Can Large Language Models Reason and Plan?

While humans sometimes do show the capability of correcting their own erroneous guesses with self-critiquing, there seems to be no basis for that assumption in the case of LLMs.

On the Self-Verification Limitations of Large Language Models on Reasoning and Planning Tasks

There has been considerable divergence of opinion on the reasoning abilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). While the initial optimism that reasoning might emerge automatically with scale has been tempered thanks to a slew of counterexamples--ranging from multiplication to simple planning--there persists a wide spread belief that LLMs can self-critique and improve their own solutions in an iterative fashion. This belief seemingly rests on the assumption that verification of correctness should be easier than generation--a rather classical argument from computational complexity--which should be irrelevant to LLMs to the extent that what they are doing is approximate retrieval. In this paper, we set out to systematically investigate the effectiveness of iterative prompting in the context of reasoning and planning. We present a principled empirical study of the performance of GPT-4 in three domains: Game of 24, Graph Coloring, and STRIPS planning. We experiment both with the model critiquing its own answers and with an external correct reasoner verifying proposed solutions. In each case, we analyze whether the content of criticisms actually affects bottom line performance, and whether we can ablate elements of the augmented system without losing performance. We observe significant performance collapse with self-critique, significant performance gains with sound external verification, but that the content of critique doesn't matter to the performance of the system. In fact, merely re-prompting with a sound verifier maintains most of the benefits of more involved setups.

"Task Success" is not Enough: Investigating the Use of Video-Language Models as Behavior Critics for Catching Undesirable Agent Behaviors

Large-scale generative models are shown to be useful for sampling meaningful candidate solutions, yet they often overlook task constraints and user preferences. Their full power is better harnessed when the models are coupled with external verifiers and the final solutions are derived iteratively or progressively according to the verification feedback. In the context of embodied AI, verification often solely involves assessing whether goal conditions specified in the instructions have been met. Nonetheless, for these agents to be seamlessly integrated into daily life, it is crucial to account for a broader range of constraints and preferences beyond bare task success (e.g., a robot should grasp bread with care to avoid significant deformations). However, given the unbounded scope of robot tasks, it is infeasible to construct scripted verifiers akin to those used for explicit-knowledge tasks like the game of Go and theorem proving. This begs the question: when no sound verifier is available, can we use large vision and language models (VLMs), which are approximately omniscient, as scalable Behavior Critics to catch undesirable robot behaviors in videos? To answer this, we first construct a benchmark that contains diverse cases of goal-reaching yet undesirable robot policies. Then, we comprehensively evaluate VLM critics to gain a deeper understanding of their strengths and failure modes. Based on the evaluation, we provide guidelines on how to effectively utilize VLM critiques and showcase a practical way to integrate the feedback into an iterative process of policy refinement. The dataset and codebase are released at: https://guansuns.github.io/pages/vlm-critic.

LLMs Can't Plan, But Can Help Planning in LLM-Modulo Frameworks

There is considerable confusion about the role of Large Language Models (LLMs) in planning and reasoning tasks. On one side are over-optimistic claims that LLMs can indeed do these tasks with just the right prompting or self-verification strategies. On the other side are perhaps over-pessimistic claims that all that LLMs are good for in planning/reasoning tasks are as mere translators of the problem specification from one syntactic format to another, and ship the problem off to external symbolic solvers. In this position paper, we take the view that both these extremes are misguided. We argue that auto-regressive LLMs cannot, by themselves, do planning or self-verification (which is after all a form of reasoning), and shed some light on the reasons for misunderstandings in the literature. We will also argue that LLMs should be viewed as universal approximate knowledge sources that have much more meaningful roles to play in planning/reasoning tasks beyond simple front-end/back-end format translators. We present a vision of {\bf LLM-Modulo Frameworks} that combine the strengths of LLMs with external model-based verifiers in a tighter bi-directional interaction regime. We will show how the models driving the external verifiers themselves can be acquired with the help of LLMs. We will also argue that rather than simply pipelining LLMs and symbolic components, this LLM-Modulo Framework provides a better neuro-symbolic approach that offers tighter integration between LLMs and symbolic components, and allows extending the scope of model-based planning/reasoning regimes towards more flexible knowledge, problem and preference specifications.

Theory of Mind abilities of Large Language Models in Human-Robot Interaction : An Illusion?

Large Language Models have shown exceptional generative abilities in various natural language and generation tasks. However, possible anthropomorphization and leniency towards failure cases have propelled discussions on emergent abilities of Large Language Models especially on Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities in Large Language Models. While several false-belief tests exists to verify the ability to infer and maintain mental models of another entity, we study a special application of ToM abilities that has higher stakes and possibly irreversible consequences : Human Robot Interaction. In this work, we explore the task of Perceived Behavior Recognition, where a robot employs a Large Language Model (LLM) to assess the robot's generated behavior in a manner similar to human observer. We focus on four behavior types, namely - explicable, legible, predictable, and obfuscatory behavior which have been extensively used to synthesize interpretable robot behaviors. The LLMs goal is, therefore to be a human proxy to the agent, and to answer how a certain agent behavior would be perceived by the human in the loop, for example "Given a robot's behavior X, would the human observer find it explicable?". We conduct a human subject study to verify that the users are able to correctly answer such a question in the curated situations (robot setting and plan) across five domains. A first analysis of the belief test yields extremely positive results inflating ones expectations of LLMs possessing ToM abilities. We then propose and perform a suite of perturbation tests which breaks this illusion, i.e. Inconsistent Belief, Uninformative Context and Conviction Test. We conclude that, the high score of LLMs on vanilla prompts showcases its potential use in HRI settings, however to possess ToM demands invariance to trivial or irrelevant perturbations in the context which LLMs lack.

