There has been considerable divergence of opinion on the reasoning abilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). While the initial optimism that reasoning might emerge automatically with scale has been tempered thanks to a slew of counterexamples--ranging from multiplication to simple planning--there persists a wide spread belief that LLMs can self-critique and improve their own solutions in an iterative fashion. This belief seemingly rests on the assumption that verification of correctness should be easier than generation--a rather classical argument from computational complexity--which should be irrelevant to LLMs to the extent that what they are doing is approximate retrieval. In this paper, we set out to systematically investigate the effectiveness of iterative prompting in the context of reasoning and planning. We present a principled empirical study of the performance of GPT-4 in three domains: Game of 24, Graph Coloring, and STRIPS planning. We experiment both with the model critiquing its own answers and with an external correct reasoner verifying proposed solutions. In each case, we analyze whether the content of criticisms actually affects bottom line performance, and whether we can ablate elements of the augmented system without losing performance. We observe significant performance collapse with self-critique, significant performance gains with sound external verification, but that the content of critique doesn't matter to the performance of the system. In fact, merely re-prompting with a sound verifier maintains most of the benefits of more involved setups.
There is considerable confusion about the role of Large Language Models (LLMs) in planning and reasoning tasks. On one side are over-optimistic claims that LLMs can indeed do these tasks with just the right prompting or self-verification strategies. On the other side are perhaps over-pessimistic claims that all that LLMs are good for in planning/reasoning tasks are as mere translators of the problem specification from one syntactic format to another, and ship the problem off to external symbolic solvers. In this position paper, we take the view that both these extremes are misguided. We argue that auto-regressive LLMs cannot, by themselves, do planning or self-verification (which is after all a form of reasoning), and shed some light on the reasons for misunderstandings in the literature. We will also argue that LLMs should be viewed as universal approximate knowledge sources that have much more meaningful roles to play in planning/reasoning tasks beyond simple front-end/back-end format translators. We present a vision of {\bf LLM-Modulo Frameworks} that combine the strengths of LLMs with external model-based verifiers in a tighter bi-directional interaction regime. We will show how the models driving the external verifiers themselves can be acquired with the help of LLMs. We will also argue that rather than simply pipelining LLMs and symbolic components, this LLM-Modulo Framework provides a better neuro-symbolic approach that offers tighter integration between LLMs and symbolic components, and allows extending the scope of model-based planning/reasoning regimes towards more flexible knowledge, problem and preference specifications.
There have been widespread claims about Large Language Models (LLMs) being able to successfully verify or self-critique their candidate solutions in reasoning problems in an iterative mode. Intrigued by those claims, in this paper we set out to investigate the verification/self-critiquing abilities of large language models in the context of planning. We evaluate a planning system that employs LLMs for both plan generation and verification. We assess the verifier LLM's performance against ground-truth verification, the impact of self-critiquing on plan generation, and the influence of varying feedback levels on system performance. Using GPT-4, a state-of-the-art LLM, for both generation and verification, our findings reveal that self-critiquing appears to diminish plan generation performance, especially when compared to systems with external, sound verifiers and the LLM verifiers in that system produce a notable number of false positives, compromising the system's reliability. Additionally, the nature of feedback, whether binary or detailed, showed minimal impact on plan generation. Collectively, our results cast doubt on the effectiveness of LLMs in a self-critiquing, iterative framework for planning tasks.
Intrigued by the claims of emergent reasoning capabilities in LLMs trained on general web corpora, in this paper, we set out to investigate their planning capabilities. We aim to evaluate (1) the effectiveness of LLMs in generating plans autonomously in commonsense planning tasks and (2) the potential of LLMs as a source of heuristic guidance for other agents (AI planners) in their planning tasks. We conduct a systematic study by generating a suite of instances on domains similar to the ones employed in the International Planning Competition and evaluate LLMs in two distinct modes: autonomous and heuristic. Our findings reveal that LLMs' ability to generate executable plans autonomously is rather limited, with the best model (GPT-4) having an average success rate of ~12% across the domains. However, the results in the heuristic mode show more promise. In the heuristic mode, we demonstrate that LLM-generated plans can improve the search process for underlying sound planners and additionally show that external verifiers can help provide feedback on the generated plans and back-prompt the LLM for better plan generation.
