Off-policy evaluation for learning-to-rank via interpolating the item-position model and the position-based model

A critical need for industrial recommender systems is the ability to evaluate recommendation policies offline, before deploying them to production. Unfortunately, widely used off-policy evaluation methods either make strong assumptions about how users behave that can lead to excessive bias, or they make fewer assumptions and suffer from large variance. We tackle this problem by developing a new estimator that mitigates the problems of the two most popular off-policy estimators for rankings, namely the position-based model and the item-position model. In particular, the new estimator, called INTERPOL, addresses the bias of a potentially misspecified position-based model, while providing an adaptable bias-variance trade-off compared to the item-position model. We provide theoretical arguments as well as empirical results that highlight the performance of our novel estimation approach.

Boosted Off-Policy Learning

We investigate boosted ensemble models for off-policy learning from logged bandit feedback. Toward this goal, we propose a new boosting algorithm that directly optimizes an estimate of the policy's expected reward. We analyze this algorithm and prove that the empirical risk decreases (possibly exponentially fast) with each round of boosting, provided a "weak" learning condition is satisfied. We further show how the base learner reduces to standard supervised learning problems. Experiments indicate that our algorithm can outperform deep off-policy learning and methods that simply regress on the observed rewards, thereby demonstrating the benefits of both boosting and choosing the right learning objective.

Fair Ranking as Fair Division: Impact-Based Individual Fairness in Ranking

Rankings have become the primary interface in two-sided online markets. Many have noted that the rankings not only affect the satisfaction of the users (e.g., customers, listeners, employers, travelers), but that the position in the ranking allocates exposure -- and thus economic opportunity -- to the ranked items (e.g., articles, products, songs, job seekers, restaurants, hotels). This has raised questions of fairness to the items, and most existing works have addressed fairness by explicitly linking item exposure to item relevance. However, we argue that any particular choice of such a link function may be difficult to defend, and we show that the resulting rankings can still be unfair. To avoid these shortcomings, we develop a new axiomatic approach that is rooted in principles of fair division. This not only avoids the need to choose a link function, but also more meaningfully quantifies the impact on the items beyond exposure. Our axioms of envy-freeness and dominance over uniform ranking postulate that for a fair ranking policy every item should prefer their own rank allocation over that of any other item, and that no item should be actively disadvantaged by the rankings. To compute ranking policies that are fair according to these axioms, we propose a new ranking objective related to the Nash Social Welfare. We show that the solution has guarantees regarding its envy-freeness, its dominance over uniform rankings for every item, and its Pareto optimality. In contrast, we show that conventional exposure-based fairness can produce large amounts of envy and have a highly disparate impact on the items. Beyond these theoretical results, we illustrate empirically how our framework controls the trade-off between impact-based individual item fairness and user utility.

Fairness in the First Stage of Two-Stage Recommender Systems

Many large-scale recommender systems consist of two stages, where the first stage focuses on efficiently generating a small subset of promising candidates from a huge pool of items for the second-stage model to curate final recommendations from. In this paper, we investigate how to ensure group fairness to the items in this two-stage paradigm. In particular, we find that existing first-stage recommenders might select an irrecoverably unfair set of candidates such that there is no hope for the second-stage recommender to deliver fair recommendations. To this end, we propose two threshold-policy selection rules that, given any relevance model of queries and items and a point-wise lower confidence bound on the expected number of relevant items for each policy, find near-optimal sets of candidates that contain enough relevant items in expectation from each group of items. To instantiate the rules, we demonstrate how to derive such confidence bounds from potentially partial and biased user feedback data, which are abundant in many large-scale recommender systems. In addition, we provide both finite-sample and asymptotic analysis of how close the two threshold selection rules are to the optimal thresholds. Beyond this theoretical analysis, we show empirically that these two rules can consistently select enough relevant items from each group while minimizing the size of the candidate sets for a wide range of settings.

Counterfactual Learning To Rank for Utility-Maximizing Query Autocompletion

Conventional methods for query autocompletion aim to predict which completed query a user will select from a list. A shortcoming of this approach is that users often do not know which query will provide the best retrieval performance on the current information retrieval system, meaning that any query autocompletion methods trained to mimic user behavior can lead to suboptimal query suggestions. To overcome this limitation, we propose a new approach that explicitly optimizes the query suggestions for downstream retrieval performance. We formulate this as a problem of ranking a set of rankings, where each query suggestion is represented by the downstream item ranking it produces. We then present a learning method that ranks query suggestions by the quality of their item rankings. The algorithm is based on a counterfactual learning approach that is able to leverage feedback on the items (e.g., clicks, purchases) to evaluate query suggestions through an unbiased estimator, thus avoiding the assumption that users write or select optimal queries. We establish theoretical support for the proposed approach and provide learning-theoretic guarantees. We also present empirical results on publicly available datasets, and demonstrate real-world applicability using data from an online shopping store.

