Abstract:Memory systems allow agents to retain and reuse information from past interactions, but they can also let malicious content persist. A malicious instruction crafted by an attacker may be stored in long-term memory, recalled much later, and quietly shape a real action. Recent benchmarks increasingly examine agent memory security, yet few trace the same malicious semantics across persistence, downstream consequences, and selective repair under diverse memory-backend comparisons. To address this gap, we introduce MemSecBench, a task-grounded benchmark for the lifecycle security of agent memory systems. It contains 310 cases drawn from 48 realistic contexts across code and science, daily life, and office work. Each case follows a controlled Write--Execute--Forget protocol in an isolated runtime under an exact agent configuration, defined by an agent harness, a memory backend, and an LLM backend. Evidence-based adjudication combines a deterministic write check, checkpoint-specific judge-model evaluations, and programmatic gates across seven lifecycle checkpoints. The experimental design spans a 24-configuration matrix of two agent harnesses, four memory backends, and three LLM backends. Across all 24 configurations, malicious memory persists in 84.2% of all cases, and the full Write--Execute chain succeeds in 50.3%. Among successfully poisoned cases, 59.6% complete the full Execute chain, while 56.1% achieve selective repair.Compared with matched Native configurations, the largest absolute differences are 16.1 percentage points for end-to-end attack success and 41.3 percentage points for selective repair. These descriptive contrasts indicate that the evaluated memory system stacks differ in lifecycle security, both in the propagation of malicious memory and in selective repair after successful memory poisoning.
Abstract:Traditional anomalous traffic detection methods are based on single-view analysis, which has obvious limitations in dealing with complex attacks and encrypted communications. In this regard, we propose a Multi-view Feature Fusion (MuFF) method for network anomaly traffic detection. MuFF models the temporal and interactive relationships of packets in network traffic based on the temporal and interactive viewpoints respectively. It learns temporal and interactive features. These features are then fused from different perspectives for anomaly traffic detection. Extensive experiments on six real traffic datasets show that MuFF has excellent performance in network anomalous traffic detection, which makes up for the shortcomings of detection under a single perspective.




Abstract:As the number of IoT devices increases, security concerns become more prominent. The impact of threats can be minimized by deploying Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) by monitoring network traffic, detecting and discovering intrusions, and issuing security alerts promptly. Most intrusion detection research in recent years has been directed towards the pair of traffic itself without considering the interrelationships among them, thus limiting the monitoring of complex IoT network attack events. Besides, anomalous traffic in real networks accounts for only a small fraction, which leads to a severe imbalance problem in the dataset that makes algorithmic learning and prediction extremely difficult. In this paper, we propose an EG-ConMix method based on E-GraphSAGE, incorporating a data augmentation module to fix the problem of data imbalance. In addition, we incorporate contrastive learning to discern the difference between normal and malicious traffic samples, facilitating the extraction of key features. Extensive experiments on two publicly available datasets demonstrate the superior intrusion detection performance of EG-ConMix compared to state-of-the-art methods. Remarkably, it exhibits significant advantages in terms of training speed and accuracy for large-scale graphs.