The performance of Whisper in low-resource languages is still far from perfect. In addition to a lack of training data on low-resource languages, we identify some limitations in the beam search algorithm used in Whisper. To address these issues, we fine-tune Whisper on additional data and propose an improved decoding algorithm. On the Vietnamese language, fine-tuning Whisper-Tiny with LoRA leads to an improvement of 38.49 in WER over the zero-shot Whisper-Tiny setting which is a further reduction of 1.45 compared to full-parameter fine-tuning. Additionally, by using Filter-Ends and Min Lookahead decoding algorithms, the WER reduces by 2.26 on average over a range of languages compared to standard beam search. These results generalise to larger Whisper model sizes. We also prove a theorem that Min Lookahead outperforms the standard beam search algorithm used in Whisper.
Neural network (NN) trojaning attack is an emerging and important attack model that can broadly damage the system deployed with NN models. Existing studies have explored the outsourced training attack scenario and transfer learning attack scenario in some small datasets for specific domains, with limited numbers of fixed target classes. In this paper, we propose a more powerful trojaning attack method for both outsourced training attack and transfer learning attack, which outperforms existing studies in the capability, generality, and stealthiness. First, The attack is programmable that the malicious misclassification target is not fixed and can be generated on demand even after the victim's deployment. Second, our trojan attack is not limited in a small domain; one trojaned model on a large-scale dataset can affect applications of different domains that reuse its general features. Thirdly, our trojan design is hard to be detected or eliminated even if the victims fine-tune the whole model.