Abstract:LLM agents now perform strongly in software engineering, deep research, GUI automation, and various other applications, while recent agent scaffolds and models are increasingly integrating these capabilities into unified systems. Yet, most evaluations still test these capabilities in isolation, which leaves a gap for more diverse use cases that require agents to combine different capabilities. We introduce CocoaBench, a benchmark for unified digital agents built from human-designed, long-horizon tasks that require flexible composition of vision, search, and coding. Tasks are specified only by an instruction and an automatic evaluation function over the final output, enabling reliable and scalable evaluation across diverse agent infrastructures. We also present CocoaAgent, a lightweight shared scaffold for controlled comparison across model backbones. Experiments show that current agents remain far from reliable on CocoaBench, with the best evaluated system achieving only 45.1% success rate. Our analysis further points to substantial room for improvement in reasoning and planning, tool use and execution, and visual grounding.




Abstract:Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand people's mental variables based on their behavior, is key to developing socially intelligent agents. Current approaches to Theory of Mind reasoning either rely on prompting Large Language Models (LLMs), which are prone to systematic errors, or use rigid, handcrafted Bayesian Theory of Mind (BToM) models, which are more robust but cannot generalize across different domains. In this work, we introduce AutoToM, an automated Bayesian Theory of Mind method for achieving open-ended machine Theory of Mind. AutoToM can operate in any domain, infer any mental variable, and conduct robust Theory of Mind reasoning of any order. Given a Theory of Mind inference problem, AutoToM first proposes an initial BToM model. It then conducts automated Bayesian inverse planning based on the proposed model, leveraging an LLM as the backend. Based on the uncertainty of the inference, it iteratively refines the model, by introducing additional mental variables and/or incorporating more timesteps in the context. Empirical evaluations across multiple Theory of Mind benchmarks demonstrate that AutoToM consistently achieves state-of-the-art performance, offering a scalable, robust, and interpretable approach to machine Theory of Mind.




Abstract:Understanding and attributing mental states, known as Theory of Mind (ToM), emerges as a fundamental capability for human social reasoning. While Large Language Models (LLMs) appear to possess certain ToM abilities, the mechanisms underlying these capabilities remain elusive. In this study, we discover that it is possible to linearly decode the belief status from the perspectives of various agents through neural activations of language models, indicating the existence of internal representations of self and others' beliefs. By manipulating these representations, we observe dramatic changes in the models' ToM performance, underscoring their pivotal role in the social reasoning process. Additionally, our findings extend to diverse social reasoning tasks that involve different causal inference patterns, suggesting the potential generalizability of these representations.