Benchmarking Multi-Agent Preference-based Reinforcement Learning for Human-AI Teaming

Preference-based Reinforcement Learning (PbRL) is an active area of research, and has made significant strides in single-agent actor and in observer human-in-the-loop scenarios. However, its application within the co-operative multi-agent RL frameworks, where humans actively participate and express preferences for agent behavior, remains largely uncharted. We consider a two-agent (Human-AI) cooperative setup where both the agents are rewarded according to human's reward function for the team. However, the agent does not have access to it, and instead, utilizes preference-based queries to elicit its objectives and human's preferences for the robot in the human-robot team. We introduce the notion of Human-Flexibility, i.e. whether the human partner is amenable to multiple team strategies, with a special case being Specified Orchestration where the human has a single team policy in mind (most constrained case). We propose a suite of domains to study PbRL for Human-AI cooperative setup which explicitly require forced cooperation. Adapting state-of-the-art single-agent PbRL algorithms to our two-agent setting, we conduct a comprehensive benchmarking study across our domain suite. Our findings highlight the challenges associated with high degree of Human-Flexibility and the limited access to the human's envisioned policy in PbRL for Human-AI cooperation. Notably, we observe that PbRL algorithms exhibit effective performance exclusively in the case of Specified Orchestration which can be seen as an upper bound PbRL performance for future research.

GPT-4 Doesn't Know It's Wrong: An Analysis of Iterative Prompting for Reasoning Problems

There has been considerable divergence of opinion on the reasoning abilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). While the initial optimism that reasoning might emerge automatically with scale has been tempered thanks to a slew of counterexamples, a wide spread belief in their iterative self-critique capabilities persists. In this paper, we set out to systematically investigate the effectiveness of iterative prompting of LLMs in the context of Graph Coloring, a canonical NP-complete reasoning problem that is related to propositional satisfiability as well as practical problems like scheduling and allocation. We present a principled empirical study of the performance of GPT4 in solving graph coloring instances or verifying the correctness of candidate colorings. In iterative modes, we experiment with the model critiquing its own answers and an external correct reasoner verifying proposed solutions. In both cases, we analyze whether the content of the criticisms actually affects bottom line performance. The study seems to indicate that (i) LLMs are bad at solving graph coloring instances (ii) they are no better at verifying a solution--and thus are not effective in iterative modes with LLMs critiquing LLM-generated solutions (iii) the correctness and content of the criticisms--whether by LLMs or external solvers--seems largely irrelevant to the performance of iterative prompting. We show that the observed increase in effectiveness is largely due to the correct solution being fortuitously present in the top-k completions of the prompt (and being recognized as such by an external verifier). Our results thus call into question claims about the self-critiquing capabilities of state of the art LLMs.

Can Large Language Models Really Improve by Self-critiquing Their Own Plans?

There have been widespread claims about Large Language Models (LLMs) being able to successfully verify or self-critique their candidate solutions in reasoning problems in an iterative mode. Intrigued by those claims, in this paper we set out to investigate the verification/self-critiquing abilities of large language models in the context of planning. We evaluate a planning system that employs LLMs for both plan generation and verification. We assess the verifier LLM's performance against ground-truth verification, the impact of self-critiquing on plan generation, and the influence of varying feedback levels on system performance. Using GPT-4, a state-of-the-art LLM, for both generation and verification, our findings reveal that self-critiquing appears to diminish plan generation performance, especially when compared to systems with external, sound verifiers and the LLM verifiers in that system produce a notable number of false positives, compromising the system's reliability. Additionally, the nature of feedback, whether binary or detailed, showed minimal impact on plan generation. Collectively, our results cast doubt on the effectiveness of LLMs in a self-critiquing, iterative framework for planning tasks.

Learning and Leveraging Verifiers to Improve Planning Capabilities of Pre-trained Language Models

There have been wide spread claims in the literature about the emergent reasoning capabilities of Pretrained Large Language Models. However, recent studies, have found that their ability to plan remains questionable. Through our experiments using GPT-2, we empirically demonstrate that the performance of a finetuned baseline remains poor because it violates pre-conditions of actions in the plans that it generates. To improve the planning capabilities of a finetuned LLM, we train a verifier, which can classify actions as being valid or invalid in a particular state. By randomly sampling actions from the same dataset, we generate examples of invalid actions which are then used to train a verifier which can check for action applicability. In the presence of diverse sampling from a generator and a verifier which can prune invalid trajectories, we show significant gains in the success rate on the Blocksworld domain. Additionally, we show that finetuning the GPT-2 generator itself to create the verifier generalizes better than finetuning the base GPT-2. Lastly, we investigate the role of the sampling temperature which can be used to control the exploration-exploitation tradeoff.