Off-Policy Evaluation for Large Action Spaces via Embeddings

Off-policy evaluation (OPE) in contextual bandits has seen rapid adoption in real-world systems, since it enables offline evaluation of new policies using only historic log data. Unfortunately, when the number of actions is large, existing OPE estimators -- most of which are based on inverse propensity score weighting -- degrade severely and can suffer from extreme bias and variance. This foils the use of OPE in many applications from recommender systems to language models. To overcome this issue, we propose a new OPE estimator that leverages marginalized importance weights when action embeddings provide structure in the action space. We characterize the bias, variance, and mean squared error of the proposed estimator and analyze the conditions under which the action embedding provides statistical benefits over conventional estimators. In addition to the theoretical analysis, we find that the empirical performance improvement can be substantial, enabling reliable OPE even when existing estimators collapse due to a large number of actions.

Variance-Optimal Augmentation Logging for Counterfactual Evaluation in Contextual Bandits

Methods for offline A/B testing and counterfactual learning are seeing rapid adoption in search and recommender systems, since they allow efficient reuse of existing log data. However, there are fundamental limits to using existing log data alone, since the counterfactual estimators that are commonly used in these methods can have large bias and large variance when the logging policy is very different from the target policy being evaluated. To overcome this limitation, we explore the question of how to design data-gathering policies that most effectively augment an existing dataset of bandit feedback with additional observations for both learning and evaluation. To this effect, this paper introduces Minimum Variance Augmentation Logging (MVAL), a method for constructing logging policies that minimize the variance of the downstream evaluation or learning problem. We explore multiple approaches to computing MVAL policies efficiently, and find that they can be substantially more effective in decreasing the variance of an estimator than na\"ive approaches.

Improving Screening Processes via Calibrated Subset Selection

Many selection processes such as finding patients qualifying for a medical trial or retrieval pipelines in search engines consist of multiple stages, where an initial screening stage focuses the resources on shortlisting the most promising candidates. In this paper, we investigate what guarantees a screening classifier can provide, independently of whether it is constructed manually or trained. We find that current solutions do not enjoy distribution-free theoretical guarantees -- we show that, in general, even for a perfectly calibrated classifier, there always exist specific pools of candidates for which its shortlist is suboptimal. Then, we develop a distribution-free screening algorithm -- called Calibrated Subset Selection (CSS) -- that, given any classifier and some amount of calibration data, finds near-optimal shortlists of candidates that contain a desired number of qualified candidates in expectation. Moreover, we show that a variant of our algorithm that calibrates a given classifier multiple times across specific groups can create shortlists with provable diversity guarantees. Experiments on US Census survey data validate our theoretical results and show that the shortlists provided by our algorithm are superior to those provided by several competitive baselines.

Fairness in Ranking under Uncertainty

Fairness has emerged as an important consideration in algorithmic decision-making. Unfairness occurs when an agent with higher merit obtains a worse outcome than an agent with lower merit. Our central point is that a primary cause of unfairness is uncertainty. A principal or algorithm making decisions never has access to the agents' true merit, and instead uses proxy features that only imperfectly predict merit (e.g., GPA, star ratings, recommendation letters). None of these ever fully capture an agent's merit; yet existing approaches have mostly been defining fairness notions directly based on observed features and outcomes. Our primary point is that it is more principled to acknowledge and model the uncertainty explicitly. The role of observed features is to give rise to a posterior distribution of the agents' merits. We use this viewpoint to define a notion of approximate fairness in ranking. We call an algorithm $\phi$-fair (for $\phi \in [0,1]$) if it has the following property for all agents $x$ and all $k$: if agent $x$ is among the top $k$ agents with respect to merit with probability at least $\rho$ (according to the posterior merit distribution), then the algorithm places the agent among the top $k$ agents in its ranking with probability at least $\phi \rho$. We show how to compute rankings that optimally trade off approximate fairness against utility to the principal. In addition to the theoretical characterization, we present an empirical analysis of the potential impact of the approach in simulation studies. For real-world validation, we applied the approach in the context of a paper recommendation system that we built and fielded at a large conference.