and MoCoDyna effectively utilize an approximate model and still converge to the correct value function.

Operator Splitting Value Iteration

We introduce new planning and reinforcement learning algorithms for discounted MDPs that utilize an approximate model of the environment to accelerate the convergence of the value function. Inspired by the splitting approach in numerical linear algebra, we introduce Operator Splitting Value Iteration (OS-VI) for both Policy Evaluation and Control problems. OS-VI achieves a much faster convergence rate when the model is accurate enough. We also introduce a sample-based version of the algorithm called OS-Dyna. Unlike the traditional Dyna architecture, OS-Dyna still converges to the correct value function in presence of model approximation error.

Reward Poisoning in Reinforcement Learning: Attacks Against Unknown Learners in Unknown Environments

We study black-box reward poisoning attacks against reinforcement learning (RL), in which an adversary aims to manipulate the rewards to mislead a sequence of RL agents with unknown algorithms to learn a nefarious policy in an environment unknown to the adversary a priori. That is, our attack makes minimum assumptions on the prior knowledge of the adversary: it has no initial knowledge of the environment or the learner, and neither does it observe the learner's internal mechanism except for its performed actions. We design a novel black-box attack, U2, that can provably achieve a near-matching performance to the state-of-the-art white-box attack, demonstrating the feasibility of reward poisoning even in the most challenging black-box setting.

Policy Teaching in Reinforcement Learning via Environment Poisoning Attacks

We study a security threat to reinforcement learning where an attacker poisons the learning environment to force the agent into executing a target policy chosen by the attacker. As a victim, we consider RL agents whose objective is to find a policy that maximizes reward in infinite-horizon problem settings. The attacker can manipulate the rewards and the transition dynamics in the learning environment at training-time, and is interested in doing so in a stealthy manner. We propose an optimization framework for finding an optimal stealthy attack for different measures of attack cost. We provide lower/upper bounds on the attack cost, and instantiate our attacks in two settings: (i) an offline setting where the agent is doing planning in the poisoned environment, and (ii) an online setting where the agent is learning a policy with poisoned feedback. Our results show that the attacker can easily succeed in teaching any target policy to the victim under mild conditions and highlight a significant security threat to reinforcement learning agents in practice.

Policy Teaching via Environment Poisoning: Training-time Adversarial Attacks against Reinforcement Learning

We study a security threat to reinforcement learning where an attacker poisons the learning environment to force the agent into executing a target policy chosen by the attacker. As a victim, we consider RL agents whose objective is to find a policy that maximizes average reward in undiscounted infinite-horizon problem settings. The attacker can manipulate the rewards or the transition dynamics in the learning environment at training-time and is interested in doing so in a stealthy manner. We propose an optimization framework for finding an \emph{optimal stealthy attack} for different measures of attack cost. We provide sufficient technical conditions under which the attack is feasible and provide lower/upper bounds on the attack cost. We instantiate our attacks in two settings: (i) an \emph{offline} setting where the agent is doing planning in the poisoned environment, and (ii) an \emph{online} setting where the agent is learning a policy using a regret-minimization framework with poisoned feedback. Our results show that the attacker can easily succeed in teaching any target policy to the victim under mild conditions and highlight a significant security threat to reinforcement learning agents in practice.