There is a growing interest in applying pre-trained large language models (LLMs) to planning problems. However, methods that use LLMs directly as planners are currently impractical due to several factors, including limited correctness of plans, strong reliance on feedback from interactions with simulators or even the actual environment, and the inefficiency in utilizing human feedback. In this work, we introduce a novel alternative paradigm that constructs an explicit world (domain) model in planning domain definition language (PDDL) and then uses it to plan with sound domain-independent planners. To address the fact that LLMs may not generate a fully functional PDDL model initially, we employ LLMs as an interface between PDDL and sources of corrective feedback, such as PDDL validators and humans. For users who lack a background in PDDL, we show that LLMs can translate PDDL into natural language and effectively encode corrective feedback back to the underlying domain model. Our framework not only enjoys the correctness guarantee offered by the external planners but also reduces human involvement by allowing users to correct domain models at the beginning, rather than inspecting and correcting (through interactive prompting) every generated plan as in previous work. On two IPC domains and a Household domain that is more complicated than commonly used benchmarks such as ALFWorld, we demonstrate that GPT-4 can be leveraged to produce high-quality PDDL models for over 40 actions, and the corrected PDDL models are then used to successfully solve 48 challenging planning tasks. Resources including the source code will be released at: https://guansuns.github.io/pages/llm-dm.
Intrigued by the claims of emergent reasoning capabilities in LLMs trained on general web corpora, in this paper, we set out to investigate their planning capabilities. We aim to evaluate (1) how good LLMs are by themselves in generating and validating simple plans in commonsense planning tasks (of the type that humans are generally quite good at) and (2) how good LLMs are in being a source of heuristic guidance for other agents--either AI planners or human planners--in their planning tasks. To investigate these questions in a systematic rather than anecdotal manner, we start by developing a benchmark suite based on the kinds of domains employed in the International Planning Competition. On this benchmark, we evaluate LLMs in three modes: autonomous, heuristic and human-in-the-loop. Our results show that LLM's ability to autonomously generate executable plans is quite meager, averaging only about 3% success rate. The heuristic and human-in-the-loop modes show slightly more promise. In addition to these results, we also make our benchmark and evaluation tools available to support investigations by research community.
Generating complex behaviors that satisfy the preferences of non-expert users is a crucial requirement on AI agents. Interactive reward learning from trajectory comparisons is one way to allow non-expert users to convey complex objectives by expressing preferences over short clips of agent behaviors. Even though this parametric method can encode complex tacit knowledge present in the underlying tasks, it implicitly assumes that the human is unable to provide richer feedback than binary preference labels, leading to intolerably high feedback complexity and poor user experience. While providing a detailed symbolic closed-form specification of the objectives might be tempting, it is not always feasible even for an expert user. However, in most cases, humans are aware of how the agent should change its behavior along meaningful axes to fulfill their underlying purpose, even if they are not able to fully specify task objectives symbolically. Using this as motivation, we introduce the notion of Relative Behavioral Attributes, which allows the users to tweak the agent behavior through symbolic concepts (e.g., increasing the softness or speed of agents' movement). We propose two practical methods that can learn to model any kind of behavioral attributes from ordered behavior clips. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods on four tasks with nine different behavioral attributes, showing that once the attributes are learned, end users can produce desirable agent behaviors relatively effortlessly, by providing feedback just around ten times. This is over an order of magnitude less than that required by the popular learning-from-human-preferences baselines.
The recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have transformed the field of natural language processing (NLP). From GPT-3 to PaLM, the state-of-the-art performance on natural language tasks is being pushed forward with every new large language model. Along with natural language abilities, there has been a significant interest in understanding whether such models, trained on enormous amounts of data, exhibit reasoning capabilities. Hence there has been interest in developing benchmarks for various reasoning tasks and the preliminary results from testing LLMs over such benchmarks seem mostly positive. However, the current benchmarks are relatively simplistic and the performance over these benchmarks cannot be used as an evidence to support, many a times outlandish, claims being made about LLMs' reasoning capabilities. As of right now, these benchmarks only represent a very limited set of simple reasoning tasks and we need to look at more sophisticated reasoning problems if we are to measure the true limits of such LLM-based systems. With this motivation, we propose an extensible assessment framework to test the abilities of LLMs on a central aspect of human intelligence, which is reasoning about actions and change. We provide multiple test cases that are more involved than any of the previously established reasoning benchmarks and each test case evaluates a certain aspect of reasoning about actions and change. Initial evaluation results on the base version of GPT-3 (Davinci), showcase subpar performance on these benchmarks.
Empowering decision support systems with automated planning has received significant recognition in the planning community. The central idea for such systems is to augment the capabilities of the human-in-the-loop with automated planning techniques and provide timely support to enhance the decision-making experience. In addition to this, an effective decision support system must be able to provide intuitive explanations based on specific queries on proposed decisions to its end users. This makes decision-support systems an ideal test-bed to study the effectiveness of various XAIP techniques being developed in the community. To this end, we present our decision support system RADAR-X that extends RADAR (Grover et al. 2020) by allowing the user to participate in an interactive explanatory dialogue with the system. Specifically, we allow the user to ask for contrastive explanations, wherein the user can try to understand why a specific plan was chosen over an alternative (referred to as the foil). Furthermore, we use the foil raised as evidence for unspecified user preferences and use it to further refine plan suggestions.